
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The quarterly magazine of the Fabian Society

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
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
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#### **FABIAN REVIEW**

Volume 125—No. 1

#### Leader

Andrew Harrop 2 New paths, new possibilities

#### **Shortcuts**

*Katrine Kielos* 3 The shades of Europe

*Kayte Lawton & Matthew Pennycook* **3** Keep the living wage alive

Emily Robinson 4 Who'd want to be a progressive?

Natan Doron 5 Silence is not an option

Ann McKechin 6 Beyond the boardroom

Jim McMahon & Catherine West 7 The only way is local

#### **Feature**

Patrick Diamond 8 An era of less

Kirsty McNeill 11 Sorry seems to be the easiest word

#### **Feature**

Sarah Mulley 12 Widening the conversation, not

changing the subject

#### **Essay**

Stuart White & Martin O'Neill 14 That was the New Labour that wasn't

#### **Feature**

*Andrew Harrop* **18** Pushing the envelope

#### **Policy Pitch**

Jen Lexmond 21 Character matters

#### **Interview**

Mary Riddell 22 All in

#### **Books**

*Rob Tinker* **25** The bang! And the crash! And then what?

**26** Fabian Society section



#### FABIAN REVIEW

Fabian Review is the quarterly journal of the Fabian Society. Like all publications of the Fabian Society, it represents not the collective view of the Society, but only the views of the individual writers. The responsibility of the Society is limited to approving its publications as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement.

Editor, Ed Wallis

Cover illustration © Kenn Goodall / bykenn.com Printed by DG3, London E14 9TE Designed by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk

sesigned by souppox, www.souppox.

ISSN 1356 1812 review@fabian-society.org.uk

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## New paths, new possibilities

Labour's emerging electoral coalition presents the party with an opportunity it has not had in a generation—*Andrew Harrop* 

YEAR HAS PASSED since Fabian research first revealed that – at a time when it has enough support to win a majority – Labour's post-2010 'converts' are just as left-leaning as people who backed the party in 2010. This upending of the stereotype of 'core votes' and 'swing votes' is explained by the composition of Labour's new arrivals: for every one ex-Conservative, there are roughly three former Liberal Democrats and two people who didn't vote at all in 2010 now saying they will back Labour at the next election.

To win in 2015, the party will need supporters from each of these three groups and the party's main objective must now be to seal the deal with everyone who says they would vote Labour today. For how many voters who are still sticking with David Cameron, while the economy's at rock bottom, are really going to change their mind in two years' time? This may mean being resigned to Labour's ongoing difficulty in breaking through to most 2010 Conservatives, only a quarter of whom would even consider changing sides. But this reflects the polarisation of politics, with more people than before firmly in one of two camps: the centre right of the Conservatives and UKIP; or the larger centre left of Labour and the Liberal Democrats (whose voters' views are barely distinguishable).

Suggesting that there could be a firm upper limit on Labour's potential support is sometimes confused with complacency by those who are used to chasing every Tory vote. It's nothing of the sort because it makes it even more important to secure the votes of every possible sympathiser. Although most Labour supporters say their minds are made up, the party's lead could evaporate if it turns out that many in the 'non-voter' group are indeed non-voters, while a strong Lib Dem revival, however unlikely that may seem, is also cause for alarm. Labour will need to wage the best grassroots campaign in its history if it's going

to find and enthuse the people who are Labour-inclined today.

While local campaigners should carefully differentiate between each sort of voter, there's a danger in worrying too much about tailoring Labour's national appeal to these different groups. The reason Labour hasn't won more supporters from among 2010 Conservatives is not because of the party's turn to the left, which is in line with the public's hardening views on economic elites. It's because too many people do not trust Labour on the economy and see David Cameron as the stronger leader. These concerns are not just the preserve of 2010 Conservative voters and resolving them is quite compatible with a radical, optimistic alternative on economic reform and public service.

Labour's other task is to respond to deep social anxieties, which are shared, again, by many in each of the three pools of 'converts', as well as 2010 Labour voters. This is where the party faces the greatest challenge, since Labour's values combine a commitment to social stewardship and stability with a liberalism that many of its supporters hold very dear. The party must not be sucked into an arms race for the votes of people who will never support it, pushing the terms of debate to the right. Rather, it must find ways to reassure and respond to centre-ground opinion, which means talking about immigration but not fanning the flames of ungrounded hysteria.

Labour's emerging electoral coalition presents the party with an opportunity it has not had in a generation: to argue for left-leaning politics, when there are enough people willing to listen to win an election. So long as the party has the courage to set out big ideas, recapture the art of speaking human, and show that the sums add up, Labour has every chance of not only winning the next election but also of shifting the battleground of British politics.

## **Shortcuts**



#### THE SHADES OF EUROPE

If one nation Labour can build a strong alliance with the Nordic countries, it could help make the positive case for the EU

—Katrine Kielos

"Britain is one of the world's most civilised countries with one of the most uncivilised debates about the European Union", the Finnish minister Alexander Stubb has said. In Britain, 'Europe' tends to be viewed as a single monolithic entity, dominated by French-style statism, generous welfare states and heavily regulated labour markets.

To the right this seems like hell, to the left it has at times seemed like something to aspire to. But the truth is that there is no such thing as a European social model.

The continental countries – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg –rely extensively on insurance-based benefits and old-age pensions. The Mediterranean states – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – have welfare systems that typically draw on employment protection and early retirement provisions. The Nordic countries are characterised by universal welfare provision, a commitment to free trade and big investments in early childhood. Then there are the new member states which can hardly be fitted into any of these categories.

There are many shades of Europe. Ed Miliband's recent tour of Scandinavia shows that he sees the north European countries as the UK's best allies. The Labour leader started his tour in Copenhagen, where he met the Social Democrat Danish prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt (a woman familiar with the British Labour party: she is married to Neil Kinnock's son Stephen Kinnock) before he flew to Sweden and the Netherlands.

The Nordic and Baltic countries are important trade partners for the British economy: at £54bn a year, this is equivalent to UK trade with China. Unlike what many eurosceptics

within the British Conservative party seem to believe, geography still matters in the global world. We are not free-floating hubs just connected through the clouds.

But it's not just Labour who see the value of Britain's alliances in the north. One of David Cameron's more visionary foreign policy moves has been the creation of the Nordic-Baltic summit. As the British prime minister said in Stockholm in 2011,"right across the north of Europe there stretches an alliance of common interests". Cameron stated that Britain, Scandinavia and the Baltic nations could lead in European growth and prosperity. His own government hasn't exactly been the poster child for growth, but this didn't seem to matter. Cameron was right. There is an alliance of common interest and it could prove important.

The Nordic-Baltic summit was however set up before David Cameron was taken hostage by the eurosceptics in his party and the reaction to his EU speech promising a British referendum was very harsh in the north. His very good friend, Swedish centreright prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt was also very disappointed when the Tories left the centre-right grouping in the European parliament.

The prospect of Britain leaving the EU is terrifying to the Nordics. In the British debate, this perspective is often lost. The fact is that there is a Europe out there which is not just doing very well in terms of its economy but which is looking to Britain for leadership. The UK is seen as the guarantee for the kind of Europe the Nordic states want. A liberal Europe, a Europe that projects global power, a Europe with fewer subsidised French cows and more innovation and growth. Not to mention that if Britain leaves or loses influence, the balance of power would shift decisively in the direction of Germany and France. This wouldn't be good for smaller member states.

Ed Miliband stated that one of the purposes of his Nordic trip was to discuss how the centre left can drive forward a reform agenda for Europe. The Nordic alliance that Cameron has been forming would indeed be very natural for Ed Miliband to hijack. If one nation Labour can realise that there are many Europes and build a strong alliance with the Nordics, it could really matter. If Labour can make its case for Europe from this starting point, it could matter even more.

David Cameron hasn't been able to stop his party from "banging on about Europe". Ed Miliband needs to provide a vision of a one nation Britain that has not only stopped banging on about it but started leading it. Those things are connected.

The debate needs to shift from what Britain gains or doesn't gain from the EU and this can only happen by providing a positive vision of British European leadership. Paradoxically, that leadership might start in Scandinavia.

Katrine Kielos is a Swedish writer living in London. She is a columnist for Aftonbladet and author of The Only Sex – Why You're Seduced by Economic Man and How it Destroys Your Life and the World Economy





#### KEEP THE LIVING WAGE ALIVE

The living wage is about the movement, not just the money. *Kayte Lawton* and *Matthew Pennycook* urge policymakers to keep it a campaign and resist the urge to legislate

More needs to be done to raise the living standards of Britain's five million low-paid workers. Yet so far, rather than addressing the problem of low pay directly, policy responses – whether it is Labour's pledge to reintroduce a 10p tax rate or the coalition's flagship policy of raising the personal allowance – have centred on using the tax system to compensate those who are struggling.

It is not hard to understand why. Despite their cost, lowering taxes is easily understood by a sceptical public and has an immediate impact. But, just as with tax credits, a strategy of reducing taxes for low earners is not, by itself, sufficient. Tax reform needs to be supplemented by ambitious efforts to raise productivity and boost wages if

>> the underlying problems of our low-wage economy are to be addressed.

The living wage (currently £8.55 in London and £7.45 elsewhere) has already secured its place in any future agenda to tackle Britain's endemic levels of low-paid work. Yet precisely what form this will take remains open to debate. Those who have organised and fought for living wages over many years (including the community activists that first revived the notion of living wages in London's East End a decade ago) remain wedded to a voluntary approach seeing a role for government but one that complements rather than erodes the campaign's civic roots. Others believe government should simply legislate to make the living wage the legal minimum in the belief it will eradicate poverty pay at a stroke.

Government certainly has a role to play in advancing the living wage, as an employer, a procurer of billions of pounds of services and by putting measures in place that support campaigners. But there are sound reasons to think that the government should not legislate for a national living wage.

First, as our recent report Beyond the Bottom Line made clear, the employment effects of raising the minimum wage to the level of the living wage are uncertain and could be large. Our estimates suggest that if a mandatory living wage were introduced across the private sector overall, employer demand for workers would drop by around 160,000. Furthermore, there would be demand for 300,000 fewer young people with intermediate or no qualifications because many employers would want to substitute older, more experienced, workers for younger ones if the wage floor was higher. Labour demand isn't a predictor of actual jobs losses, because employers can often find ways to raise productivity in response to a higher wage floor. Similar analysis would have predicted a fall in labour demand following the introduction of the minimum wage but there is no evidence that the minimum wage has been associated with job losses. Nevertheless, this analysis should serve as a caution for those calling for the imposition of a statutory living wage in a weak labour market, particularly given its potential impact on the young and low-skilled.

Second, if adopted by government the living wage would inevitably change. Recommendations about the minimum wage are made by the Low Pay Commission (LPC) and are the product of negotiation between employers, unions and experts. The minimum wage rate that emerges each October is therefore a compromise between boosting the wages of the lowest-paid workers

and what low-wage employers can afford without shedding large numbers of jobs. What's unique about living wage rates is that they are set by academics purely on the basis of calculations about standards of living and prices, and take no account of the health of the labour market or the wider economy. Calculating a living wage through a consensual process like that used to set the minimum wage would fundamentally alter the character of the living wage by introducing employment considerations into the process. Such a process may produce a state-backed 'living wage' but one that is likely to be lower than at present and not recognised by civil society organisations fighting for a living wage.

A strong wage floor is vital but we should also work to tackle the wider inequalities in our labour market, which may require more radical solutions

Third, living wage campaigns are about more than wages. At their best they empower low-paid workers in sectors and occupations largely untouched by traditional union structures, shifting power and resources to those who typically lack both. This is one reason that Citizens UK and other longstanding living wage activists remain opposed to the introduction of a statutory living wage.

We should also remember that ensuring everyone is paid at least a living wage would not, by itself, solve our living standards crisis. No single wage rate can guarantee a decent standard of living for all family types, which is why both living wages rates are premised on a full take-up of tax credits and other in-work benefits. A strong wage floor is vital but we should also work to tackle the wider inequalities in our labour market, which may require more radical solutions.

The living wage is a rare success and it is clear that government needs to do far more to advance coverage across the country. But this does not mean simply pulling levers from Whitehall – as appealing as that quick fix may seem to those who desire a reduction in low pay. Instead, governments at local and national level must think creatively about the role of the living wage as part of a wider and more ambitious agenda to tackle low pay and weak wage growth in Britain.

Kayte Lawton is Senior Research Fellow at IPPR. Matthew Pennycook is Senior Policy Analyst at the Resolution Foundation



## WHO'D WANT TO BE A PROGRESSIVE?

Arguments over the 'progressive' label continue both between and within political parties, while voters are confused as to what it all means anyway—*Emily Robinson* 

Over the past couple of years, the word 'progressive' has been the subject of some contestation.

On the one hand, it has been claimed by the centre right; first, in David Cameron's assertions that"Conservative means are the best way to achieve progressive aims", and more recently in declarations of the 'progressive partnership' between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

On the other, the concept of progressive politics has been questioned by some on the left. Maurice Glasman argued in 2011 that the 'progressive', intellectual, Fabian tradition within Labour had eclipsed the more traditional values of organised labour – to the detriment of the movement. These ideas have become more mainstream since Jon Cruddas became Labour's policy co-ordinator. His speech to the Resolution Foundation this February picked out Labour's 'progressive tradition' as one of the causes of its aloofness from the concerns of the very people it is supposed to represent.

Cruddas's comments point to a key ambiguity in the term'progressive'. While we tend to associate it with a centre-left (or even broad-left) political tradition, its most obvious meaning is simply one of forward movement. The direction of travel is not specified and may turn out to be very far indeed from what self-described'progressives' might condone. Indeed, as Cruddas suggests, the entire notion of progress tends to overlook the plight of those least able to adapt and keep up. This is why it has been seen as cold and elitist, an intellectual quest for reform, which fails to take account of the human desire for stability and rootedness. Despite this, 'progressive' remains common currency on the left - a catch-all term, which has vague connotations of social justice and allows us to divide the world into "left and right, Labour and Tory, progressive and conservative", as

Gordon Brown put it in his 2010 Fabian Society pamphlet *Why the Right is Wrong*. Even Cameron's Conservatives were using the idea of 'progressive Conservatism' to indicate their supposed acceptance of some core social democratic values.

However, this shared understanding doesn't seem to travel very far beyond Westminster. When respondents to a 2012 YouGov survey were asked to define the term'progressive' in their own words, overwhelming numbers (37 per cent) simply didn't know (or weren't prepared to say) what it meant. The rest tended to stay clear of politics – even though this had specifically been mentioned in the question. Forward movement, change and novelty were the key associations, making up 18 per cent of all responses, followed by a non-specific notion of improvement' (13 per cent).

Despite the overriding political association between progressivism and Lib-Lab politics, just 0.6 per cent (10 in 1,651) of respondents mentioned liberal politics (two in a negative context: "wishy-washy liberal politics" and "too liberal. anything goes policies, espcially [sic] for minority groups"). The link with social justice and left politics was stronger, but still only 4 per cent of the answers could be categorised in this way – barely more than the 3 per cent who gave cynical answers such as: "Progressing their career" or "progressive to me means it dont [sic] matter how much the government will take off you it will allways [sic] progress to more and more". While 'progressive' has very particular associations for the party faithful, it seems clear that it has little political resonance beyond that.

Despite this, a clear majority (57 per cent) of survey respondents thought that being progressive was a 'good thing' – even though 23 per cent of these respondents also said they didn't know what the word meant. A plurality (41 per cent) were even prepared to describe themselves as progressive.

Given the general level of uncertainty over the meaning of the word, these are striking numbers. While they do nothing to disprove the suspicion that 'progressive' is a weasel word, disguising as much as it explains, they do indicate that forward movement and progress are not in themselves such elitist and alarming concepts as Cruddas fears. The key question, of course, remains: progress towards what?

Emily Robinson is an Advance Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Nottingham. Her first book, History, Heritage and Tradition in Contemporary British Politics was published in 2012. She is now working on a history of public and political uses of the word 'progressive'



#### SILENCE IS NOT AN OPTION

Labour might not like what it hears if it listens to the public on housing benefit. But it's the only way to start a new conversation—*Natan Doron* 

Protecting social security is central to many of the values dear to the Labour party: poverty prevention and alleviation; collective insurance against bad luck; providing support for young, elderly and disabled people. But the public politics of social security have grown increasingly toxic. This has left Labour often unsure about what to say and how to talk about this issue to an ever more hostile public.

One thing is clear though: silence is not an option. Simply saying nothing leaves the territory clear for the right to frame the social security debate around the language of the 'scrounger'. It also makes Labour seem evasive and remote from people's true concerns.

New research the Fabians have been working on with the charity Crisis offers some clues on how the left can talk authentically about social security. We explored what the public thinks about perhaps the most emotionally charged area: housing benefit.

The first thing that Labour must do is to listen to the public. This will mean hearing

things that they might be uncomfortable about. People will voice concern that our social security system makes it too easy for some people to give up working and live at the expense of the state. Some will express a concern that too many people are coming from abroad to claim support from the taxpayers in this country.

Listening to these concerns, however hard that is, will ultimately be the easy part though. The next thing that Labour must do is understand where these concerns come from. Much of the negativity informing attitudes to those claiming state support is founded on the view that many people choose to be poor. To a large extent, such a view will have been legitimated and reinforced by almost constant tabloid media and Conservative party attacks on the integrity of claimants. While the debate remains focused only on the choices of individuals, any attempts to generate alternative narratives will largely be constrained.

The challenge for Labour is to resist the temptation to bombard the public with facts and to instead tell new stories that can tap into different emotions

Another important thing that Labour must understand is that facts in and of themselves will not change hearts and minds. We saw instances in our research of people simply ignoring facts that challenged their views on social security. One woman, when presented with the statistic that only 13 per cent of those claiming housing benefit were born outside of the UK, said that whilst she knew she was being 'prejudiced' she had to >>



>> be honest. Being honest in this case meant being concerned that too many people from abroad were claiming housing benefit.

Where facts don't do much to change views, stories and emotions do. The problem for Labour is that in the debate about social security, the most predominant emotions have been anxiety about levels of dependency. The challenge for Labour is to resist the temptation to bombard the public with facts and to instead tell new stories that can tap into different emotions.

To begin with, Labour has to shift the focus from the individual to the wider socio-economic context. This means shining a light on 'hidden' forms of poverty: those who are in work but struggling to keep up with rent levels that rise whilst their wages stagnate; or those who earn just enough to get by in a volatile rental market but not enough to be able to get a mortgage. These people do not choose to be poor but they have been overtaken by events beyond their control.

Labour must also be more clear about the root causes of our housing benefit bill. We spend over £20bn a year, in large part because wages are not keeping pace with rent levels (or wages at the top end of the spectrum). We also suffer from a chronic shortage of housing. Housing benefit in its current form, like large parts of the social security budget, is picking up the costs of economic failure.

The public can be sympathetic to these ideas. Our research confirms that there is a real public appetite for a position on housing benefit that identifies the root causes of the problem and commits to tackling them. This holds even if people know that the solutions will be expensive and take a long time.

Labour must accept that addressing the public politics of social security will be difficult, timely and messy. People often hold conflicting views and emotions can build a resistance to new information. But deep down, people are caring. If someone is in need, people will want to help them. If our economy is causing people to suffer poverty despite their best efforts, people will demand action. Labour must highlight that many people are in need and that our economy is in fact failing to keep people above the poverty line.

Changing the debate will mean starting a new conversation. To be truly effective, much of the work will have to take the shape of real face-to-face conversations. This will mean getting out of the meeting room and into the kitchens, pubs and onto the doorsteps of the land.

Natan Doron is Senior Researcher at the Fabian Society



#### BEYOND THE BOARDROOM

Efforts to break the glass ceiling fail to address the real victims of workplace inequality: women on the bottom rung of the economic ladder—*Ann McKechin MP* 

Gender equality in the workplace has been high on the political agenda in recent months. Two fundamentally different approaches divide those seeking progress. In Europe, EU draft legislation modelled on Norway's successful introduction of 40 per cent female quotas on the boards of listed companies has been circulating for some time. Meanwhile, public companies in the UK have ploughed on with a voluntary equalising of gender imbalances on their boards, inspired primarily by the weighty recommendations in Lord Davies' 2011 report, *Women on Boards*.

Both approaches have been conceived with the best of intentions, but both fail to address the real victims of workplace inequality: women on the bottom rung of the economic ladder, doing low-wage work, with few benefits and little opportunity for development. Laurie Penny of the New Statesman summed up the problem: "While we all worry about the glass ceiling, there are millions of women standing in the basement – and the basement is flooding". Correcting persistent gender imbalance at the top of organisations, and in the career ladders which feed them, should certainly be a priority for responsible firms and organisations. But putting those who inhabit the dizzy heights of City boardrooms ahead of those who do the grimier jobs in our offices, shops and hotels simply maintains the inherent income imbalance between men and women's lifetime earnings. The equality agenda of a future Labour government would put equal stock in both.

One reason why women do more lowpaid work is because men take the lion's share of technical, high-skill vocational training places, leaving too many women stuck on career pathways that offer fewer opportunities for advancement. Recent figures from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills give a worrying insight into the gender balance of National Apprenticeship Service placements by industry sector in 2011/12. They show that men outnumber women by as many as 50 to one in engineering, IT, industrial applications, security systems, and rail transport – all sectors which offer a multitude of options for progression, along with rising pay and responsibility. Women, on the other hand, dominate the beauty therapy, customer service, hairdressing and teaching assistant schemes. If our mission is gender equality in the workplace, we should be seriously questioning why we aren't doing anything about the opportunity gap that exists between these male dominated and female dominated sectors.

FTSE 100 companies like Rolls Royce or BAE Systems are voluntarily adhering to gender targets at the top of their businesses. Yet their aim to have 30 per cent or more female board members is not matched by complementary targets for those they take on at apprenticeship level. There is a clear case for the government to put targets in place to correct some of the more egregious sectoral imbalances (12,880 men to only 400 women started engineering apprenticeships in 2011/12, for example), to lessen the gender gap in pay, responsibility and opportunity. Such a bottomup approach would empower more women, and do as much for gender equality at the top of organisations as any amount of boardroom musical chairs has done to date.

With large companies involved in highend manufacturing all too aware of the looming shortage of skilled engineers, it's puzzling why attracting more women isn't a key plank of their long-term strategies. Jaguar Land Rover, who recently launched an education outreach programme targeted at school-age girls, is one company which seems to have grasped that there is a problem. Let's hope others can demand more of the government and call for training funding to be pushed towards in-demand, high-skill sectors and moved away from oversubscribed placements in retail, beauty and hairdressing.

This won't be easy. Entrenched attitudes, often reinforced by family members, communities and schools, still say that electrician, mechanic and heating engineer are not'jobs for girls'. Business secretary Vince Cable and his fellow minister Jo Swinson are right to have both spoken about how girls' aspirations are so often subject to external pressures which don't affect young men. But instead of putting all the blame on the lack of confidence in teenage girls, they should channel their concerns into pro-active policy that truly helps these girls to consider a career in STEM areas - science, technology, engineering and maths - and for employers, in turn, to reach out to them.





#### THE ONLY WAY IS LOCAL

Jim McMahon and Catherine West lead councils in very different areas, but their message is the same: understanding local labour markets is the way to transform the economic futures of our towns

As local Labour leaders we know how desperate the situation is for many of our residents. We have a government whose economic strategy is to give money to banks that don't want to spend it and take it away from people and businesses that do. Frankly the only increase in bank activity we have locally is the massive increase in food banks.

Although a fairer distribution of existing resources would undoubtedly assist in the short term, the stark reality is that the traditional model of local government is broken. Our real challenge is to provide an alternative: how dynamic local government can meet the interests of local residents and businesses and create a set of policy initiatives for a new government in 2015.

To do this we are very clear that we have to serve the town rather than the town hall and recognise the vital importance of locality. Islington – an inner London borough with a huge disparity in local incomes and house prices – is quite rightly concentrating on the creation of affordable rented homes. In Oldham there is a greater need to encourage the local private housing market and concentrate on attracting aspirational

families into the borough who will support the local economy and drive up standards in schools and community facilities (and also broaden Oldham's council tax base, which currently has 80 per cent of its properties in the lowest two bands).

If we share one ambition it is to help create sustainable local employment. The last Labour government achieved much but at times it appeared to be a job creation agency for the professional classes. Despite the billions of pounds spent we still have working class communities with no sustainable economic legacy. One of the most interesting developments since the last general election has been the development of the Cooperative Council Network, with two clear principles for future policy – everyone does their bit so we all benefit; and a commitment to help people to help themselves. Both of these principles have deep roots in the labour movement but somehow got lost in recent years. However if we are going to make progress in removing the curse of unemployment from too many families, the Labour party has to recognise a fundamental truth.

The Work Programme is failing not because it is a Conservative policy but because it is an over-centralised and prescriptive programme which has no understanding of local labour markets. Sadly such programmes are the default position of central governments, including Labour ones. Barely 20 per cent of public expenditure is under the direct influence of local councils. The rest is controlled through a myriad of government departments, executive agencies and outsourced commercial interests, all with competing agendas and little motivation to work together. Those involved barely understand any remit beyond a bewildering set of nationally imposed targets and there is absolutely no local accountability to local people either as citizens or consumers.

Realistically it will be difficult to reverse this tide of centralism and it has powerful friends in the vast army (20,000 and rising) of lobbyists, advocates and national media who prefer the easy life of having all the decision makers concentrated in the Westminster village. There is also no desire on our part to return to a past when every local decision was made by a council committee. But as the Work Programme and the fiasco that was NHS IT procurement indicates such a degree of centralised control leads to poor decision making and a massive waste of public money. In terms of making the case for more effective local government there are three urgent issues for this or future governments.

The first is to resolve the issue around adult social care, with defined financial responsibilities for the individual and local government. Second we need to recognise the limitations of national employment programmes and devolve the budgets and responsibilities to local councils, either individually or as part of a consortium such as the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities. And the third is to develop a phased local capital development programme to address critical infrastructure needs.

Our task as responsible local leaders is to make this case before the next general election and show that we have the knowledge and leadership to transform public services and the economic futures of our towns. We want to work not just with the Labour party, but cross party through the Local Government Association and with trade unions and businesses to make that case. As another politician once said there really is no alternative.

Jim McMahon is Leader of Oldham and Catherine West of Islington. Both are members of the LGA Labour Group Executive

Diane Johnson, first female president of the Electrical Contractors Association, told the business select committee that women recently made redundant are too often advised by jobcentre staff to take up jobs in social care or cleaning, despite there being extensive possibilities for re-training. Johnson's Wired for Success scheme trains female social housing tenants to be electricians, with most going on to work immediately and many setting up their own businesses. By encouraging diversity in a male-dominated industry, the scheme exemplifies what

the government should be thinking about if it is serious about workplace equality and changing attitudes.

With so-called 'trickle-down feminism' arguably doing little for women in low-paid work, the possibilities of targeted spending in the government's apprenticeship scheme could not be clearer. It would reduce gender inequality, whilst at the same time helping to provide the skilled workers so desperately needed in the near future. Schools, families and communities should help ditch outmoded stereotypes about 'women's work'

and start encouraging young girls to opt for the non-traditional careers which could transform their lives. If not, we'll simply preserve a society in which the high-skill, high-mobility career pathways are mainly for men, and the low-mobility, low-pay pathways are seen as the natural preserve of women.

Ann McKechin is MP for Glasgow North, a member of the Business, Innovation and Skills committee and a member of the Scottish Fabians Executive Committee

## An era of less

Labour is struggling to articulate a compelling argument on the economy because it has yet to come to terms with what to do in an era of less growth, less public spending and lower living standards, writes *Patrick Diamond* 



Patrick Diamond is Senior Research Fellow at Policy Network

T WAS ONCE said that contempt for ideological doctrine has been a defining characteristic of British socialism. GDH Cole, the leading Fabian intellectual, warmly welcomed the fact that Labour was "so undefined in its doctrinal basis as to make recruits readily among people of quite different types". In the year of the Attlee government's defeat in 1951, Richard Crossman judged the party "had lost its way not only because it lacked maps of the new country it was crossing, but because it thinks maps unnecessary for experienced travellers". Today, Labour needs an ideological compass more than ever: the model of political economy which defined its governing strategy from Attlee to Blair has all but collapsed. The party must find a new raison d'être for the post-crisis age.

Labour's approach to political economy since the second world war rested on three fundamental assumptions: first, rising economic growth; second, rising public expenditure; and third, rising wages and living standards. Growth would generate the tax receipts necessary for investment in public services. An expanding private sector and 'social wage' would improve living standards, guaranteeing a high and stable level of employment. The increasing rate of consumption would, in turn, lead to a faster rate of growth. This was a virtuous cycle of capitalist production and stateled redistribution. Post-war social democrats, most prominently Anthony Crosland in *The Future of Socialism*, argued that western capitalism had been transformed.

The presumption that growth, public spending and living standards would rise continuously did not survive the post-1945 era unscathed. The oil price shocks of the early 1970s, together with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates, led to rapid inflation and a sterling crisis. The dramatic cuts in public expenditure implemented by the Labour government in 1975-6 were as severe as the Geddes Axe in the 1920s. Thatcherism further undermined central pillars of the post-war settlement. But Labour's approach to governing continued to embrace certain assumptions about the relationship between states and markets in a modern capitalist economy and unified nation-state. The belief that economic growth, an expanding public sector and rising living standards would be delivered through macro-economic fine-tuning and fiscal policy 'from on high'animated Labour's programme under Attlee, Wilson, Callaghan, and latterly, Blair and Brown.

Faith in this model has been shattered by a combination of the post-2008 financial crisis, and long-term structural trends. Five years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Labour is struggling to define a new story about Britain's political economy. First, the idea that social democracy can simply rely on a straightforward return to growth' appears illusory. The coalition government's austerity plan has damaged output and growth in per capita GDP by withdrawing spending power from the economy, in particular



cutting back public sector capital investment. Moreover, the impact of the crisis in weakening the balance sheets of financial institutions has meant the supply of capital from lenders to consumers has evaporated. Any functioning market economy requires the lubricant of lending to businesses and industry. However, this is not the principal reason why growth contracted so severely. The post-2008 financial crisis was a symptom of structural weakness in the developed economies, especially the UK economy.

The crisis in Britain and the United States was fuelled by escalating income inequalities and structural imbalances, including excessive financialisation and rising public and private sector indebtedness. The origins of the crisis lie in the economy's lack of productive capacity: inadequate infrastructure, under-developed human capital, declining rates of investment, regional imbalances and a failure to exploit the potential of new technologies. The ongoing turbulence in the eurozone, the UK's largest export market, further weakens growth potential. The shift of economic power from the west to emerging economies makes it unlikely that post-war rates of growth can easily be replicated. The post-2008 crisis was a crisis of production, as much as a crisis of debt. And it was a crisis of a distinctively British model of capitalism.

The old growth paradigm will not be easily resuscitated. The wider question for the left is whether it ought to be. A recent book by Robert and Edward Skidelsky, *How Much* 

is Enough? poses an important question about how far conventional growth enables people to attain what they need in order to lead a good life. The concern about climate change and environmental sustainability leads many in the west to question how much growth is necessary, and the viability of the existing model. This has profound implications for the left's strategy: the advanced democracies may be on the brink of a green industrial revolution, where technological change gradually eases the pressure on resources, cutting energy use and detoxifying the productive process, leading to transformation throughout the economy. Social democracy must address how to amplify this wave of innovation and rebalancing.

The second assumption of post-war political economy relates to public spending. If rising growth rates can no longer be guaranteed, and might not be desirable anyway, the long-term outlook for public spending remains fragile. On current forecasts, UK government spending will fall from 45.4 per cent of GDP to 39.2 per cent by 2017 – a lower level than the United States. There are grounds to contest the pace and scale of fiscal consolidation. Sooner or later, however, the public and private sector debt overhang in the British economy will have to be addressed.

Moreover, demographic and structural trends will impose greater demands on the public sector over coming decades. The Dilnot Commission estimates that an ageing population will increase the proportion of national income

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spent on social care from 1.2 to 1.7 per cent of GDP by 2030. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) predicts that as the population over 65 rises from 17 per cent today to 26 per cent by 2061, spending on health, social care and pensions will rise by 5.2 per cent of national income. The constraints on UK public spending are set to grow.

The third pillar of the post-war model is living standards. The squeeze in real wages among middle and lower income earners has begun to command attention from policymakers. However, wage compression in the UK

economy began in the early 2000s, well before the crisis. The net effect is that by 2014, median wages will be worth less in real terms than in 1999. The 'great compression' has been driven by a model of globalisation which redistributes gains from the low skilled to those with high levels of human capital who compete in the international market for talent. The squeeze has been further accentuated by tax and spending decisions made by the previous Labour government,

notably the abolition of the 10p rate in 2007.

Restoring rising real wages will not be easy. There is no single policy measure that will deliver more high-quality, better paid jobs in the British economy, solving the crisis of living standards. Past reform strategies provide few clues. A return to protectionism would be unlikely to yield long-term gains. Centralised planning had evidently failed by the 1970s. Moreover, there is less money around, reducing government's capacity to redistribute income through benefits and tax credits.

The unravelling of the post-war Keynesian model of political economy raises a profound question for the left, not just in Britain but throughout Europe: what is the strategic purpose of social democracy in an era of *less* – less growth, less public spending, and lower living standards? This is the critical challenge facing Labour's politics in the years ahead.

Of course, it is wrong to be fatalistic about growth: there are measures states can adopt to improve growth performance. Labour ought to focus on qualitative measures beyond per capita GDP, addressing how far median incomes are rising and how many secure, well-paid jobs are created. The Labour leadership's focus has been on how reforms of corporate governance, skills policy, labour markets and top pay will produce more egalitarian outcomes. This accent on 'predistribution' is promising territory for the left. It should be coupled with a vision of how Britain can pay its way in a competitive international economy, through UK businesses that adopt a global outlook. The dream of 'socialism in one country' is an illusion: any tenable strategy of predistribution requires a Britain fully engaged in the European Union.

Nor is government powerless in the face of declining living standards. The crisis may have decisively altered the politics of redistribution: voters are more willing to agree that the very wealthy ought to pay their fair share of tax than a decade ago. According to YouGov, 55 per cent of British voters believe that 'the rich' (those earning above

£100,000) do not pay enough tax and should pay more. There are debates emerging about how far the 'affluent elderly' can be shielded from the burden of fiscal adjustment, and the case for new forms of property taxation. The territory is shifting in a progressive direction.

In reducing 'in-work' poverty, lower tax liabilities are more likely to deliver improvements in living standards. As John Kay argues, "a higher personal allowance is always a better way of spending money on helping the low paid than a lower initial rate". However, there are limits to the reach

of classical redistribution. Strategies are required to make structures of wage determination fairer, strengthening collective bargaining and workplace organisation. Moreover, a wider dispersal of ownership and assets is necessary, exemplified by James Meade's concept of a 'property-owning democracy'. Rather than disposing of the government's stake in the nationalised banks through a share giveaway, for example, the proceeds should be invested in a

'capital stake' for each citizen – a bolder version of the child trust fund enacted by the last Labour government.

There is no panacea for restoring rising growth and living standards. If Labour is to come to terms with an era of less, the party should reclaim the territory of being wise spenders committed to nostrums of economy and efficiency. The state will be investing 42.2 per cent of GDP even after Osborne's cuts in 2015. Resources and priorities have to be aligned effectively across public services. Take the NHS. Hospital closures are always controversial in local communities, but the NHS needs more localised, responsive and community-based provision as the socialist founders of the health service recognised in the 1940s. Labour should be the party of the NHS, not the party of a status quo NHS. Across public services, the post-bureaucratic state must be a Labour principle: improving citizens' engagement with the state is vital for social democracy.

In an era of less, Labour must acknowledge that there are structures and resources that give people's lives meaning beyond those provided through states or markets. These are the ties of belonging which provide a sense of security and identity above commodified economic exchange. The communitarian critique of markets raises the question of how to build and sustain relationships and institutions that strengthen family life, while creating networks that enable disadvantaged communities to access public goods from vocational training to affordable childcare. The rhetoric indicating a renewed commitment to mutualism has to be translated into reality, altering the regime of financial regulation so many more building societies and credit unions are created.

Labour's attachment to the model of post-war political economy reflects a paradox throughout the party's history. An ostensibly radical party has remained deeply attached to the established structures of the British economy and the British state. The new era of less will require a markedly different approach, as the old social democratic orthodoxies are steadily undermined.

## Sorry seems to be the easiest word

Labour's recovery will not be secured with a politics of apology, but with a politics of national progress in an era of international interdependence, argues *Kirsty McNeill* 

Labour's current masochism strategy has us trapped picking over the bones of our past when we should be talking about the country's future. In arguing that things the last Labour government actually got right we got wrong, we seem intent on doing our opponents' job for them and, even worse, on offering mechanistic responses to what focus groups say rather than credible policy solutions to what the public mean.

Fabians are often parodied as believing Labour's renewal needs just 'one more heave', that past failed strategies simply haven't been pursued vigorously enough. Such criticism tends to come from those to whom it could be better applied, the people who think all we need to do to cover the left's weak political flanks is administer just 'one more kicking' to benefits claimants, the European Union or Britain's migrants and minorities. On this analysis, a synthesis of New Labour triangulation and Blue Labour turbo-communitarianism, the priority is mirroring focus group fury without meaningful investigation into its emotional drivers or serious consideration of its governing implications.

That can never be a strategy for victory, because it fails to understand that our national conversation is taking place in code: voters use a whole host of terms as shorthand for unmet emotional needs they expect leaders to satisfy and not simply repeat.

Thus the prime minister and his head-line-happy advisers, afflicted by precisely the same crude reductionism which led Labour to respond to increased public alarm about terrorism with a bidding war on pre-charge detention, have been bewildered to discover how voters actually use words like 'scrounger'. They don't use them to guide politicians in making complex trade-offs about the distribution of Britain's bedrooms but to express a whole host of connected feelings about desert and belonging and shared reward.

Likewise, on immigration, we live in a nation in which 67 per cent of those polled by YouGov think immigration over the last decade 'has been a bad thing for Britain',



but which nonetheless delighted when Mo Farah told a journalist "look mate, this is my country" and cheered the daughter of a Jamaican migrant, Jessica Ennis, on to Olympic gold. The emotional picture here is significantly more textured than Labour's recent immigration interventions have acknowledged, with people's anxieties driven as much by identity and their own access to resources as any first order desire to pull up the drawbridge and turn the clock back.

In other words, both immigration and welfare are proxy debates where ill-considered gimmicks from the government and ill-advised apologies from the opposition won't cut through. Instead, what Britain's grafters are hungry for is policies that will lift their living standards in line with their deep (and wholly correct) instinct that there should be a strong relationship between what you do and what you get.

Against this backdrop, Labour does have some explaining to do, but not about the current sources of our self-flagellation. Far bigger than any of them is our failure to come to a public settlement with a globalisation that created profound insecurities at the same time as it was providing ordinary families with unprecedented access to travel and consumer goods.

While the financial crisis was the most extreme example, global forces in the form of outsourcing, wage stagnation and downward competitive pressure on pay and conditions had been buffeting those on middle and modest incomes disproportionately for years. Labour's answer – embracing free trade while equipping the working and lower middle class to compete through investment in state education and increased higher education participation rates – was the right one economically, but we were never able to convey it emotionally,

or to illuminate adequately the choices and opportunities before the British people. Globalisation is a fact rather than an option, but we never found the right words to explain why that is so – or what we intended to do about it – in the language of the kitchen table rather than the cabinet table.

In 2010, Ed Miliband's Labour leadership campaign made much of the fact he 'speaks human'. He does, and he will need to muster every ounce of that ability as he transitions from acknowledging people's fears to helping us overcome them. Global interdependence – with all of its pitfalls and potential - is now a given; so the biggest question facing Labour is how to deliver decent work for our people in a context where so many of the drivers of growth lie beyond our shores. If New Labour was about renewing the left after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the electoral triumph of neo-liberalism, the task of this left generation is creating a progressive globalisation.

A comprehensive progressive agenda for the age of interdependence would need to address sustainability and the management of the global commons; the tensions between equality and growth; stability, to ensure that people's quality of life and livelihoods aren't threatened by conflict, shocks or crises; accountability, to close the democratic deficit which results from global problems being redefined as national ones and which leaves the sources of them completely unaccountable to the people whose lives are affected; and fraternity, so that the acceleration of globalisation doesn't lead to further fracturing of communal life or a retreat to nativism and political extremism. When faced with this, the great progressive challenge of the age, the politics of apology seems both self-obsessed and crushingly irrelevant. The time for deconstructing yesterday is past - the fight to build tomorrow must now begin. F

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# Widening the conversation, not changing the subject

Even if people can be convinced that immigration works for the economy, they must also believe that the economy works for them, writes *Sarah Mulley* 



Sarah Mulley is Associate Director at IPPR @sarahmulley

HE LINKED CHALLENGES of immigration and welfare reform have been the subject of much recent discussion. This is, in many respects, comfortable territory for the Conservatives, and difficult ground for Labour. But there does now seem to be an emerging consensus across the political spectrum that we can't talk about either in isolation; answers must come from reforms to the welfare system, as well as immigration policy.

Very similar arguments apply to discussions about immigration and the economy – in policy terms, immigration reform must be considered alongside economic reform. This is more natural ground for Labour, and both Ed Miliband and Yvette Cooper have emphasised the need for better enforcement of the minimum wage and other labour market regulations as part of a policy response to immigration. These are perfectly sensible proposals, but Labour needs to take this argument much further, in both policy and political terms, if it is to untangle the economic arguments for and against immigration.

Economists can convincingly rebuff the most common economic arguments against immigration, namely that immigrants displace natives from jobs, and/or reduce their wages. Numerous studies have found that any impacts of

migration on employment and wage rates are so small as to be insignificant. However, this argument does not convince the public, for two good reasons.

The first is that, although the aggregate effects may be insignificant, immigration does negatively affect the employment and wages of some individuals and groups. The economic costs and benefits of migration are not evenly distributed, and in political terms the stories of those who lose out will always be more powerful than statistical evidence of an aggregate benefit.

The second problem is that economists are more effective at rebutting the claims of those who believe that immigration causes economic harm than they are at explaining the positive economic case. There are good reasons to believe that migration brings a range of 'dynamic' benefits to the economy via flexibility, innovation and entrepreneurialism, but these benefits are difficult to measure and provide evidence for. This often leaves the impression that, while the economic case against migration might not be convincing, neither is the economic case for it. If people believe that then other, non-economic, concerns against immigration can tip the balance of the argument.

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Labour's recent interventions on immigration have sought to address these concerns – an emphasis on protections for the most vulnerable workers on the one hand, and a defence of 'high value' migrants who create jobs on the other

But even if these two problems can be overcome, politicians on the left face a more fundamental challenge in making the economic case for migration. That is that, even if people can be convinced that migration works for the economy, they must also believe that the economy works for them.

This was arguably the biggest flaw with the case that

Labour tried, and failed, to make to the public about immigration while in government, and in particular after the accession of new countries to the EU in 2004. While Labour ministers were making the case for a relatively open immigration policy, responding to employers' demands for a more skilled and flexible workforce, a significant proportion of the UK workforce were seeing their wages

stagnate and their living standards drop. Immigration may well have helped to drive economic growth, but the proceeds of that growth were not evenly or widely enough shared.

It is important to be clear that immigration was not the cause of this wage stagnation, at least for the vast majority of people, nor of widening inequality. Indeed, it may well be the case that things would have been worse with lower levels of immigration. But immigration was a powerful and visible symbol of the broader economic model: open, competitive and flexible; or, conversely, unprotected, dogeat-dog, and insecure.

Labour, and many others on the left, now recognise that the UK's economic model needs radical change. But in the meantime, what does all this mean for the debate about immigration?

The first thing to say is that Labour's instinct to focus on protections for the most vulnerable workers is the right one. Aside from the fact that the left should always be concerned with protecting those at risk of exploitation, this is also important in the immigration debate because it helps to reassure people that the 'rules of the game' are fair. The enforcement of regulations like the minimum wage helps to create a level playing field between migrants and natives, and prevents employers from exploiting the willingness (or desperation) of some migrants in order to undercut others.

But protections for the lowest paid and most vulnerable workers will neither address the problems facing the 'squeezed middle', nor be sufficient to reassure voters about immigration's economic impacts. In order to secure mainstream support, a position on migration and the economy must also consider a wider set of issues about wages, unemployment and training.

Politicians and policymakers on the left must accept that high levels of immigration (particularly low-skilled immigration), set alongside high levels of unemployment (particularly youth unemployment), are symptomatic of a problem with our labour market. It should be of genuine concern that unemployed people are unable or unwilling to take up the jobs done by new migrants. But they must also be clear that reducing immigration will not solve that problem – the coalition's approach, based as it is on the idea that reducing immigration should be the main objective of policy, is (at best) treating the symptoms rather than the cause.

So in policy terms, the left's response needs to be about skills and education, welfare policies that get people (and young people in particular) back to work as quickly as possible, and ensuring that jobs at all levels of the labour mar-

> ket pay a fair wage and offer people security and job satisfaction. None of these things are easy, of course, nor should policies in this area be developed exclusively or even primarily in response to concerns about immigration (there are plenty of other reasons to act).

Politically, the risk of this approach is that it appears to be 'changing the subject'. This is a trap that many of us on the left fall

into all too easily – faced with a concern about immigration and jobs, or immigration and housing, or immigration and public services, our instinctive response is to talk about jobs, or housing, or public services, or anything except immigration. In policy terms, that may sometimes be right, but in political terms it can add to the dangerous myth that the left is unwilling or unable to talk about immigration.

There are three things that Labour can do to avoid this trap. The first is to be clear that, logically, if high levels of immigration (or low-skilled immigration) alongside high unemployment are symptomatic of a problem, then success would mean lower levels of immigration. But this is a fine line to walk – given that most low-skilled immigration comes from within the EU, politicians from all sides need to be very wary of setting any expectations that it can be limited or reduced by fiat. So the message must be that Labour is seeking to change the economy in order to make it less reliant on immigration, not seeking to reduce immigration in order to change the economy.

The second is that Labour must also continue to talk about the importance of competent immigration control, and make clear that the primary purpose of managing immigration is to benefit the UK. Yvette Cooper is right to emphasise the importance of effective institutions and enforcement in the immigration system – this should, after all, be a primary concern of anyone aspiring to be home secretary, regardless of any broader arguments about the role immigration should play in our economy or our society.

Finally, Labour must always remember that immigration is not only an issue of economics. The economic case for an open and flexible approach to migration policy is a strong one when coupled with an approach to economic policy that emphasises equality and fairness, but this must always be set against cultural and community concerns about the impacts of migration. A new economy might be expected to reduce community tensions and divisions, but it will never provide all the answers.

# That was the New Labour that wasn't

The New Labour we got was different from the New Labour that might have been, had the reform agenda associated with stakeholding and pluralism in the early-1990s been fully realised. Stuart White and Martin O'Neill investigate the road not taken and what it means for 'one nation' Labour





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ABOUR CURRENTLY FACES a period of challenging redefinition. New Labour is emphatically over and done. But as New Labour recedes into the past, it is perhaps helpful and timely to consider what New Labour *might have been*. It is possible to speak of a 'New Labour That Wasn't': a philosophical perspective and political project which provided important context for the rise of New Labour, and which in some ways shaped it, but which New Labour also in important aspects defined itself against. What was this alternative, this road not taken? And what relevance does it have for Labour today?

#### The New Labour That Wasn't

What we might call the New Labour That Wasn't found expression in a number of important works from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Perhaps the key early contribution was David Marquand's *The Unprincipled Society* (1988), followed by Paul Hirst's *After Thatcher* (1989) and *Associative Democracy* (1994). Will Hutton's *The State We're In* (1994) arguably pulled the ideas together in the way that had the biggest impact. Another important feature of the context was the rise, from 1988, of Charter 88 as a pressure group and wider political movement arguing the case for comprehensive constitutional reform.

The New Labour That Wasn't put forward a reform agenda with three core elements.

#### 1.The stakeholder economy

All three writers – Marquand, Hirst and Hutton – argued that the UK's economic problems had deep institutional roots. In *The State We're In*, Hutton argued that the UK's

competitiveness in manufacturing had been undermined historically by the short-termism of the City, making for an excessively high cost of capital and consequent underinvestment. German capitalism, he argued, offered an alternative model based on long-term, 'patient' industrial banking. It also illustrated the benefits of structures of governance of the firm that incorporate not only long-term investors but also labour as long-term partners – 'stakeholders' - in enterprise management.

For Hirst, the UK's economic revival depended on manufacturing renewal in particular. At its heart would be small and medium-sized firms adapted to 'flexible specialisation': production of high-quality goods, targeted to the needs of varied customers, on the basis of highly and broadly skilled workforce. Institutionally, Hirst argued, this kind of production is supported by 'corporatist' arrangements that facilitate collaboration between labour and capital. Appropriate finance is also crucial. Focusing on examples such as the Emilia-Romagna and Vetona regions in Italy, and drawing on Michael Piore and Charles Sabel's important work on industrial strategy, The Second Industrial Divide, Hirst argued for a strong regional dimension to economic growth strategy. Labour's job should be to help create regional infrastructures of industrial finance and corporatist negotiation in support of innovative small and medium-sized firms engaging in flexible specialisation.

#### 2.The pluralist polity

The second key plank of the New Labour That Wasn't was the advocacy of a pluralist polity. Charter 88's platform, which formed the core of this agenda, demanded: the creation of devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales; a Bill of Rights for the UK; electoral reform for the House of Commons, specifically proportional representation; a democratic, non-hereditary second chamber; and freedom of information, all tied together through a written constitution for the UK. Charter 88 began as an initiative of the New Statesman, under the editorship of Stuart Weir, and drew on the support of a wide range of left and liberal intellectuals. Marquand, Hirst and Hutton all shared in the main objectives of Charter 88. Hirst was chair of the Charter's executive committee and, in the view of Alexandra Runswick, important in giving the organisation intellectual support and practical leadership.

'Pluralism' here is a complex notion and we can only touch on some of its aspects. First there was the pluralism involved in devolution to Scottish and Welsh assemblies. For some, such as Hirst, this was a stepping-stone towards a fully federal UK with much stronger structures of regional government. Second, pluralism involved getting away from one-party majoritarian government towards a wider representation of parties in assemblies and government through coalition. This was envisaged as applying both at the UK centre – through PR elections to the UK parliament – and at devolved national and regional levels. A robust UK Bill of Rights and Freedom of Information Act would provide the individual citizen with a strong platform on which to base their own association and participation in these new, pluralist structures.

Pluralism implies diversity, of course, but it also comes, in the New Labour That Wasn't, with an idea of cohesion and the common good. Pluralism is the context for the shared negotiation of common goods, at firm, local, regional and national levels – what Marquand termed "politics as mutual education". In this sense, pluralism could be seen as expressing a 'republican' recasting of politics, and was explicitly described as such by both Hutton and Marquand. The individual citizen should be able to argue their case in dialogue with other citizens both in the workplace and in the wider public sphere.

## 3. The interdependence of economic and political reform

The third key element of The New Labour That Wasn't lies in the claim, or hypothesis, that economic and political reform are *necessarily connected*. A stakeholder economy demands a pluralist polity. Stakeholder capitalism is itself a kind of pluralism. Power is shared across parties: industry and finance, labour and capital. But, so the argument went, it is difficult to create the framework for this kind of pluralism to flourish when the state itself is so centralised and majoritarian. The latter, according to Hirst, militates against the creation of "a collaborative political culture" and the development of "other forms of corporate consultation". As Hutton put it in *The State We're In*:

"The constitution of the state is vital not only for its capacity to express the common good but also as the exemplar of the relationship between the individual and the wider society. The extent to which the state embodies trust, participation and inclusion is the extent to which those values are diffused through society as a whole...If creative companies orchestrate the voices of all stakeholders into a common enterprise, embodying

such a conception in company law is impossible if the state is genetically programmed to view the business of governance as the exercise of sovereignty, and the duty of the governed to obey."

#### The New Labour That Was

As suggested, actual New Labour was partly inspired by this current of thought. But it was also defined, in some important ways, by a strong rejection of it.

On the economy, New Labour briefly, and somewhat superficially, adopted the language of stakeholding. However, Hutton's relational idea of stakeholding gave way to a much more individualistic understanding of the term, a matter of individuals holding assets (skills, financial assets) which increase their options in the marketplace. This reflected a key strategic decision on Labour's part to accept the existing financial system and (to a large extent) the rules of corporate governance. The aim was not to try to convert British capitalism into something closer to the German model but to try to inflect the British model with a more egalitarian character by means of in-work tax credits, universal public services and a limited degree of 'asset-based welfare'.

While New Labour took a much weaker line on reforming the economy, on the side of political reform, New Labour of course adopted and delivered on a number of the pluralists' commitments. As Helena Kennedy has put it: "... that first term of Labour in office produced more far-reaching reforms than anything seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832". In addition to devolution, there were gains in terms of freedom of information (though not as much as campaigners proposed) and the Human Rights Act. Labour also tried, unsuccessfully, to establish new regional assemblies. There were, however, also some major elements of the pluralists' agenda that Labour did not deliver on and which arguably reflected a lack of commitment to do so. While most hereditary peers were removed from the House of Lords, Labour did not go further in reform of the second chamber. The Jenkins Commission on the voting system reported in 1998 only to be politely but emphatically shelved.

This was not accidental. Labour's attitude to Charter 88 was marked at the outset by wariness and a degree of hostility. John Smith was sympathetic to many goals of the Charter, and gave an important speech in March 1993, under the Charter's auspices, calling for a new constitutional settlement. After Smith's death, the new leadership inherited many reform commitments, such as devolution, but did not share the pluralists' underlying philosophy.

The pluralist republicans saw political process not simply as a means to an end but as valuable in itself. By contrast, New Labour adopted a decidedly more instrumentalist view, and took a significantly more managerialist approach. As Anthony Barnett put it in 2000:

"New Labour looked to modern business management to teach it how to deliver, Blair comparing himself to a chief executive. By setting targets, policing delivery, insisting on outcomes, advocating joined-up administration, ministers project themselves as a businesslike team. Theirs is not a pluralist vision of the state."

Over time, and especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, New Labour's managerialism evolved in what many liberals saw as a markedly authoritarian direction, towards the 'database state'.

#### One nation Labour?

This brief narrative offers an interesting way of looking at the emerging perspective of one nation 'Labour.

On the one hand, there are some clear similarities between one nation Labour and the New Labour That Wasn't. This is particularly true around the economy. First, there is the judgment that economic revival must involve industrial renewal. Second, there is an interest in exploring what lessons the German and Nordic economies might have for achieving industrial renewal. This is evident, for example, in Ed Miliband's recent speech on regional banking. As Jon Stone has recently argued, it is also reflected in Labour's interest in placing workers on firms' remuneration committees and in a stronger emphasis on apprenticeships and vocational training. Although, just as Robert Heilbroner famously talked about the idea of a "slightly imaginary Sweden", it seems like Labour's current thinking is perhaps influenced by the example of a 'slightly imaginary Germany', more egalitarian and democratic than its real-world counterpart.

But what about the political pluralist dimension of the New Labour That Wasn't? Here, thus far at least, the similarities are much less marked.

Will Hutton and David Marquand will offer their own views on the continuing relevance of the pluralist reform agenda (Paul Hirst sadly died in 2003, aged just 57). In fairness, however, it is not clear that pluralist republicans today could or should simply go back to the demands of Charter 88, in the spirit of 'one more heave'. As Anthony Barnett has argued, the context has been radically changed by those reforms Labour did deliver and by the emergence of issues, such as the growth of corporate power within the state and political process, which the Charter 88 agenda did not address.

But there are, perhaps, important ways in which Labour's politics could be usefully informed by the spirit of pluralism we see in the New Labour That Wasn't.

To give just one example, if Labour is serious about radical economic change then it needs to consider how it can build an alliance of social and political forces to support it. Of course it will call on people to join and vote Labour. But it must recognise that many people whose support and energy it needs will belong to other parties or to none. In the constitutional reform process of the 1990s, Labour found a way to work with other parties and social forces, for example in the Scottish Constitutional Convention and (so far as other parties are concerned) in the Cook-Maclennan agreement that formalised Labour and Liberal Democrat co-operation on constitutional reform in the UK parliament. Is there a lesson here for the politics of economic reform?

Positive economic change requires a broad movement and Labour cannot credibly claim simply to *be* this movement. Nor can it just demand that others follow. It must try to earn leadership through argument in open debate with others – including trade unions, religious groups, community organising initiatives and anti-cuts campaigners, to

name but some. Labour should remember the value in the practice of politics as mutual education.

It is encouraging to see that Labour is starting to grapple with the need for serious economic reform. The party is beginning to make arguments that our current predicament requires a radical rethink of industrial finance, corporate governance, taxation and financial regulation. But if there is a lesson to be learned from turning back to the insights of New Labour's road not taken, it is in seeing that economic reform and political reform are closely intertwined. One nation Labour is a project that is developing in what is now a very different country to the United Kingdom of the immediate post-Thatcher years, but many of its central ambitions concerning the more equitable distribution of economic power are closely allied with the now-eclipsed agenda of the New Labour That Wasn't. As the party thinks hard about creating the political conditions for real economic reform, it should take what is best from both its own real history, and from the counterfactual history of what New Labour might have been.

The authors would like to thank Anthony Barnett and Joe Guinan for discussions that have contributed to this article.

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## Pushing the envelope

The political pressure for Labour to accept George Osborne's spending envelope will be intense. *Andrew Harrop* explains why its crucial Labour should resist



Andrew Harrop is general secretary of the Fabian Society

ABOUR IS THE party of reckless spending and economic incompetence; that's the line peddled by the Conservatives and it could sink Labour's chances of winning the 2015 election. So the solution is simple, isn't it? Labour should just outsource fiscal policy to George Osborne and sign up to his spending plans for the early years of the next parliament. There are a fair few people within the Labour party who subscribe to this view but it would be a disaster. It will harm the economy, further undermine the welfare state and might not even help Labour's election chances, if voters sensed the party lacked a positive alternative to austerity.


But nor can the party promise to reverse most of the cuts and spend lots more money. Labour must have a clear plan for closing the deficit which can withstand the political pressure that any deviation from the Conservative course will bring. The challenge then is for Labour to find a middle way, between hugging close to Osborne and the path of fiscal denial.

The idea of accepting Conservative fiscal plans comes straight out of the 1997 playbook. It's credited as a political masterstroke, which laid to rest the ghost of the 1992 shadow budget. But when we look back, with the hindsight of data that was not all available at the time, the economic wisdom of the policy is highly questionable.

In the late 1990s, by holding back spending as the economy boomed, Labour presided over the tail of the longest and deepest fiscal retrenchment in modern British history. A public sector deficit of 7.6 per cent of GDP in 1993/94 turned into a surplus of 4.1 per cent in 2000/01. It's now obvious that Labour's contribution to this contraction went too far. By the time Labour came to power in 1997 the budget was already in balance, so by adopting the Conservative spending plans the party created a surplus of unprecedented magnitude. The national debt fell by a quarter in just four years, from around 40 per cent to 30 per cent of GDP, far below Gordon Brown's own ceiling for sustainable debt. And the proportion of the economy devoted to public spending, which had sunk below 40 per cent of GDP in just three of the previous 30 years, plummeted to 34.5 per cent.

All things considered, it was overkill, and there was little that could be done because the party was locked into plans which had been taken over by events. If the right had been in power perhaps we'd have seen massive tax cuts and a perpetuation of the threadbare public sphere Britain endured in the 1990s. But of course Gordon Brown and Tony Blair did not want a denuded, mid-Atlantic welfare state and rightly switched on the spending taps. But as the size

Figure 1: Public spending, public receipts and national debt 1996/97–2006/07



of the public sector returned towards its post-1945 norm, what followed was an increase in real spending of 50 per cent in just five years. Inevitably, not all of the money was well spent, and looking back it's hard not to come away thinking that Labour's record would have been stronger with steady, gradual spending rises over the whole of Blair's decade in power (see figure 1).

Circumstances today are very different but the lesson is that flexibility is one of the most important tools in a chancellor's armoury and should not be cast away lightly. The story applies in reverse for George Osborne, who has seen the economy perform worse not better than expected. He has trapped himself by committing too firmly to his own 2010 plans and will not change his mind 'when the facts change'. As a consequence, he's locked into a spending path which sucks money out of the economy when demand and investment is desperately needed. Why would Labour want to accept a Conservative plan, hatched in 2010, which it didn't agree with even at the time?

The case for rejecting Osbornomics becomes even clearer when you look at the numbers in his latest budget. If you believe his figures, the chancellor is planning annual cuts to public services that are greater than anything he has inflicted so far. Figure 2 shows that, apart from the 'protected' areas of schools, the NHS and international development, public service current spending would fall by almost one fifth in two years, resulting in a total cut of 35 per cent since 2011/12.

The idea of public spending cuts on this scale is frankly unbelievable and if George Osborne were to return in 2015 you can bet he would find a way to ease the pain, through welfare cuts or tax rises. With a pledge to match Tory plans, Labour would be unable to go for the latter and the party would find that any welfare savings it could even contemplate would raise nothing like the money needed to prevent the decimation of public service budgets.

There are three possible scenarios for the economy after 2015 and in none of them do Osborne's plans make sense. First, it is just about conceivable that the economy might return to strong growth, as you would expect after a'normal' recession. Were we to have several years of annual growth at over 3 per cent, our fiscal problems would simply melt

Figure 2: Labour's inheritance? What sticking to Tory spending plans might mean

	Real annual change		Cumulative since 2011/12		
	2016/17	2017/18	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Departmental spending	-4%	-4%	-9%	-13%	-17%
'Unprotected'	-9%	-11%	-20%	-27%	-35%
'Protected' (NHS, schools, development)	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Other current spending	2%	3%	10%	13%	16%
Social security and tax credits	1%	1%	2%	3%	3%
Debt interest	10%	9%	12%	23%	34%
Gross investment	0%	0%	-6%	-6%	-6%
Total managed expenditure	0%	0%	0%	0%	-1%

Sources: Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2013, Office for Budgetary Responsibility; Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2012, HM Treasury

44% 43% 42% 41% 40% Current plans for government 39% spending as a share of GDP 38% 37% 36% 2015/16 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2021/22 2023/24 2016/17 2020/21 2022/23 2024/25 Annual real public spending increases

- 0%

**-** - 1%

Figure 3: If growth returns to trend: scenarios for public spending as a share of GDP

· Coalition plans

away of their own accord as they did in the 1990s. At that time the rapid improvements in the public finances went alongside real spending increases each and every year.

More likely is the second scenario: we will creep back to trend growth of a little over two per cent a year. In this eventuality, an incoming chancellor will still need to keep a tight rein on spending, but will have more flexibility than Osborne would have us believe. In particular, by deviating a little from the Conservatives' plans, Labour could promise an end to retrenchment in public services. From a political perspective, this would create the critical election dividing line: under Labour spending might not rise by much, but the huge cuts would be over. No doubt there would be tough decisions and reductions in certain services to pay for expansion elsewhere, but the overall message would be clear. For it turns out that freezing department budgets in real terms is surprisingly affordable, because the 'unprotected' areas suffering the deepest cuts make up quite a small proportion of public spending: ending the cuts would require an increase to overall public spending of around one per cent each year.

It would be for a future chancellor to decide whether to pay for this extra spending through tax rises or borrowing, but the important point is that an annual spending rise of one per cent is totally consistent with sound public finances. Figure 3 shows that if GDP growth is in line with the Office for Budget Responsibility's projections, under this plan it would take just two years longer to reach George Osborne's current target for government spending as a share of GDP. The graph also shows the limits of what is possible: annual spending increases of two per cent do not produce the same result and can only be contemplated once deficit reduction is complete or growth is very strong indeed.

My third scenario for 2015 is that the economy continues to flatline, with growth somewhere around one per cent. In this context it would be hard to increase everyday public spending, because without decent growth even George Osborne's cuts do not lead the overall deficit to fall. But after eight 'lost' years, the case for Keynesian fiscal interventions would be very strong and a future chancellor would want the flexibility to introduce temporary investment spending on a massive scale. Nor should Labour rule

out using social security as well as temporary tax cuts to pump money into consumers' pockets.

Rejecting the Conservative spending plans need not be a case of good economics but bad politics. For although there are risks ('tax bombshell' posters and all) there is equal risk in failing to offer a robust alternative to the millions who are unclear about what Labour stands for and think all the parties are the same. Labour needs to create fiscal space so it can set out signature policies to show politics can offer hope, whether that's guaranteed jobs, affordable homes or a new early years service.

On the other hand if Labour follows Osborne's spending plans, we know, as the last budget demonstrated, what will happen to public services budgets – and we can imagine the consequences for people who rely on services the most. We don't know what will happen to the economy, but under none of the scenarios do Osborne's plans look necessary or wise. So Labour should plan on the basis of modest increases to overall spending, which would in turn lead to roughly flat budgets for public services. But this should only be a starting point, not the party's last word on spending, for in such uncertain times a future chancellor needs flexibility above all. Labour must not repeat George Osborne's stubborn mistakes.

## Fabian Society Commission on Future Spending Choices

Whichever political party wins the 2015 election, the next government will have to make tough choices on the economy and the prospect of further cuts will loom over any administration.

The Fabian Society Commission on Future Spending Choices will make recommendations on how spending decisions can be made in a way that best safeguards prosperity, sustainability and social justice. For more details visit www.fabians.org.uk/spendingchoices

## Policy pitch

Character capabilities help young people overcome adversity and disadvantage. Life chances depend not only on life circumstances, but also on particular personal qualities: the ability to stick with a task, even when it becomes onerous; to stand by a relationship, even when it is hard; to empathise with others, even when they are difficult or very different to you; to use willpower to defer gratification, and save for the future.

Many of our most intractable public policy problems – rates of retirement saving, family breakdown, obesity, teenage pregnancy, crime, drug addiction – are to a significant degree, questions of character. In particular, certain character attributes play a vital and potentially growing role in the promotion of an 'opportunity society'.

Traditional concerns about character, at least in the public policy arena, have often been focused on order: crime, delinquency, drugs and incivility. James Q Wilson wrote extensively and presciently about the need to attend to character formation to reduce criminality. These remain vitally important concerns. But there is also growing recognition that character virtues – albeit not necessarily the same ones – matter for opportunity, too. Character counts for social stability, but it counts for social mobility too.

Now character has made it firmly onto the political agenda. Recently we've seen the all-party parliamentary group on social mobility host an evidence hearing on the role of character and resilience in shaping life outcomes; a'national summit' on character and resilience, where research and policy proposals were shared by experts and MPs alike; and the inaugural activities of a new international academic centre, the Jubilee Centre for Character and Values. The newly established commission on social mobility and child poverty, chaired by Alan Milburn, is also taking a keen interest in converting the evidence into practical policies.

What should these policies to build character look like, now there is apparently the political will? There are three big things all parties should be thinking about as they begin planning their next manifestos.

First, we need to stop the erosion of our early years' services – currently occurring both through the slashing of funding and opening up of ringfences, as well as through the slow shift from an original focus on child

#### Character matters

Politicians from all parties accept the evidence that many social problems are questions of character. *Jen Lexmond* outlines the policies to match the political will



development into a focus on childcare and getting parents back into work. Character is not something you are born with; it must be nurtured and developed through trusted and loving care, and through the formation of habit. Parents play a key role here, and should consequently be a core focus for children's centres. We need more programmes, starting at the antenatal stage, and involving fathers as well as mothers, to provide learning and advice to new parents. The parenting classes developed for the famous Harlem Children's Zone in New York were informed by neuroscience and brain development studies and proved incredibly effective in helping parents to understand the unique role that they play in setting the foundations for trust and healthy attachment in their children. Most of the gap in school readiness between advantaged and disadvantaged children can be explained through differences in parenting style (use of vocabulary in the home, frequency of positive v negative feedback, consistency in rules and boundaries), with poverty and place being major influencing factors.

Second, we should not just judge schools on academic success. Character capabilities and resilience are as important as academic attainment. Employers agree: research from Accenture shows that 'intangible skills' went from 20 per cent to 70 per cent of the value of the US's top 500 companies from 1980 to 2006. Crucially, character capabilities have to be developed through experience – they can't simply be taught in class rooms like so many 'character education' curricula developed in the US. Key to character building

strategies in schools will be expanding the provision of extra-curricular activities - craft, drama, art, sport, music. Programmes to support'whole education' – beyond narrowly defined academic attainment - are remarkably uncoordinated and under-funded. Including psychometric tests such as mental toughness, the strengths and difficulties scale, or the self-esteem survey alongside existing Ofsted assessments of academic attainment would provide a fuller picture of a school's success in educating their students for life as well as for passing tests, and build the case for routing more funding into these spaces. An explicit objective on reducing the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged children is another way the focus of character and resilience could be promoted.

Third, we must increase sharing between public and state schools. There is much to learn from public schools' strategies, for example the Wellbeing Programme developed at Wellington College, or the 'relational approach' adopted by Tony Little, headmaster at Eton College to encourage trust between teacher and student, learning from failure, building ambition, and leadership opportunities. Of course, public schools can afford to innovate and develop tailored programmes, with budgets available and the necessary freedom and space to innovate. State schools, by contrast, are hamstrung by targets and tightening budgets. Crucially, to ensure that lessons can be learned and good models adopted, you need evidence and evaluation. There should be an onus on public schools to produce evaluation and learning on their approaches and programmes - perhaps a new policy for public schools to retain their coveted charitable status – and partnerships between public and state schools should be developed.

Back in 2010, David Cameron hailed the evidence showing the role of character in social mobility as "one of the most important findings in a generation for those who care about fairness and inequality" and "the new law for social mobility". We still have some way to go to make sure it's a law that gets enacted.

Jen Lexmond is Founder of Character Counts, an independent centre that promotes, evaluates and designs public policy interventions that build character. www.charactercountsgroup.org

## All in

Andy Burnham's plan to integrate health and social care is the boldest idea to emerge from Labour's policy review so far. If he can convince his shadow cabinet colleagues to back it, can he convince the country in 2015?"The Labour party is going to have to decide how ambitious it wants to be," he tells *Mary Riddell* 



Mary Riddell is a columnist for the Daily Telegraph

OME OFFERS ARE impossible to refuse. And so, when Andy Burnham was asked by a constituent to skydive from a Red Arrows jet to raise money for an exemplary charity, the shadow health secretary agreed. We meet some time before the stunt, but Burnham – a vertigo sufferer – is already gripped by trepidation. "My mum's in meltdown about it. I couldn't say no, but I'm not brilliant with heights."

In politics, as in aerobatics, Burnham tends to close his eyes and jump. A candidate in the Labour leadership election, he has now embarked on the most ambitious policy advanced by any shadow minister. So radical is his idea that Ed Balls is rumoured to have reacted with some dismay when he first learnt of Burnham's plan to integrate health and social care.

"I don't think he was dead against it. The truth is that the implications went well beyond my brief," Burnham says. "You always have to be a little careful because obviously I can't just write everybody else's policy for them. But, with those concerns, the shadow cabinet endorsed it, Ed B endorsed, so we're really motoring."

According to the Burnham preference, health and social care would be fully merged, with the additional cost of decent provision for elderly people met either by a levy on all estates or by payments made by older people. The notion of whole person care' is now being floated, at meetings up and down the country, as an alternative to the proposals by the economist, Andrew Dilnot, whose recommendations of a cap on personal contribution and a voluntary insurance scheme have been embraced, in a diluted form, in George Osborne's budget.

Although Burnham says that straw polls show an overwhelming preference for his approach, he regards better social care as a continuum. "Even the government's move [which offers a cap of £72,000] is a tiny, tiny step forward, and I give them credit for that. To do Dilnot properly [Dilnot initially suggested a maximum lifetime limit of £50,000] would be much more significant. The all-in approach would go one further."

Burnham's enthusiasm for gradualism runs out, it seems, in 2015. If Labour wins, he hopes to move fast. "It would have a very clear timetable...Integration could be done quickly [through] a bill early in the next parliament. A new way of paying for social care would have to be phased in over a period of time."

In the short run, he plans to elaborate on his plan at this year's conference and, assuming he gets endorsement, to develop the detail for a policy that would be signed off in 2014. "The Labour party is going to have to decide how ambitious it wants to be," he says.

Despite the Tory campaign against a "death tax" that derailed his previous reform plans in the closing stages of the Brown administration, he remains an evangelist for a 10 per cent tax on all estates, great and small, to fund social care. "There's a simplicity, and it does need clarity. The more options you give people, the more potentially complex the whole thing gets. But there are other options – such as payments at 65 or an annual payment over [people's] retirement years. All these questions are on the table."

Stephen Dorrell, the Tory chairman of the health select committee, has argued the need for integration, and Liz



Kendall, Burnham's deputy, has also done much groundwork for a revolution long favoured by Burnham, a onetime health secretary who says he is the only member of Ed Miliband's top table to be"a shadow of my former self".

Assuming that he succeeds in allaying colleagues' anxieties, his all-in health system may end up as one of Labour's big ticket pledges for 2015, along with a major house-building programme and a move towards universal childcare. Given Labour's coyness about what it might cut, could Ed Miliband afford even one of these flagship policies, let alone all three?"Partly what I'd cut to pay for my policy are hospital beds. I'm very clear that we could get much better results for the current £120bn we put into health and adult social care if we were to treat it as one budget. Some social care could be met for free from a much more preventative, home-based system."

The logical consequence of such a shift is fewer hospitals. "We're definitely saying that none of this is sacrosanct. We're not going to be on every picket line opposing every closure." The exemptions seem less clear. On planned retrenchment at Lewisham hospital and the Whittington, in north London, Burnham appears to be on the side of the anti-cuts lobby. "If there isn't a clinical case behind the changes, then we won't support them."

In the shorter term, Labour has modulated some aspects of government reforms, most recently seeing off regulations favouring private providers. None the less, Burnham says the NHS "feels as if it's on a knife edge", principally because elderly patients unable to get care at home due to council cuts are ending up in hospital.

"Just to say we're going to protect the NHS budget can be pretty meaningless. You shouldn't give a rise over and above inflation, because [more money] should go to councils. You can't have this mismatch between health and local government spending." Although Burnham opposes any notion that Labour should prune one of its untouchable budgets, such as healthcare, he claims his words have been twisted. "Because I was saying we should give the NHS inflation but not real terms increases, the Tories have mutated that into me wanting to cut the NHS, which isn't true. It has to be protected, but at the moment it's [failing to] use money as efficiently as it might. I'm working on the basis of no new money [though] I'm hoping that means inflation. But the way I shall get the improvements that we want is by full integration."

Given that others in the shadow cabinet are reported to be keener on simply promising to protect the NHS, Burnham must have struggled to get his plan even to the consultation stage. "I have made a strong argument. I've had to because I'm proposing something quite big. Where Ed B and I completely agree is that health will be a very big issue at the next election...I've got to convince not just Ed B but Ed Miliband too that I'm giving them the right policy.

"It's right that I should be tested. Ed B has set a number of efficiency drives going, assuming there will be no more money, so this kind of came from a Treasury request anyway. The economic necessity is that we have to think about combining these budgets, because local government will be completely overwhelmed if we don't. The financial imperative is probably as important as the quality imperative in all of this."

Burnham regards each small move as hopeful. "Getting permission to do the speech [in which he launched the idea at the King's Fund] was quite a big step," he says. Underlying any deference to doubters is a steeliness instilled by the blow of watching his last reform moves wither before the 2010 election. "I've really learnt from the last parliament and started early. The NHS is on a fast track to the fragmentation of the market when the future demands integration."

Much as he might wish to look ahead, the failures of the past continue to haunt Burnham. He has rejected suggestions that he did not do enough to investigate supposedly avoidable deaths in NHS trusts, saying he acted "firmly" and "immediately" on the information at his disposal. In addition, he remains supportive of David Nicholson, the

"Winning again is

critically linked to our ability

to show we want to reward

people who are doing the right

thing - to show we're on the

side of common sense and

people who are making

a contribution"

beleaguered head of the NHS who has been implicated in the scandal of appalling care at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust. "I wouldn't just put this at David's door. Our policy was a bit hospital-focused, and I don't too much blame people internally. We set that direction. I don't think I've seen David since I left the department, but I found him to be someone genuinely committed to the NHS and all it stands for.

"There have been failings in the NHS. It can't be perfection because of human error. But the overall context was an NHS which made huge strides forward." While that may not satisfy those who argue that he, along with his

Labour predecessors, have more questions to answer, few would argue with his diagnosis of a crisis in which "people really are fearing hospital...People are beginning to worry about mum or dad going into hospital, and that's a real change. What's really sad is that older people drop like a stone because hospitals are not geared to deal with all their needs."

Burnham has more personal experience than he would wish

of the services he hopes to revolutionise. "My gran went through the care system just over a decade ago, and it was thoroughly depressing. We walked in one day, and her knuckle was red raw because someone had ripped off her engagement ring and stolen it. I wasn't even a candidate at the time, but I remember my mum saying to me: 'If you ever get into parliament, you had better do something about this.'"

More recently, Burnham's wife, Marie-France, had a double mastectomy after tests showed that she had the gene for the breast cancer that killed her sister at the age of 39."What the NHS did for my wife was incredible. Her family were living in Belgium, and the care there is not as good as what is provided here. Of the three sisters, Claire died, and Louise, the eldest, had breast cancer but has seen it off.

"I remember being lobbied as a health minister to speed up genetic testing. I did a lot of work, never knowing that one day we would have to use those tests, and it does bring it home to you how [progress] can save lives." Marie-France's operation took place during the Labour leadership race in which Burnham overcame family trauma to fight a valiant campaign. "I've no regrets at all. I knew David [Miliband] would stand, and I thought Ed B would stand, but I didn't think Ed M would stand against David. So although I was the rank outsider, I also knew there was a real space for somebody to come through the hole [of the] Blair/Brown dynamic.

"Then shortly after the [general] election, Ed M rang me and said: 'I'm thinking of standing, and I wondered if you might support me.' I knew at that moment that the ground I was aiming for had gone, because Ed M was more prominent than me." And so it proved, even though Burnham, whose views are perceived to place him towards the right of the party, was never an ideological replica for the eventual winner.

Burnham, for example, was a strong believer in restricting new migrants' access to benefits long before the pos-

sibility was publicly floated by Yvette Cooper. "I've long argued within the shadow cabinet around the issue of benefits and the EU. I just found it indefensible on the doorstep at the last election that people should be able to repatriate child benefit. I couldn't and I can't defend it."

His restrictions would not stop there. For the first time, Burnham says that, if he becomes health secretary, he would wish to restrict migrants' access to the NHS. "There have to be pretty clear rules about entitlement. It can't be an open...system. People do try and take advantage of it, and we have to protect it [the NHS] from that."

So would he say, for example, that people had to spend

a year here before they had any access to free healthcare and that they would have to carry cards to prove their entitlement? "I do take a pretty tough line on these things," he says, citing only one exception. "If someone is in this country, I think they should get emergency care without checking up. If something's life-threatening or could seriously impair them, I think care should be given without checking their credit card

details. To go down an American system [for emergencies] would be antithetical to me.

"Essential emergency care should be provided free. Whether you can recover the cost later is a different question. But I believe on being tough on entitlements to care, because the NHS doesn't do well at chasing these bills ... Around [all] planned care, I would want a pretty tough entitlement."

Both on healthcare and benefits, he is "happy to look at" existing rules, with a view to toughening them considerably. "We've got to move away from saying that it's too hard to change so we shouldn't mention it, because that's not going to wash with people. When we left government, we had started to look like people who didn't want to do the right thing, or people who wanted something for nothing.

"Winning again is critically linked to our ability to show we want to reward people who are doing the right thing – to show we're on the side of common sense and people who are making a contribution. We need to regain that ground absolutely."

If that standpoint is anathema to some in his party, Burnham is inured to their disapproval. The leadership contest was, for him, a liberation. "When you go over a line and speak for yourself and no one else, you just think: Who am I, what do I really believe, what's my purpose in all this?" He doubts if he will ever run again but cannot be quite certain. "I don't know. But I don't think so. It took a hell of a lot out of me.

"And I've seen the pressures Ed has had to deal with. I think he's done fantastically well, to be honest. I've had my go, and my mission now is to build a health and care service for the 21st century." Vertigo sufferer and reluctant skydiver he may be, but there are few bolder or more ambitious politicians than Andy Burnham. He will soon find out whether he can aspire to be a Beveridge for our times or whether the law of political gravity will ordain that he instead becomes the man who fell to earth. F

## **Books**

## The bang! And the crash! And then what?

As a new form of capitalism struggles to emerge from the dust of the financial crash, there is much to learn from the economic decade which started it all, writes *Rob Tinker* 

The financial crisis will be a useful tool for economic historians. Until 2008, the relatively benign economic period that preceded it, now referred to as the 'Great Moderation', was less easy to periodise. Nothing like the crisis that beset Keynesianism during the 1970s and led to the collapse of the post-war consensus was in sight.

This clearly changed with the events that brought a number of 'too big to fail' financial institutions close to collapse. They seemed to mark the end of a consensus promulgated and advanced over the decade that Graham Stewart's *Bang!* takes as its focus.

Only with the crash are we beginning to appreciate, or accept, how inequitably the growth generated by this model has been distributed. So, why should today's decision makers be interested in the decade which did more than any other to promote its guiding assumptions? The answer is that as discredited as its ideas may be, five years after the financial crisis many of the institutions that underpinned this model are still in preponderance. As one author has described it, the failure has been a 'strange non-death'. To make sense of this resilience, economic analysis needs to be supplemented with a political and cultural explanation.

The social costs of Thatcherism were many. But as figures on the left from Stuart Hall to Ed Miliband have observed, its powerful combination of a strong political vision, economic radicalism, and sweeping cultural change commands recognition. Only by understanding their relationship can one hope to grasp how "the heresies of one period became ... the orthodoxies of the next".

Bang! surveys the development of these conditions over the course of the 1980s. Early discussion of Callaghan's management of financial crisis, rioting throughout English cities and the Labour party's internal battles provides an interesting vantage point from which to reflect on our social and economic challenges today. Synth-pop, electric baroque and acid house leave the reader more assured that we have moved on. In all cases Stewart commands a level of detail from which most readers will benefit, and compensates for a tendency towards ponderous discussion which makes the book over long.

Throughout, the author's admiration for the Iron Lady is not in question. Defining of, rather than defined by, her years in power, she is "...the reason why the 1980s began on 4 May 1979 and ended on 28 November 1990". More than anything, Thatcher's disruptive force – whether in the insulated world of the Tory'wets' or militant culture of the



Bang! A History of Britain in the 1980s

—Graham Stewart Atlantic Books £25



Rob Tinker is a researcher at the Fabian Society

trade unions – is celebrated as making possible the decisions none before her would have contemplated.

Despite these sympathies, Stewart's treatment is judicious. We are reminded that in contrast to the popular image of Boudica breaking the unions, the early years of Thatcher's leadership were marked by a sense of weakness. Similarly, at the point of Thatcher's re-election in 1983"the scale of the recession, by curbing tax receipts and boosting welfare payments, had increased rather than diminished the size of the state".

At times one is left wondering whether it is Thatcher or her ideology which was the truly transformative force; for some, Stewart's strong focus on the prime minister will restrict the potential of a wide-ranging history like <code>Bang!</code> to chart Thatcherism as an economic doctrine which drew upon culture and the vision of a new society for its strength and resilience. This expanded character of capitalism is touched upon but underdeveloped – most obviously in Stewart's account of the faith placed on privatisation during this period, and most interestingly in a chapter dedicated to the to the rise of postmodernism as the cultural logic of Thatcherite political economy.

In Stewart's view these ideas have been transformative and far reaching. In this assessment Bang! must be correct. All the better, we are told, to have led from the front in the monetarist revolution than been dragged along by it. Less definite is how far this neoliberal framework continues to condition our politics. Definitions vary unhelpfully, but at its basis neoliberalism can be thought of as the attempt to dismantle collective economic outcomes and in its place enshrine the individual consuming subject. A revival of interest in the collective identities fostered by tradition, trade unions, or more diverse forms of ownership may suggest a weakened hold. On the other hand, the struggle, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, to break monopoly in sectors such as banking and energy may suggest a continuing resilience. To the extent that actually existing neoliberals, rather than theoretical approaches, have always relied on state and legal apparatuses to impose and support the extension of markets, this present day contrast may simply reflect a deeper incoherence.

Maybe this demonstrates that, for all the Labour leader's talk of a new form of capitalism, an alternative of the kind that emerged from the 1970s is not yet forthcoming. What this well-researched book brings into relief is the scale of the opportunity that presents itself, and the mark that will be left, if it is realised. **F** 

## Community, solidarity and the Facebook generation

How can we stop the rising tide of youth alienation, asks *Claire Leigh* 



The past month has seen the publication of a raft of reports and analyses that claim that young people are disengaging in important ways from the social and community identities that have dominated British life in the post-war era. According to the Adam Smith Institute, today's youth are increasingly more likely to identify with virtual communities online, or with the plight of people living thousands of miles away, than with their fellow citizens. Meanwhile, a recent ICM poll found that 24 per cent of 18- 24-year-olds now disagree that it's important to get to know your neighbours, as opposed to just 11 per cent of pensioners.

It was ever thus, you might say. Youthful detached cosmopolitanism is an important but transient staple of political life, and fades as family, mortgages and traditional community ties take hold.

But perhaps more worryingly for the left, young people also seem to be falling out of love with key aspects of the social democratic project. 48 per cent of 18–24-year-olds disagreed with the statement that most people on unemployment benefits 'are for the most part unlucky rather than lazy'. The over-65s category registers just 25 per cent disagreement with the same statement. And according to Ipsos-Mori analysis of the latest British Social Attitudes survey, 'Generation Y' are significantly less satisfied with the NHS and less likely to favour higher benefits than their parents were at the same age.

If these figures signal underlying shifts in political sentiments of the next generation of voters, the generation that has traditionally been most vociferous in their defence of socialist values and institutions, then we in the Labour party have a problem.

These findings seem all the more surprising given that it is young people who have arguably been hardest hit by the economic crisis. Since the financial collapse hit in 2008, the scrapping of the education maintenance

allowance (EMA) and a concurrent tripling of university tuition fees have seen applications to higher education fall 15 per cent in the past year. Youth unemployment in 2012 topped 1 million for the first time in decades and further cuts threaten housing benefits for the under-25s. Meanwhile, the average age of first home ownership has hit a record high of 39.

The result of the crisis has been a dramatic reversal of what Ed Miliband has referred to as 'the promise of Britain', that each generation can expect a life of greater opportunity, prosperity and wellbeing than their parents. Today, YouGov reports that 83 per cent of young people expect to find it harder to buy a home than the previous generation, and 72 per cent believe it will be harder to find a good job.

The world over, industrialised countries are only just starting to come to terms with what all this means for their young people. Commentators in the US increasingly talk of a 'generation screwed', while European analysts have coined the term 'lost generation' to describe youth in a continent where 22 per cent of 15–24 year-olds are unemployed.

But instead of translating crisis into a vigorous defence of the state and the safety nets it provides, underpinned by a sense of solidarity with those at the sharp end of economic failure, young people seem instead to be retreating into a fragmented individualism, where self-actualisation and community are achieved online, with peers and through self-selecting communities of interest. The rising popularity of single-issue, often virtual, protest groups at the same time as young voters eschew the polling booth and mainstream political parties in ever greater numbers may be part of the same malaise.

How worried should we be by all this? Young people have arguably always been more loosely attached to traditional communities as they find their way in life. But wider trends may be compounding youth alienation in a much more fundamental way. When young adults were asked about what community meant to them, as part of the 'Generation Crisis' policy commissions run by the Young Fabians over the course of 2012, they reported struggling to find access points in society. The decline of traditional solidaritycementers, such as churches and unions, the greater frequency with which young people move jobs, and the growing need to move geographically for employment, higher education, training or to access affordable housing, all mean that the standard notion of community – of a neighbourhood where people all know each other's names, the family live close by and where different generations socialise

together – is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the realities of Robert Putnam's 'Bowling Alone' generation.

The vision of one nation is as much about re-building social solidarity in the post-Thatcher era as it is about reducing the inequalities that currently afflict us. You can't do one without the other. Showing that the state is capable of addressing inter-generational injustice, social alienation and the multi-faceted crisis facing young people today is an important step towards ensuring that a One Nation Britain takes its youngest members with it. F

The Young Fabians' new pamphlet, Generation Crisis, was launched at the Fabian Conference in January. The pamphlet provides an insight into how young people themselves view and understand the challenges facing them, and the ways they would like to see these tackled.

Claire Leigh is co-chair of the Labour Campaign for International Development and chair of Tonbridge and Malling CLP. She was Young Fabians vice chair between 2011–12.

#### DATES FOR YOUR DIARY

#### South Eastern Regional Conference Ethical Capitalism

Saturday 18 May, 10.30–4.00 Westgate Church Hall, Peterborough

Speakers include Gavin Shuker MP, Andrew Harrop, Andrew Sawford MP, Anne Campbell, Daniel Zeichner

Details from Brian Keegan on 07979 694305, email brian@briankeegan.demon.co.uk

#### South Western Regional Conference

Labour's Policy Review, Shaping the Next Manifesto

Saturday 8 June Miramar Hotel, Bournemouth Speakers include Kerry McCarthy MP, Andrew Harrop, Lord Jim Knight Details from Ian Taylor on 01202 396634

## Annual House of Commons Tea The Arts under the Coalition

Tuesday 9 July

Details from Deborah Stoate on 020 7227 4904

For information about all these events, please contact Deborah Stoate on 020 7227 4904 or at debstoate@hotmail.com

#### If these walls could talk

The Fabian Society is moving from its home of 85 years. Deborah Stoate tells the story of 11 Dartmouth Street




Fabian members will probably know by now that the Fabian Society is moving from its Westminster offices at 11 Dartmouth Street to new premises just around the corner, in Petty France. You might, as I do, have mixed feelings about the move, given the significance of the building in Fabian and Labour history. Logically it makes sense of course but there's no denying that Dartmouth Street has a fascinating past, and one which I would like to see recorded and remembered in some way. So why and how did the Society first move into its current office?

The Fabians moved into 11 Dartmouth Street in 1928 following the notice to terminate their tenancy of 25 Tothill Street. George Bernard Shaw – a prominent (and rich) member – made this possible by lending them £2500 as a 5 per cent loan to be secured as a mortgage towards the purchase price of £3150. The Executive minutes of Thursday 10 May 1928 note that Messrs Sidney Webb, F.W. Galton, then the General Secretary, and H.J. Laski be appointed to act on behalf of the Society in the acquisition of Dartmouth Street. They duly, as instructed, viewed and approved the suitability of the premises.

The loan from George Bernard Shaw was received with thanks on 21 June 1928. I don't know if Shaw was being tardy about actually producing the money as the minutes read, "Webb undertook to mention the question of mortgage to Shaw. If this failed, Galton was instructed to take the matter up with the solicitors and the bank...The question of making some grant to our tenants the Railway Club for the termination of their tenancy was deferred".

The Executive minutes of Thursday 4 October 1928 note Item 5: "Matters arising from removal. It was agreed that the common room, [which provided the advantages and conveniences of an inexpensive club for members including smoking accommoda-





tion, provision for chess and other games and tea and coffee served at low prices] should be re-opened on 15 October and to recommend that a house warming party be arranged for December 13". It, sadly, was also agreed that the piano"no longer needed for our use, be sold". (November's minutes note that it was sold to the Army and Navy Co-op Society for £12). And the problem of the poor Railway Club tenants was resolved as well, in that it was agreed that an allowance of £20 off the quarter's rent be made.

So how was the move presented to the members in the monthly issues of Fabian News? We learn from July 1928's Fabian News that "members and friends will learn with regret that after 14 years in its present offices, the Society's tenancy has been terminated, the premises having been sold for rebuilding". The loan was mentioned but interestingly, Shaw remained an anonymous donor. Members were informed that the Fabian common room would be closed as the housekeeper would be away so no more refreshments would be served, but that the newspapers and journals would be supplied as usual.

The Society reopened in Dartmouth St on 15 October 1928 and disarmingly apologised in advance for delay in responding to correspondence "due to the disorganisation of the office consequent upon its removal". Thankfully, the common room opened again and the 'At Home' was announced –

to be held in the Livingstone Hall, right by Dartmouth Street. Tickets were two shillings and expected to sell out fast, and for that members were offered "coffee, some music and short speeches". Also on offer was the opportunity to have a look round the new premises.

Well let's hope that the housewarming party went with a swing, that the coffee went down well, that the speeches were indeed short and the members enjoyed their tours of Dartmouth Street. I can't help feeling regretful about the loss of the piano. We can imagine - possibly - the Webbs, Shaw, Laski and all, gathered round the Fabian piano in the common room – having dismissed the housekeeper – maybe singing'The Fabian Magnificat', a pastiche composed around that time which begins: "My soul doth magnify the State and my spirit hath rejoiced in Webb my Saviour"; and ends: "Glory be to the Fabians and to the Manager and to the Bureaucrat, As it was in Dartmouth Street, And in the Labour Exchange and in the House of Commons. Wages without End."

As it was in Dartmouth Street! Well let's hope that Petty France will, in the years ahead, come to represent all that Dartmouth Street did, in the hearts and heads of all present and future Fabians.

Deborah Stoate is local societies officer at the Fabian Society

## Listings

Regular meetings. Contact Alan Scutt on 0208 304 0413 or alan.scutt@phonecoop.coop

#### BIRMINGHAM

Regular meetings at 7.00 in the Birmingham and Midland Institute, Margaret Street, Birmingham. Details from Claire Spencer on virginiaisawitch@gmail.com

#### BOURNEMOUTH & DISTRICT

26 April: Jon Trickett MP on 'How can Labour Win a Majority in 2015?' 31 May: Chi Onwurah MP. Meetings at The Friends Meeting House, Wharncliffe Rd, Boscombe, Bournemouth at 7.30. Contact Ian Taylor on 01202 396634 for details or taylorbournemouth@gmail.

#### BRIDGEND

Society re-forming. Members or potential members should contact Huw Morris at huwjulie@tiscali.co.uk or telephone 01656 654946 or 07876552717

BRIGHTON & HOVE
Details of all meetings from Maire
McQueeney on 01273 607910 email mairemcqueeney@waitrose.com

Society reforming. Contact Ges Rosenberg for details on grosenberg@ churchside.me.uk

#### CAMBRIDGE

Details from Feng Ding at cambridgefabians@gmail.com. Join the Cambridge Fabians Facebook group at www.facebook.com/groups/ cambridgefabiansociety

#### CARDIFF & THE VALE

Details of all meetings from Jonathan Wynne Evans on 02920 594 065 or wynneevans@phonecoop.coop

#### CENTRAL LONDON

Details from Giles Wright on 0207 227 4904 or giles.wright@fabians.org.uk

#### CHATHAM & AYLESFORD

New Society forming. Please contact Sean Henry on 07545 296800 or seanhenry@live.co.uk

#### CHISWICK & WEST LONDON

All meetings at 8.00 in Committee Room, Chiswick Town Hall. Details from Monty Bogard on 0208 994 1780, email mb014fl362@blueyonder.co.uk

#### COLCHESTER

Details from John Wood on 01206 212100 or woodj@madasafish.com or 01206

CUMBRIA & NORTH LANCASHIRE
31 May: Jackie Daniel, CEO, University
Hospitals, Morecombe Bay Trust. 28
June: Lord Liddle on'Britain's Economic
Future'. Meetings, 6.30 for 7.00 at Castle
Green Hotel, Kendal. For information, please contact Dr Robert Judson at dr.robertjudson@btinternet.com

#### DARTFORD & GRAVESHAM

Regular meetings at 8.00 in Dartford Working Men's Club, Essex Rd, Dartford.

Details from Deborah Stoate on 0207 227 4904 email debstoate@hotmail.com

Details for meetings from Alan Jones on 01283 217140 or alan.mandh@btinternet.

#### DONCASTER & DISTRICT

New Society forming, for details and information contact Kevin Rodgers on 07962 019168 email k.t.rodgers@gmail.

#### EAST LOTHIAN

Details of all meetings from Noel Foy on 01620 824386 email noelfoy@lewisk3.

#### **EDINBURGH**

Regular Brain Cell meetings. Details of these and all other meetings from Daniel Johnson at daniel@scottishfabians.org.uk

#### **EPSOM & EWELL**

New Society forming. If you are interested, please contact Carl Dawson at carldawson@gmail.com

25 April: Lord Glasman on Blue Labour and the Fabians'. 30 May: Jenny Manson on'Public Service on the Brink'. Enquiries to Mike Walsh on 07980 602122 mike. walsh@ntlworld.com

Now holding regular meetings. Contact Martin Hutchinson on mail@liathach.net

Regular meetings at TGWU, 1 Pullman Court, Great Western Rd, Gloucester. Details from Roy Ansley on 01452 713094 email roybrendachd@yahoo.co.uk

#### **GREENWICH**

If you are interested in becoming a member of this local Society, please contact Chris Kirby on ccakirby@hotmail.

Regular meetings. Details from Maureen Freeman on m.freeman871@btinternet.

Details from Marilyn Devine on 0208 424 9034. Fabians from other areas where there are no local Fabian Societies are very welcome to join us.

#### HASTINGS & RYE

Meetings held on last Friday of each month. Please contact Nigel Sinden at fabian@sindenql.com

18 April: Cllr Sanchia Alasia on 'French Politics'. Details of all meetings from David Marshall email david.c.marshall. t21@btinternet.com tel 01708 441189 For latest information, see the website http://haveringfabians.org.uk. 16 May: 7.30 pm, Clive Efford MP, shadow Sports Minister, on the Olympic Legacy Hornchurch Library.

New Society forming. Secretary Deborah Matthews can be contacted at HullFabians@gmail.com, on Twitter at @ HullFabians or on 07958 314846

#### ISLINGTON

Details from John Clarke at johnclarke00@yahoo.co.uk

Details of all meetings from John Bracken at leedsfabians@gmail.com

#### MANCHESTER

Society reforming. Details from Rosie Clayton on rosie\_clayton@hotmail.co.uk

#### THE MARCHES

Society re-forming. If you are interested, please contact Jeevan Jones at ieevanjones@outlook.com

#### MERSEYSIDE

Please contact Phillip Brightmore at p.a.brightmore@gmail.com

#### MIDDLESBOROUGH

Please contact Andrew Maloney on 07757 952784 or email andrewmaloney@ hotmail.co.uk for details

#### MILTON KEYNES

Anyone interested in helping to set up a new society, contact David Morgan on jdavidmorgan@googlemail.com

#### NEWHAM

Regular meetings. Contact Tahmina Rahman – Tahmina\_rahman\_1@hotmail.

#### NORTHUMBRIA AREA

For details and booking contact Pat Hobson at pat.hobson@hotmail.com

#### NORTHAMPTON AREA

If you are interested in becoming a member of this new society, please contact Dave Brede on davidbrede@ vahoo.com

#### NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE

Any Fabian interested in joining a North Staffordshire Society, please contact Richard Gorton on r.gorton748@ btinternet.com

#### NORWICH

Society reforming. Contact Andreas Paterson – andreas@headswitch.co.uk

#### NOTTINGHAMSHIRE

10 May: Ivana Bartoletti and Lilian Greenway on 'Feminism and One Nation Labour' 7.00, UNISON, Vivian Avenue, Nottingham. Details from Lee Garland. secretary@nottsfabians.org.uk, www. nottsfabians.org.uk, twitter @NottsFabians

#### PETERBOROUGH

Meetings at 8.00 at the Ramada Hotel, Thorpe Meadows, Peterborough. Details from Brian Keegan on 01733 265769, email brian@briankeegan.demon.co.uk

#### PORTSMOUTH

Regular meetings. Details from Daniel Greenaway at daniel.idris.greenaway@ gmail.com

#### READING & DISTRICT

For details of all meetings, contact Tony Skuse on 0118 978 5829 email tony@ skuse.net

#### SHEFFIELD

Regular meetings on the 3rd Thursday of the month at The Quaker Meeting House, 10, St James St, Sheffield.S1 2EW Details and information from Rob Murray on 0114 255 8341or email robertljmurray@hotmail.com

#### SOUTH EAST LONDON

For details, contact Duncan Bowie on 020 8693 2709 or email duncanbowie@ vahoo.co.uk

#### SOUTH WEST LONDON

Contact Tony Eades on 0208487 9807 or tonyeades@hotmail.com

SOUTHAMPTON AREA For details of venues and all meetings, contact Eliot Horn at eliot.horn@ btinternet.com

#### SOUTH TYNESIDE

For information about this Society please contact Paul Freeman on 0191 5367 633 or at freemanpsmb@blueyonder.co.uk

Details from John Cook on 01473 255131, email contact@ipswich-labour.org.uk

Regular meetings at Guildford Cathedral Education Centre Details from Robert Park on 01483 422253, robert@park. titandsl.co.uk

TONBRIDGE & TUNBRIDGE WELLS
12 April: Debate' The Profit Motive has no place in Taxpayer-Funded Services'. 3 May: Rob Tinker, Fabian Society Researcher on 'How to Reduce the Deficit in a Socialist Way'. For details of meetings contact John Champneys on 01892 523429

#### TYNEMOUTH

Monthly supper meetings, details from Brian Flood on 0191 258 3949

#### WARWICKSHIRE

All meetings 7.30 at the Friends Meeting House, 28 Regent Place, Rugby Details from Ben Ferrett on ben\_ferrett@hotmail.com or http://warwickshirefabians.blogspot.com/

#### WEST DURHAM

The West Durham Fabian Society welcomes new members from all areas of the North East not served by other Fabian Societies. It has a regular programme of speakers from the public, community and voluntary sectors. It meets normally on the last Saturday of alternate months at the Joiners Arms, Hunwick between 12.15 and 2.00pm light lunch £2.00. Contact the Secretary Cllr Professor Alan Townsend, 62A Low Willington, Crook, Durham DL15 OBG, tel, 01388 746479 email Alan.Townsend@ dur.ac.uk

#### WIMBLDON

Please contact Andy Ray on 07944 545161or andyray@blueyonder.co.uk

Regular meetings on 3rd or 4th Fridays at 7.45 at Jacob's Well, Off Miklegate, York. Details from Steve Burton on steve. burton688@mod.uk

## Fabian News



### FABIAN QUIZ

ANSWERS MUST BE RECEIVED NO LATER THAN FRIDAY 28TH JUNE 2013



## THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME

#### – Adrian Raine

A culmination of Adrian Raine life's work so far, *The Anatomy of Violence* draws on the latest scientific research to explain what it reveals about the brains of murderers, psychopaths and serial killers. The book offers the latest answers to some of the most difficult questions: what are the causes of violence? Can it be treated? And might it one day be stopped? Are some criminals born, not made? What causes violence and how can we treat it? Through a series of case studies of famous criminals, Raine shows how their criminal behaviour might be explained on the basis of these new scientific discoveries but the conclusions point to a host of philosophical and moral issues as well.

## Penguin has kindly given us five copies to give away. To win one, answer the following question:

In the nursery rhyme 'Oranges and Lemons' what follows: "Oranges and lemons, Say the bells of St. Clement's, You owe me five farthings, Say the bells of St.Martin's..."



Please email your answer and your address to: review@fabian-society.org.uk Or send a postcard to: Fabian Society, Fabian Quiz 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1H 9BN

### **Noticeboard**

#### **Fabian Fortune Fund**

WINNERS:

Graham Cole £100 Austin Mitchell £100

Half the income from the Fabian Fortune Fund goes to support our research programme. Forms and further information from Giles Wright, giles.wright@fabians.org.uk

## Family, Ageing and the Care Society with Liz Kendall MP

## Committee Room 14, House of Commons 7 May 2013, 6.30pm-8pm

In association with Labour's Policy Review, Liz Kendall (Shadow Minister for Care and Older People) will deliver a keynote speech on how changes in family life and the implications of our ageing population call for radical new approaches to public services and the role of the state. Experts in the field will respond to Liz's speech before we take questions from the floor.


To register please visit www.fabians.org.uk/events

Usdaw's Freedom From Fear Campaign seeks to prevent violence, threats and abuse against shopworkers.

Usdaw believes that it is time that the law protected shopworkers whose job requires them to have face-to-face contact with the public in the same way as emergency services workers are protected.

Visit our website for some great campaign ideas and resources: www.usdaw.org.uk/campaigns

To join Usdaw visit: www.usdaw.org.uk or call: 0845 60 60 640\*



General Secretary: **John Hannett ●** President: **Jeff Broome**Usdaw, 188 Wilmslow Road, Manchester M14 6LJ

#### Scan here\*

to view the latest news and resources from our Freedom From Fear Campaign.



www.usdaw.org.uk/fff

to scan the code, download a QR reader app from your app store. A charge may be applied by your network provider.