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How integration can deliver the good society

Nick Johnson

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Separate and Unequal

How integration can deliver the good society

Nick Johnson

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In addition to this publication, the FES engages with equality issues in the framework of the Good Society debate (www.goodsociety.eu).

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Nick Johnson, September 2010

INTRODUCTION

Britain is separate and unequal. It is separate because it is unequal, and it is unequal because it is separate. The gap between rich and poor, having exploded during the 1980s, is still growing, despite measures to address poverty in the 13 years of Labour Government. At the same time, we face growing fragmentation in our communities.

Overall, things are looking pretty gloomy for equality campaigners. Britain, as well as being a society with declining social mobility and an increased gap between rich and poor, is a country where social segregation is increasing. We are still living with the Thatcher legacy, which not only profoundly accelerated inequality and social division, but also created an ethos that there is 'no such thing as society'. Collective institutions such as trade unions and political parties are steadily losing members. Our society has become far less integrated. The ties that bind people together have eroded, to be replaced by the idea of every individual for themselves. David Cameron talks of the 'Big Society' but there is little substance and the onset of massive cuts to public spending only further threaten the most vulnerable and isolated.

Two years ago, Britain's income inequality returned to its highest ever level according to a study by the Institute of Fiscal Studies. Meanwhile, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation's recent publication on 'social evils' identified

the decline of community as leaving people "isolated, lonely and fearful". That is not to say that 13 years of Labour government achieved nothing. The evidence shows that Labour had at least managed to halt or significantly slow the trends that it inherited in 1997. Without many of the policy interventions we have seen, the situation would be far worse.

However, the fact is that those interventions have not gone far enough – the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s had a more profound impact upon British society than Labour since 1997.

For too long, those campaigning for equality and those working for integration have been arguing against one another rather than working together. We are not likely to address concerns about our increasing social atomisation and the fracturing of society into ever smaller groups, whether of class and income, race or faith, unless we realise that a more integrated society must be one where citizens are more equal, more empowered and more connected to each other. Nor is it easy to see how greater equality can be achieved without a strong sense of solidarity to underpin broad alliances to pursue a shared vision of the good society.

This pamphlet looks in detail at what 'integration' really means across a series of policy areas, showing how we can measure success in education, work, health and social care, housing, criminal justice, and political participation.

I argue that the good society we need to pursue is both more equal and more integrated. But this is not the politics of equality or indeed of integration that we currently have. First we need to understand why that is.

What's going wrong?

There are heated and polarised debates about integration, without a clear enough sense of what we are trying to achieve

In part we have arrived at this state of affairs because integration was frequently used interchangeably with assimilation in some of the immigration debates of the 1950s and 1960s. The word has come back into fashion in the early years of this century, though meaning something very different. To some extent, however, it has been reactive – responding to the latest issue of public and political concern – rather than a new considered programme of action. Too often policy has been driven by events and crises, without a clear enough sense of where we are headed. Events like the summer riots of 2001 or the London bombings of July 2005 have inevitably had a significant impact on public discussion. But it is less clear that there is an overall sense of direction beyond crisis flashpoints. For as long as we see integration as a fix to be applied to individual problems, we will be unable to take the necessary strategic approach.

Over the last decade there has been a great deal of focus on the question of how to 'join up' different strands of the equality debate – particularly aimed at finding commonality among the different strands of discrimination – in order to create a stronger and more coherent framework for equality policy and campaigning. This has always competed with a fear that this 'joining up' could lead to particular causes and concerns being diluted and lost.

A great deal – and probably too much – of the debate about integration and equality has been conducted around issues of race and faith, where there has been a fierce debate for and against the concept of multiculturalism over the last decade. Those outside this debate can struggle to identify precisely what

is at stake, and often feel torn by competing impulses. While there are important issues at stake for a politics of equality and integration, those who feel this debate might now be generating more heat than light need to ask whether we can identity a common frame of reference which can reconcile the liberal case for diversity with the need for common bonds of solidarity. This pamphlet tries to do this.

The academic debate about different conceptions of multiculturalism risks becoming too much about abstract definitions, with little clarity about the real world political or policy consequences.

What we see currently is the result of our lack of a broad policy framework bound together by integration: a confused combination of high-level analysis, small-scale initiatives and highly targeted pots of funding. We are treating symptoms, not finding a cure. To bring about the social change that is needed, we require a deeper understanding of what is happening and the levers we need to use. That is why integration matters, because it provides the political vision in which programmes can be developed; it looks at the wider situation and not just different aspects in a piecemeal fashion. However, the concept of integration is still too fuzzy and ill-defined. To broaden it out from a focus solely on race and ethnicity and into other policy areas we must decide with far greater clarity what we mean by the term, and that is what this pamphlet sets out to do.

Public debate is too often framed around a choice between a politics of equality or a politics of integration, failing to understand the way in which these are inextricably linked.

Life chances and greater equality has always been central to the centre-left's vision of the good society. Indeed, the Fabian Commission on Life Chances and Child Poverty

came up with detailed definitions of how we should measure life chances as "the likelihood of a child achieving a range of important outcomes which occur at successive stages of the life course" and examined the current picture through a number of different dimensions. Any definition and framework for integration can expect to build heavily upon this work. Securing more equal life chances is integral to an integrated society.

However, integration goes further than that. It is about the type of society in which we live – our relationships with each other as well as our own individual opportunities. A good society is one where there is mutual trust, reciprocity and solidarity. Recent work on social capital, particularly by Robert Putnam, has enriched our notions of what a positive community life can look like and how we can assess the factors that influence it. A good society requires that we worry more than just about individual equality indicators: it also demands we look at the health of our social fabric. Just as someone's background should not be a predictor of the opportunities they have, it should also not erect social barriers between people.

This pamphlet argues that a major reason for the inability to close the equality gap under the previous Government has been the failure to recognise that segregation entrenches inequality. As I argue later, we should see any group of people who live in tight, inward-looking communities that are defined by some limited facet of their identity, as being segregated. And the end result is almost certain to be increased inequality. This report presents evidence as to how often issues of inequality and segregation go together, and how they might be addressed together.

There is disagreement about the facts of segregation – and whether and in what ways this matters.

The heated debate about the facts of segregation has been fuelled by the complex nature of the evidence. What is clear is that Britain has become sharply more unequal in socio-economic terms, with rising segregation by social class, and vocal narratives that identify specific groups in terms of an underclass and a 'broken society'. This presents significant challenges for an egalitarian politics. There has been a hotly contested disagreement about segregation by race and faith, with fears raised about complacency on the one hand, and alarmism on the other.

Though the evidence is mixed, it is important to address the question of what we are seeking to achieve. The fear of catastrophic social breakdown has been frequently overstated, ever since Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech 40 years ago. But social democrats want to do much more than prevent the sky from falling in.

Challenging segregation is, of course, not about calling for an end to immigration and nor is it about attacking groups who have become cut off from the rest of society. We should reject the claim that increased diversity in itself makes collective risk-sharing or welfare institutions impossible, but it is necessary to pay attention to how public institutions and policy can build or undermine a sense of solidarity and shared experience if we wish to prevent social segregation – in terms of class, race or faith – becoming deeply entrenched.

So the debate about why integration matters would make considerably more sense and be less polarized if it sought to connect concerns about the risks of social class segregation to concerns about race and faith.

There has been too much rhetoric, and too little social change

The argument for integration has often not been well made by its advocates. This reflects several of the difficulties set out above: that the objectives have been vague, and sometimes there has been a danger of falling into the trap of defining integration as an alternative to a politics of equality, rather than stressing their interdependence.

The promotion of integration has too often been primarily rhetorical. Speaking in favour of integration is a long way short of a coherent agenda to promote it. Indeed, the Labour Government's embrace of the language but not the substance has had the unfortunate consequence of leaving no-one satisfied: it has failed to take the required action whilst simultaneously angering many on the left, who fear integration has become a mechanism to avoid lingering issues of discrimination and inequality.

Too little attention has been paid to what an integration agenda means in practice. As a concept and set of ideals, it has barely made its way beyond the walls of academic debates about ethnicity and race, let alone into the mainstream of political discourse about, say, sink estates, GP practices, Job Centres, the prison population or further education. But it offers progressive politics a vision of a good society and a way beyond some failing policies.

The notion of integration has been embraced by all political parties. However, the same word is often used to describe very different intended outcomes. It can be highly progressive and yet it is also used by those who seek to restrict immigration or take away all translation services.

Where do we go from here?

This is why we must define integration – and unite around a progressive and practical vision of it.

Doing so will also highlight some tensions: the rhetorical case for integration has gone alongside an advocacy of a strong strand of individualism. But there are conflicts here that need to be highlighted. Integration and choice can clash – for example, in education policies. If this is not even being acknowledged, then integration may not be being taken seriously. The rise of faith as a factor in school choice, for instance, has allowed parents to place their children into a narrow facet of their identity and cut themselves off from the wider community. In this respect, policy has placed individual choice ahead of community solidarity.

The progressive integration agenda

In early 2005, I wrote that we needed to focus on "integration, defined as an inter-dependent combination of equality, interaction and participation." Notably, this was before the bombings on the London underground and the subsequent tendency to see integration primarily in relation to terrorism. That definition of integration was simple and not supported by a detailed policy programme. However, what it aimed to do was to provide a framework for addressing issues of profound inequality and social diversity in the twenty first century. Since that time, much has changed and the policy debate has raged but, perhaps because the debate has been so heated, we have not been able to properly define what that integration might mean in policy terms. That must change.

Those three central tenets of an integrated society – equality, interaction and participation – still hold true. Integration demands that our citizens are equal, connected and empow-

ered. This not only represents a progressive analysis of Britain's diversity but it can ensure that we do not allow a continued separation between advocates of social cohesion and those advocating greater equality. We now need to go beyond a high-level definition and work out what that agenda means in practice.

The best test of an integrated society would be how far we all felt part of it – integral to it. It would be a society where we felt responsibility for each other; where we could be confident that we had a fair chance in life and which sought to ensure equal opportunities for all; where we knew that our voice counted, and respected that of everybody else. That would be a more equal society than that of Britain today.

An integrated society is one that is socially just and where there is a commitment to equality for all. However, it is more than that. Integration demands a high level of social solidarity and democratic empowerment. It requires this not just because they are worthy aims, but because without one, the others will be impossible to achieve.

Integration is both ambitious and progressive and should be a key part of a centre-left policy framework; and can build on the twin tenets of equality and solidarity and provide a progressive outline for action that is both strategic and substantive.

PART ONE

Why We Need Progressive Integration

The new politics of integration

Because the left in politics is primarily motivated by the values of equality and fairness, issues of integration and identity are often viewed as being a distraction from what really matters: if social problems are addressed, issues of identity will look after themselves. But there are two problems with this approach. Rediscovering the politics of class matters but the claim that all issues of identity and integration can be reduced to the single dimension of social class inequality is unconvincing. Furthermore, class is in many ways as much about identity as race or faith. Surely, it is socio-economic inequality – income disparity and poverty – that we really care about? That is different from class per se which is about identity. Talk of class can distract us from the actual differences in equality of both opportunities and outcomes that we need to focus upon.

There is an important political problem too. It will not be possible to build the broad coalitions needed to address social inequalities if issues of identity are dismissed as second order. This will seem like a desire to change the subject, rather than to link those concerns to a substantive egalitarian agenda.

Meanwhile others, some on the political right but across the spectrum too, like to champion greater integration, insisting on the importance of being clearer about shared values and norms. Attention to the ties that bind a society together is important. But a socio-economic dimension is too often missing.

This then risks being a primarily rhetorical, top down and ineffective approach, which is likely to fail if it loudly proclaims the promise of integration – and demands allegiance to it – without paying sufficient attention to the question of whether the promise of integration and opportunity is being honoured. If arguments about integration in terms of values and citizenship, and arguments about social equality seem to run on separate tracks, they are both fatally diminished. And, rather than being a way to make the necessary links about the case for a strong shared citizenship, rhetoric around a 'broken society' risks entrenching segregated inequalities.

Getting integration right can also help us change the debate around immigration. Labour currently risks getting into a false debate between those who equate a more liberal immigration policy with progressive politics and those who feel we need to talk and act tougher to win back support from certain sections of the population. We need to break the link between immigration and race. If we can refocus upon the decline of community and the need to promote solidarity, we can address some of the issues that local communities need to feel secure. Rising population mobility does bring challenges with it – our funding mechanisms, service provision capacity and housing supply are slow to respond. Particularly in a time of economic uncertainty, people's insecurity is bound to be rising. We need to undertake measures to restore security rather than try to sound tough on immigration. Stronger and more equal

communities will not be as hostile to immigration or as susceptible to the arguments of the far right. Getting integration right will ease the left's fears over immigration.

Defining integration as the combination of equality and solidarity will also provide us with a way in which we can assess the policies and impact of the Coalition Government. Their new policies and procedures can be judged in the context of whether they work towards these goals or not. It can also provide a framework by which Labour can refresh and renew its agenda while in opposition.

Separate and unequal

The world over, segregation entrenches inequality. And a more equal society can only happen with greater integration.

Deliberate segregation on racial lines is illegal under the UK's race relations legislation, but segregation does not have to be calculated policy for it to exist. The law merely makes a deliberate decision to segregate illegal; it does not make segregation per se unlawful. Indeed, legislating against segregation is only the start of a process for full integration. Despite the landmark Brown vs Board of Education decision in the United States in 1954 and the raft of civil rights legislation passed by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the 1968 Kerner Commission still asserted that America was "moving towards two societies – separate and unequal". Forty years on, the facts clearly tell us that the United States is still "through separation and segregation, institutionalising and perpetuating inequality". (Cashin, 2004) This was a pattern seen in the 2001 riots in our northern towns – where the investigative Panel found widespread inequality, reinforced and often exacerbated by the fact that people were leading 'parallel lives'.

The segregation debate has traditionally been framed in ethnic terms but we should be clear that segregation applies to any group of people living in isolated communities. It does not matter in terms of outcomes whether this separation is caused by personal choice, social pressures or is influenced by policy. The end result is almost certain to be increased inequality as the incentives for action are reduced – out of sight, out of mind is too often the result. As the geographer, Mike Poulsen has argued, segregation leads to discrimination in the labour market, disadvantage in the housing market and reduced access to human capital (Poulsen, 2006).

To demonstrate, let's look at things through the lens of ethnic minority communities, for whom the data is most readily available. Successive Social Exclusion Unit reports have documented that Britain's ethnic minority population has an increased chance of living both in poverty and in poorer neighbourhoods. Their geographical isolation makes it harder for services to reach these communities. Entrenched language and cultural barriers make access to information and services more difficult. Geographical exclusion makes the path out of poverty even more difficult. Place matters; locality can have a profound effect upon life chances. For many it is a double whammy – as well as being more likely to suffer from poverty themselves, they are also more likely to live in poor areas. And in all this, the aspirations of local people are limited by the world around them. This is clear in socio-economic as well as ethnic terms. As research for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation asserts, over the past forty years "areas that were already wealthy have tended to become disproportionally wealthier and areas that experienced high levels of relative poverty saw these levels increase."(Wheeler et al, 2005) This may explain why many of the previous Government's social justice initiatives have not had the impact that had been hoped.

It is the data on ethnic segregation that has caused most debate in the recent arguments over the future of Britain's multiculturalism. While it is certainly true that some ethnic minority communities are moving out from urban centres into traditionally white, middle-class areas, many inner cities are becoming increasingly concentred with minority populations. The row over data has often concentrated on contradictory interpretations of the same data sets, primarily derived from the 2001 Census. Both trends outlined above are visible but academics and other commentators choose which aspects of these suit their wider political point. Rather than offering a detailed analysis of the data, we end up with ideological arguments with each side using the data that supports their cause. As Alan Carling has concluded, we end up with "a political struggle for the correct position rather than a technical struggle with recalcitrant numerical data". However, one area of agreement between geographers and social scientists is that segregation is a bad thing.

Equality and integration are not 'either, or'; they are not in opposition to one another.

What is clear is that Britain is experiencing rapid and significant demographic change that is changing the nature of our communities and posing profound public policy challenges.

An increasing polarization or separation of communities matters beyond the simple argument over equality. A range of reviews of local authority areas undertaken by the Institute of Community Cohesion found that where communities live separately, there is greater fear, mistrust and ignorance about other communities. This is frequently exploited by extremists who play on the lack of understanding to turn

communities against one another. In some cases, as in the north of England in 2001 or Lozells in Birmingham in 2005, this can result in civil unrest. More usually, it simply results in reduced levels of social capital and a lack of social solidarity. It may also be a partial explanation for the recent increase in public concern about issues of immigration and race relations and the toxic way this is often expressed, as seen in the electoral success of the BNP.

These issues and concerns have been the trigger for a new approach to community policy in the last few years. Community cohesion (LGA, 2002) has been the primary policy tool used by the public sector since the Home Office and subsequently Communities and Local Government largely adopted the findings of the Cantle report. In reality, much of the practice that has developed has been rooted in 'contact theory', and the belief that contact between groups can reduce prejudice. The leading proponent of this work has been Miles Hewstone who has used the experiences of Northern Ireland to support his case for heightened interaction between communities as a way of breaking down barriers (Hewstone et al, 2006). Contact theory challenges assumptions about existing group identities and suggests that contact is the key to forming new identities and to establishing relationships based upon mutual interests rather than a fixed identity. Positive interactions can challenge assumptions about who 'people like us' might be. Rather than be the result of prejudice, heritage or instinctive bonding, it is social circumstance and familiarity that should determine relationships. This is all important but this focus has allowed for critics to ignore the fact that equality is also fundamental. Even though the original report argued that the barriers to cohesion were created by persistent inequality, too much of cohesion policy subsequently has focussed on the interaction side of things rather than equality. 'Community cohesion' has

been used to have a sharper concrete focus on delivery, but with relatively little clarity about the principles and values which underpin it. It has also led to new areas of policy rather than changing existing ones.

Integration offers us a way beyond this, by stressing the three elements of equality, interaction and participation. Too often critics have ignored the importance of equality. For all the opprobrium heaped on Trevor Phillips – the then Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality – after his speech warning that Britain was "sleepwalking to segregation", the passages of that same speech that talked in detail of the need to break the cycles of underachievement and discrimination were simply ignored by his political opponents.

Public concern about a lack of integration and rising immigration is unchallenged by the left.

Equality and integration are not 'either, or'; they are not in opposition to one another. Rather, each needs the other and they cannot work apart. Some critics from the left, such as Ken Livingstone who claimed Phillips was "pandering to the right" so much that "soon he'll be joining the BNP", claim that integration is actually an assimilationist argument. They say that it is all about equality and that a focus upon interaction is a way of ignoring discrimination and pervasive inequality.

At best, this is quite simply a refusal to listen to the argument for integration. The worst thing about this though is that it has allowed the right to define the diversity argument. From 'Rivers of Blood' onwards, the left has been on the defensive on matters of migration and culture. This has allowed the right to embrace integration without equality in part because some on the left have banished integration from

debates over equality and fairness. We end up with a left that seems only interested in equality while the right can conveniently ignore it in criticising minority communities for cutting themselves off from the rest of society. This plays into the false idea that they are competing notions. Public concern about a lack of integration and rising immigration is unchallenged by the left.

Integration should build upon many progressive causes. It can emphasise the campaign for racial equality and recognition of Britain as a multi-ethnic society but goes far beyond that. Not only does it bring in other minority groups but it embraces campaigns against child poverty and promotes social mobility for all. Integration also builds upon the left's traditional commitment to solidarity and collective action; it recognises that we are greater than the sum of our parts and what Martin Luther King called the "inter-related structure of reality".

Beyond multiculturalism

Moving forward on integration means navigating a way around multiculturalism. A major factor in the current integration debate is how the thesis of multiculturalism has struggled to adapt to the age of 'super diversity' and the wider range of identities this presents. Integration is able to build upon the progressive elements of multiculturalism while taking it beyond notions of race and faith into a wider policy framework. It is also the bridge whereby we can bring together a commitment to race equality with wider campaigns for social justice and solidarity.

Multiculturalism is a set of ideals particularly prevalent amongst progressive academics and campaigners who argued for the celebration and maintenance of distinct cultures. As a counter to right-wing assimilationist arguments,

multiculturalism asserts the equal value of all cultures and argues that we should not impose a single norm to which everyone in society has to adhere to, whatever their own ethnic or religious background.

It developed in an era with a small number of clearly identifiable minorities who had made a once-in-a-lifetime decision to move to Britain. This contrasts with today's patterns of migration where satellite television, the internet and the availability of air travel enables greater transnational ties and means notions of a single transfer of identity are redundant. Increasingly we see dual or multiple nationalities and loyalties with some people regarding their social networks as being half way around the world as well as down their street and diaspora communities becoming a powerful element in society.

This poses a challenge for progressives. Multiculturalism has been a key plank of the left's platform for over forty years. Indeed, almost all the significant markers of positive social change and greater racial equality have occurred under Labour governments from Wilson to Blair. The left's embrace of multiculturalism has been crucial in making Britain a country increasingly at ease with its diversity.

The origins of British multiculturalism were a direct response to the mono-cultural quasi-imperial assumptions of Britain in the 1950s. It was a reaction to those who asked all immigrants to suppress their heritage and sought to impose a uniform notion of white cultural supremacy. Thus multiculturalism was vital in asserting the legitimacy of different cultures and cultural identities. This in turn led to explicit anti-discrimination legislation and means of funding and supporting the maintenance of divergent cultures. In taking on the then orthodoxy, multiculturalism was triumphant and

went a long way to making Britain a relatively successful multi-ethnic society.

However, an approach that was necessary in the 1960s and 1970s became increasingly atrophied as time went on and refused to adapt to the changing times. It was a much-needed reaction to conservative assimilationist politics but it was still a reaction. It has consistently struggled to spell out a vision of its own. Multiculturalism has become unsuited to the changing times and in the worst cases, has become counterproductive. As our diversity has increased, set notions of ethnic and minority identification cannot cope with the sheer pace and scale of mobility that we see in the twenty first century; not only in purely race and faith terms but also in terms of other increasing forms of identity in our society such as sexual orientation, social class and age. People increasingly have multiple identities and different facets matter most at different times – context should be everything. For example, the sports team that someone supports or their role as a carer – let alone their gender, age or sexual orientation - will matter most at different times in their daily life. Due to its origins in the post-war battles over immigration, multiculturalism is fundamentally rooted in the politics of race. Diversity has now moved beyond race alone and thus we need new policies to meet today's challenges.

Events in recent years including clear fractures in society, such as the disturbances in the northern towns in the summer of 2001, have emphasised the need to re-evaluate multiculturalism. Furthermore, from recognising and supporting difference, we started to reward it to the extent that funding mechanisms and means of representation undermined social interaction. People were encouraged to organise in distinct cultural or ethnic groups in order to gain access to funds or be seen as representative voices. While initially this was a way of defending minority interests and voices, it became a

way of conveniently putting people into boxes which are often neither relevant nor helpful. Thus, public consultations or grants demanded a narrow ethnic identification which preserved a somewhat atrophied difference. Those towns that saw riots in 2001 were witness to this – local residents were divided into their ethnic groups and each would get their own community centre or meeting with the council. As well as causing rivalry between ethnic groups, this implicitly told them that their ethnicity or race was more important than the fact they were a citizen of Oldham, Burnley or Bradford.

Additionally, the desire to celebrate cultural difference has undermined some of the central tenets of equality. As the American academic Walter Benn Michaels argues, the left has become the champion of difference which has weakened the case for equality. "We love thinking that the differences that divide us are not the differences between those of us who have money and those who don't but are instead the differences between those of us who are black and those who are white or Asian or Latino or whatever." (Benn Michaels, 2006) We have concentrated too much on celebrating identity difference and not enough time worrying about an economic one.

There is now little opposition to the notion that we need to do more to invest in a common and shared culture.

Integration can counter this because it restates the importance of equality to any consideration of a successful diverse society. It is through eradicating the economic divisions in our society that we move towards integration. In that cultural pluralism can support equality and solidarity, it can help but it must not be mistaken as an end in itself.

In recent years, the traditional multicultural approach has been much critiqued, not least from figures on the left. The different but somewhat complementary attacks on multiculturalism from David Goodhart (Goodhart, 2004) and Trevor Phillips (Phillips, 2005) shook the left's stasis on these issues and forced a re-evaluation. Goodhart suggested that there might be an inherent tension between solidarity – high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system – and diversity – equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life. Phillips argued that not enough had been done to promote shared understanding and that this marginalised debates around race equality. Subsequent years have seen increasing heat in the debate but a lack of clear alternative approaches, though some attempts have been made. These have tended to focus upon greater notions of common citizenship and have even been seen in the arguments for Britishness. Most recently, there has been a general acceptance that multiculturalism as was does not meet the needs of modern society. It is acknowledged that there has not been enough emphasis upon common or shared identities and that there is nothing contradictory in having a strong sense of national citizenship together with some rituals alongside an appreciation of diversity.

Much of the critique has been accepted even by some of multiculturalism's strongest defenders (Modood, 2008). In that sense, we have reached a point where the normative debates about the ideal model have come to an end. There is now little opposition to the notion that we need to do more to invest in a common and shared culture. As Tariq Modood argues, "one can't just talk about difference. Difference has to be related to things we have in common" (Modood, 2007). He goes further, asserting that "[it] does not make sense to encourage strong multicultural or minority identities and weak common or national identities."

The question now is whether we rebrand multiculturalism, as academics such as Modood, Bikhu Parekh and others seek to do, or to reject it in line with Phillips or Jonathan Sacks who has argued that we need a renewed focus upon our common responsibilities and that too great a focus upon cultural difference has led to social fragmentation. A re-imagined multiculturalism has merits, as an explicit rejection of multiculturalism gives credence to the right and heightens the vulnerability of some communities.

However, this remains primarily an academic and theoretical debate that has, in fact, distracted us from defining an alternative; whether we call it multiculturalism or not, the question must be how to make an increasingly diverse society more equal and more integrated. The definition and implications of multiculturalism may well have changed from what it meant even a decade ago but that does not provide the answer. Redefinition is not enough as only those closely involved in the political or academic debate can see the changes. We need to change both the substance and language of how we talk about these issues. Furthermore, as outlined above, integration goes beyond the ethnicity-focussed nature of multiculturalism. It builds upon it and many of its achievements but it is time to move on.

Moving beyond the old terminology may allow us to move forward more rapidly: part of reassuring people in a time of rapid change and increasing uncertainty is to find a new language. The importance of language in gaining public support cannot be underestimated. For instance, efforts to assert life chances as a means of advancing equality have been made because the terminology has more resonance and appeal than simply combating poverty. It makes people think it is about them and not somebody else. For too many people, multiculturalism equates with ethnic minorities – in that way it is an exclusive way of framing the debate. We need to

assert the usefulness of integration as a concept and define it in an inclusive and progressive way.

The good society

According to many indicators, despite our current economic concerns, Britain should be a much better place to live than ever before – as a nation we are wealthier, we live longer and technology means communication and travel opportunities have expanded exponentially. However, more of us live alone, we express greater anxiety about the future and are generally less happy than previous generations. We complain of poor work-life balance, time taken to commute to work and incessant pressure of generating more income. Volunteering has declined with far fewer people taking part in community activities such as sport, religious communities or charitable activities. As the pressure group Compass has argued, we have been in a sustained "social recession" which is deeper and more entrenched than any economic one (Rutherford & Shah, 2006). It is also easier to ignore. Whilst our economic state demands action and column inches, the social side is forgotten. In part, this is because the economic situation is clearly visible and governed by hard, independent data. A social recession is harder to measure than simply looking at economic growth. However, if we can begin to define integration and how we might measure it, we will have a picture of how healthy our society is. Solidarity is crucial in ensuring resilience to economic pressures. Without it, the superficial calm when people have been relatively comfortable will disappear rapidly when there is increased competition for resources. The impending cuts to public services proposed by the new Government will only intensify this competition as resources become ever more limited.

We need to reassert a collective vision of the good society. This requires some on the left to rise above narrow interest or lobby groups. No longer can we see equality through the prism of minority rights, with disadvantaged or marginalised groups competing against one another for limited resources or legislative privileges. Too often, measures to address inequality have been presented as targeting some individuals or groups rather than benefiting society as a whole. As well as stepping back from making the arguments of the wider social benefits of a more equal society, this also undermines solidarity.

A good society is an integrated one; an integrated society is one where there is truly equal citizenship with no group or individual denied any rights or opportunities.

Integration rejects the uber-liberalism that has led to the obsession with choice and individualisation in public service reform

Citizenship here is not just a legal status but a cultural notion. It is about participation in the life of the community and nation, whether that is voting in elections, volunteering or campaigning against the expansion of a local supermarket. Integrated citizens feel empowered and engaged in the democratic process.

Integration thus rejects the uber-liberalism that has led to the obsession with choice and individualisation in public service reform. No longer is it important that all schools provide good quality education; merely that parents can choose to send their children to the school they want. This argument undermines the shared stake we have in each other's lives and opportunities. Crucially, it also removes the incentive for equality – rather than a shared commitment to improved

services for all, it becomes a competition between people for a limited supply.

It is important to differentiate between choice as a concept and choice as it has come to be presented as part of the New Labour programme for public service reform. We need diverse services for a diverse society. But this diversity must be about type, not quality. Choice can fit well with the desire to produce more culturally appropriate and sensitive services. To achieve this, however, the focus should be on people choosing how the service is delivered, rather than who does the delivering. A more positive approach to choice would be based on a proper needs assessment and motivated by the primary desire to promote fairness and equality rather than contestability. But the choice agenda as currently practiced seems too rooted in the market and competition to achieve this objective. The idea of 'free schools' may be opposed by Labour in opposition but it is in many ways a logical extension of policies they introduced whilst in government.

Much of the British public sector reform programme has often been in marked opposition to integration. It plays into the Thatcherite philosophy where the individual is all that matters and undermines collective action. It is profoundly depressing that back in 2006, the Henley Centre's annual survey concluded that a majority of Britons believed that their quality of life would be improved most by "looking after ourselves" rather than "looking after the community's interests instead of our own", the first reversal in over a decade.

Choice is likely to exacerbate this situation when deployed in a climate of acute inequality and social isolation. For example, the limited surveys that have been done show that the middle-classes have been most able to take advantage of increased choice in service provision. Awareness of NHS Direct was 10 per cent lower among lower socio-economic groups and 59 per cent of people said transport was impor-

tant in choosing a school (SEU, 2005), with the reduced choices available to those without a car. Even in the case of Sure Start, one of Labour's most progressive initiatives, the take-up has been disproportionate. Its own evaluation admitted that "the differential beneficial and adverse effects that emerged indicate that among the disadvantaged families living in the deprived Sure Start Local Programme (SLLP) areas, parent's families with greater human capital were better able to take advantage of SSLP services and resources than those with less human capital (i.e. teen parents, lone parents, workless households)." Low aspirations and expectations of individuals and communities can also be a significant, if often invisible and subjective, barrier to overcoming persistent inequality. This concept has recently been developed in respect to the education of ethnic minority children but it also relates to the perception of being unsafe or vulnerable to crime and the insecurity which comes with the realisation of not having the same life chances. Insecurity and risk are clearly important contextual factors that affect integration.

This is not to revert to some kind of monolithic service delivery that refuses to accept cultural or religious difference but to say that public services are a social asset for everyone. We must assert the fact that we are citizens and not consumers. This can be done alongside reform of public services. For instance, choice as exercised in other EU countries, such as the Netherlands or Scandinavia is combined with strong notions of a shared public realm. Those societies are also starting from a fundamentally more equal position. There are less widespread disparities in access to material, human and social capital and thus the playing field for people is more level. Choice as practised in unequal communities risks escalating those inequalities. There is certainly no evidence that increased choice can actually eliminate inequality.

In many ways the current choice agenda is an admission that a more equal society can no longer be a legitimate political goal. It is an indicator of a centre-left that has been ideologically in retreat even whilst in power. Integration – if we are serious about it – is a positive agenda for a more socially progressive society.

Public service reform has been divorced from integration and that is why we have made little actual progress towards being a more integrated society. To succeed, integration must be central to the development of public policy not, as it has tended to be, a separate part of policy making, allowed to plough its own furrow.

Integration acknowledges a set of rights and responsibilities – to fellow citizens as much as between the individual and the state. This builds upon the foundation of universal human rights but provides a richer notion of what the individual can expect. It is a society where a person's birth does not determine the quality of their education, their potential in the labour market, their housing conditions or their health expectations. However, it is also one where someone's birth does not determine their circle of friends, their social position or their contribution to both civil and civic society. Indeed, integration relies upon the one to drive the other and states quite simply that life chances will not be equal unless there is full interaction and social solidarity.

This is not just the responsibility of a single government department; nor does it apply only to some communities. It is the job of all of us.

And, as the next section shows, it must be achieved across a range of policy areas and public services. It embraces many of the traditional issues around ensuring equality of life chances but goes further.

For instance, equality of educational attainment is not enough; we must have integrated schools where pupils learn

to live in a diverse society. It should be more than just the sum of its parts – the theory of integration is that we actually will not get one without the other. Segregated schools will increase the likelihood of disparities in attainment as sink schools increasingly are defined by their ethnic or social intake, and other communities no longer worry as long as their children succeed. We cannot allow schools that separate people into ever more narrow forms of identity. For example, recent education reforms risk making a bad situation worse: we might develop a notion that deems it appropriate that people are kept apart. If parents are encouraged to select schools according to their faith, how do we argue that it is not acceptable to make the same choice on class or income lines? If children are not coming into daily contact with those of a different background, we are storing up difficulties for the future. We cannot expect children to learn about dealing with difference and understanding other cultures from text books, it must be part of their daily experiences.

Integration is about how we develop policy across the board. It provides a vision of the type of society we wish to see – one that has equality, interaction and participation. This pamphlet now goes into suggest ways in which we might achieve that and assess it. In doing so, it spells out a programme that is essentially progressive; showing how many on the right's embrace of the word 'integration' is an empty promise. But it also challenges some on the left to combine equality and solidarity in a way that has not been done before.

"For too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our Gross National Product… counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who break them… It does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials… It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile."

– Senator Robert F Kennedy,
whilst campaigning for the Presidency in 1968.

Deciding how to measure integration

We can be clear on what constitutes a society that is not integrated – symptoms include civil unrest, acute inequality, racial tensions, extremist activity and low levels of participation in the electoral process.

We are less clear what success looks like. Deciding how we judge success in creating an integrated society will enable both policy-makers and practitioners to see the scale of the challenge and identify what changes need to be made.

One cannot criticise the amount of activity that integration and cohesion have inspired in recent years. A new book industry has arisen and different Government departments have not been short of initiatives. Just some related activities in the last few years have been the Cantle report, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, the Equalities Review, the addition of Citizenship to the national curriculum, Lord Goldsmith's Citizenship Review, the civil renewal agenda, the Governance of Britain green paper, the creation of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, the introduction of citizenship ceremonies, and countless reforms to our ways of integrating new migrants.

The volume has almost been dizzying. And that, in part, is the problem. Very few of the developments outlined here

have been connected to one another. In some cases, they have actually worked against one another. At one point the Home Office was stressing the importance of newcomers learning English while the DfES (as was) was cutting funding for English language (ESOL) provision. Disparate initiatives have given the appearance of progress while the lack of a strategic vision and co-ordinated action has actually prevented it.

We know success when we see it. Oldham has improved immeasurably since its disturbances in 2001. While not truly integrated, we can look at what has changed and begin to understand how we might achieve integration. The life chances debate has been successful in identifying those key markers by which we can assess whether social progress is being made. Additionally, both 2007's Equalities Review and the Hills Review of 2009 set out some key domains and areas to measure that are likely to inform the tracking of progress over time. This has subsequently been developed by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission in its Equality Measurement Framework. Integration requires the same level of detail.

This approach requires measurement. For something that was key to New Labour's governing philosophy, the idea of measurement has recently fallen into disrepute. The priority is now to be less focused on targets and reduce the amount of things that will be measured. In part, this is the right reaction but that is primarily because the Government consistently made the mistake of judging the performance of an authority or institution rather than the social outcome. In very prosaic terms, it mattered more how quickly a local authority answered its phone than whether the caller got what they needed. Yet measurement

is important. If we get it right, it tells us how effective our policies are in bringing about change.

But it is crucial that we measure the right things: it must be outcomes rather then process, and combine quantitative and qualitative measures. The trend now is for measuring perceptions and attitudes; indeed, in purely political terms, it is this approach, through focus groups and polling, that drives much of policy. Yet polling conclusively shows that public opinions both lag behind the reality when change has occurred and are often at huge variance from their personal experiences. If eighty one per cent of people were satisfied with their last visit to a hospital, why do fifty nine per cent of people disapprove of the way the health service is being run?

The Government consistently made the mistake of judging the performance of an institution rather than the social outcome.

Perceptions and attitudes are important in measuring integration. We want to know how people feel about their areas and one another. But it is not enough. We must balance those types of soft indicators with concrete examples of social outcomes that are not so subject to whim or the preoccupation of the moment.

The correct measurement framework will demonstrate what integration means in practice; how we link together life chances, social solidarity and empowerment. It should also provide a means by which we can measure the health and success of our country.

In the most part, this should not be too difficult. In the UK, we are data rich but analysis poor. We collect more data about social conditions than almost any other countries and our categorisations generally make it far easier to draw com-

parisons and identify gaps in outcomes. As the next section of this publication makes clear, this is not always the case but our data can and should be comprehensive. It sets out the beginnings of a progressive integration framework by exploring some key public policy areas that are vital to integration – education, housing, employment, health and safety and justice. These are augmented by some cross-cutting social indicators around participation and solidarity. Each chapter sets out the kind of integration we wish to see; how we might be able to measure that; the situation as it currently stands; and what needs to happen for progress to be made. This creates an integration framework that cuts across public policy and clearly demonstrates the mutually reinforcing nature of the agenda.

Education

Why it matters

An equal and inclusive education system is the foundation of an integrated society: personal development, knowledge, skills and competencies are crucial for any member of society to fulfil their potential, be appreciated and to be able to contribute to the good society. If education is offered unequally across society then it is likely that those inequalities will be maintained and almost certainly exacerbated as the life cycle continues. As the recent Cabinet Office study of social mobility made clear, how children do in school remains the single most important determinant of future success (Cabinet Office, 2008).

Education also matters beyond a simple equation of equality. Early years services, colleges and universities not only provide an opportunity for every person to learn to play, relax, create and develop with people from different backgrounds, they also provide a meeting place and common interest for parents and other family members. Education settings can act as agents of integration, encouraging participation and interaction from the earliest opportunity between children of different backgrounds and allow children to develop positive attitudes and behaviour towards others. Friendships formed at an early stage are crucial in building a society that can deal with diversity in a meaningful and sustained way.

An education system that is segregated will not equip people to live in a truly plural society. This will further marginalise the most vulnerable members of that society. If children, and their parents and families, do not meet or interact with people from diverse backgrounds then their experience of diversity will be a theoretical one. This is not

a firm grounding for a successful and enriching life as a global citizen.

The aim is for an integrated society where all our citizens are equal, connected to one another and empowered. This clearly applies within the education system as anywhere else. Schools must be a place where we equip today's children to live in our heavily diverse and mobile world, providing young people with the knowledge, skills and understanding to be active citizens at a local, national and international level.

What does success look like?

Successful integration will be characterised by the breaking of current negative relationships between educational opportunities and family background. Education is an area of public policy rich with data and analysis, so the challenge here is choosing which factors are most important in determining how integrated we are rather than finding the right data.

Given our definition of integration is about both equality and wider social solidarity, what should interest us are the results of formal education in terms of access, participation and attainment and the development of social relationships between individuals of different backgrounds. Key social outcomes might be that:

- Every social group or individual receives adequate support in the early years of a child's development to enhance his or her wellbeing, skills and competences to reach their full potential;
- There is no disparity between social groups in obtaining the required skills and competences through formal education;

- Educational institutions actively contribute to enhanced interaction between all groups in society.

How do we measure success?

In order to judge where we are, we need to identify which indicators might be suitable to assess the objectives outlined above. The indicators look at these aspects in terms of proportionality of access, participation and attainment and the development of friendships, acquaintances and social networks.

- Use of early years services and proportionality in outcomes of foundation stage;
- Trends and proportionality in choice of subjects and grading of different group graduates in GCSE, FE and HE;
- Diversity of friendships in early years (including parents) and post-16 education for students.

How are we doing?

Current data gives much cause for concern. Sutton Trust research shows that many of the recent increased educational opportunities have disproportionately benefited those from better off backgrounds, as was the case with Sure Start outlined earlier.

There is a great level of disparity between certain groups in terms of educational participation and attainment. Here we see entrenched patterns of under-achievement and inequality. The likelihood of richer pupils reaching certain performance benchmarks is higher than that for poorer pupils and increases over their time in the education system (Cabinet Office, 2008). Ethnic minority pupils are still twice as likely to be

excluded from schools and exam rates for some groups, notably the white working class, the gypsy and traveller communities and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage are well below the national average.

Social segregation in our state schools is a major cause of educational inequalities; too many of our schools are still under-resourced, under-performing and failing our children. These schools are also far more likely to have pupils from the lowest socio-economic groups and concentrations from certain ethnic minority communities. In part this is because of narrow catchment areas that allow wealthy parents to move to the more exclusive neighbourhoods. However, it goes beyond this. The Sutton Trust shows that leading state schools take a disproportionately low number of children eligible for free school meals. This is a situation that is likely to be exacerbated in a climate of increased choice whereby those with the greatest social networks and skills in navigating ever more complex admissions procedures will be able to manipulate the situation for their own ends. Free schools and the mass expansion of Academies threatens increased segregation.

This has a knock-on effect when it comes to post-16 education where, while overall participation rates are moving in the right direction, we still see differences in choice of institutions and subject. For instance, there are more students of black Caribbean heritage at London Metropolitan University than at the whole of the Russell Group put together (CRE, 2007). This tends to overlap with the data that shows that universities are still hugely segregated along socio-economic lines.

While we have limited data on inter-ethnic friendships, we do have evidence that in some parts of the country, particularly those where there is a history of segregation and tensions between ethnic groups, schools are frequently

more segregated than their surrounding neighbourhoods. This is seen in the national picture produced by Simon Burgess and his colleagues, which argues that in many areas over half the minority pupils would have to switch schools to produce an even spread of ethnic groups (Burgess, 2004).

This is reinforced by more local studies such as that conducted by Education Bradford which showed that 59 per cent of primary school pupils attend a school which has over 90 per cent of its pupils from a 'single cultural or ethnic identity' (Raw, 2005). One highly diverse London borough reported 17 of its primary schools that had over 90 per cent of pupils from one ethnic group while 9 reported less than 10 per cent (CRE, 2007). BBC research in Blackburn found an alarming worsening of the situation. In 1997, just over half of all Indian and Pakistani students in that cohort went to schools where non-White-British formed over 75 per cent of the entry: in 2003, 87 per cent did so, for both groups.

Policy implications

The curriculum and educational culture must promote integration. This should build upon the recommendations from the Ajegbo report and include a richer teaching of history and citizenship. This includes the history of Britain as a country of both Empire and immigration. Citizenship must be about culture and values as well as facts and should aim to equip pupils to live in a diverse, multicultural society in the same way and to the same level as the process for new migrants. When done well, citizenship education has provided the opportunity to debate controversial issues. The Iraq war, Britishness and the 2005 bombings in London have formed part of citizenship lessons across the country. It is better to discuss such issues in a

safe environment than not at all. Successful citizenship education must be about taking a whole school approach. The ethos, organisation, structures and daily practices of schools have a marked impact on the effectiveness of citizenship education. The curriculum cannot exist alone: it must be part of the mainstream alongside other educational initiatives.

We need to make sure that our education system promotes interaction; in the short-term that is best achieved by mitigating the effects of segregation through initiatives such as creating federations of schools or twinning arrangements. Ensuring some cross-curricula activities and interaction is vital in dispelling myths and fears of difference.

Therefore, we must work to ensure that our schools are integrated. Children should be children first, not any particular class, race or faith. Even in integrated schools, we should be aware of any increasing segregation in school playgrounds, in the dinner hall or after school clubs.

In the longer-term, we need to ensure that our educational activities – from nursery through to further and higher education – are integrated and encourage mixing and ensuring that recent developments such as faith schools and academies are not exacerbating the problem. This means detailed monitoring and developing policies, possibly including funding mechanisms, to bring this about where it is not the case already. This applies just as much to socio-economic status as race or faith. School choice must be monitored so that it is an equal choice for all families. The Coalition Government's proposals for more Academies and Free Schools could well prove to be diatrous in this regard, entrenching segregation and inequality into our education system.

The balloting system introduced recently in Brighton, while controversial, is a way of eliminating socio-econom-

ic disadvantages or racial segregation in any school choice. Even if the change has been less dramatic than initially hoped for, this is due in large part to the geographical restrictions of catchment areas. It is only through such radical measures that the level and pace of change that we need can be achieved. Balloting or a lottery of this type certainly should be more widely explored and considered.

Bussing has deeply unfortunate connotations in the world of school integration and I do not advocate it here. However, one of the key reasons for school segregation is access to public transport and, for many families, their choice of education establishment is severely limited by geography. A national school bus network would remove this barrier and take away the advantage of being able to travel further held by affluent parents (Sutton Trust, 2004). It would also have a positive impact upon reducing congestion and carbon emissions.

Ensuring that our schools are equally accessible for all communities would provide an immediate impetus towards ensuring that they are all equally well-funded, attract the best teachers and deliver equally good education for all children and young people. Ultimately, this might be the only way to close the attainment and access gaps detailed earlier. If any child could, in theory, go to any school, then the demand for them all to be equally good will move from being a political cause to a national imperative.

We also need to consider the role of educational data. Firstly, we need to build on the data we have and augment it with information on subject and course choices and the diversity of an institution's pupils. This should be made as much a measure of that institution's success as pure attainment rates. The focus in recent years on the massive ethnic disparity in exclusion rates has resulted in a dramatic reduction – while it is still 2:1, that is down from a ratio of

around 7:1 just a decade ago. This shows how data collection can expose an issue and precipitate action to tackle it.

Secondly, inequalities in attainment rates still need to be addressed. Eventual success will only come where there are no clear patterns of attainment and participation by ethnic group, social class or gender. This has to be intrinsic to the assessment of whether a school, college or university is successful, no matter its overall position in any league table. This needs to be extended to subject and course choice and there is a role for Office for Fair Access (OFFA) in ensuring that this is case at higher education level. The 2006 Education Act made some key commitments towards making schools more inclusive and socially equitable. It is vital these are followed through.

Furthermore, this kind of data collection and action to eliminate inequalities and elements of segregation needs to be built into legal obligations such as the duties under the 2010 Equality Act and the recent duty to promote community cohesion. It is important that the EHRC and Ofsted work together to ensure that these are complementary and robust.

Work

Why it matters

Participation in the labour market is vital to improving the life chances of all individuals: it not only enables individuals to have a decent standard of living, it also contributes to personal well-being and self-esteem. Every individual should be given the opportunity to gain employment in his or her chosen fields and should not face barriers to his or her progression. Furthermore, our definition of social mobility relies in large part upon the employment opportunities made available to people and their ability to transcend any factors of birth. An integrated society is clearly one where there are high levels of social mobility.

Interaction in a work environment can often be the first step towards reducing fears and tension in the local community.

While success in employment is determined to a great extent by existing skills, knowledge, qualifications and human capital, inequalities can be exacerbated by experiences in the workplace. Employment opportunities and progression also have a massive impact upon other aspects of personal well-being such as health, housing conditions and the level of education available to children in those families. Worklessness and low pay not only affect current life chances but significantly impact upon the life chances and aspirations of the children in those households.

The workplace is also a key area in which people from different backgrounds interact, and increasing the diversity of employees can contribute to improving interaction. Given how long we spend at work and the lengthening

working lives people are now facing, workplace integration is becoming ever more vital.

Interaction in a work environment can often be the first step towards reducing fears and tension in the local community. This can include tackling negative images, myth busting, countering the misinformation that suggests that migrant workers either take advantage or are taken advantage of in respect of employment practices. Better workplace integration can also establish better communications and improve the understanding between new and old members of the neighbourhood as well as providing opportunities for volunteering, community development and similar outreach work.

What does success look like?

The employment terrain is well covered in terms of both the ethnic and the gender pay penalty, lower rates of employment for some communities and the so-called 'snowy peaks' of top public and private sector organisations. However, it is important to take our measures of success beyond simple ones of equality of access to employment and attainment to ones that look in more detail at job segregation and progression. This is even more important in an economic downturn where some parts of the economy and some parts of business are likely to be far more vulnerable to redundancy than others. We must also look for ways to understand the development of acquaintances across traditional boundaries.

Therefore, we should be look at a range of indicators that encompass this broader employment agenda:

- Everybody has equal access to a diverse range of employment opportunities;

- There is a fair distribution of members of all groups in the main economic sectors;
- Individuals from all groups in society progress to senior positions under the same conditions;
- Employers promote a working environment which enables interaction between people from different backgrounds.

How do we measure success?

Indicators for these outcomes should be, with the exception of those on interaction, in plentiful supply. The task is selecting those measures that best tell us about the proportionality of pay, participation and attainment and the development of friendships, acquaintances and social networks.

- Participation in all sectors and sections of the labour market and proportionality in employment rates;
- Average pay rates for different groups in society;
- Numbers of women, ethnic minority and other group employees in senior positions;
- Development of interethnic professional and personal networks between colleagues (including acquaintances & friendships).

How are we doing?

Employment has been at the forefront of anti-discrimination legislation over the past 40 years and this has had some significant impact in terms of levels of direct discrimination but limited progress has been made against many of the indicators outlined above. Even so, the CRE was regularly involved in employment discrimination cases that saw total payouts of over £1 million every year – and that was just those that made it to court.

All ethnic minority groups have lower levels of employment, some massively so. The overall gap has remained stuck at between 15-20 per cent for over twenty years and while there has been some positive movement in recent years, the rate of progress is criminally slow. Within some groups, there is an even more pernicious juxtaposition of race and gender with Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in particular having respective economic inactivity rates of 69 per cent and 75 per cent. Workless households also predominate in ethnic minority communities. There are other groups who face acute disadvantage. For example, lone parents have an employment rate only just above 50 per cent (ONS, 2008).

2008's study of social mobility showed that one of the most important drivers in its decline in recent years was the lack of career progression across socio-economic groups. The fact that parental income was a more important determinant of people's own income for those born in 1970 as opposed to those from 1958 paints a clear picture that life chances are more pre-determined for some people than they were. 2009's Social Mobility White Paper painted an even starker picture of a permanent cycle of underachievement passing from generation to generation: low skilled employees find job opportunities limited and worklessness rife; even if they do break this part of the cycle, they find job progression almost impossible and thus their wages lie below the national average. Unsurprisingly, this disadvantage is then passed on to their children, who are less likely to receive a successful education and are also more likely to suffer from poor health and poverty.

There have been one or two notable exceptions but we still see a higher echelon of both public and private sector organisations that is white and primarily male. Just 2.4 per cent of FTSE 100 directors are from an ethnic minority

background and just 11 per cent are women. The 'Sex and Power' report has been published for 5 years and looks at gender progression in 25 key areas. Over those five years, six areas have seen a decline in representation of women and thirteen have seen minor progress, though increases in representation have generally been less than five per cent.

We simply cannot have a picture of job segregation. Despite its importance, there is very limited data – almost all of it restricted to issues of gender – and there is only just beginning to be an academic programme exploring such issues, based primarily in the United States.

Policy Implications

The key policy challenge in the workplace is to eliminate the persistent employment gap and the respective pay penalties from the labour market. As the lack of success in recent years shows, to achieve this requires going beyond simple data collection and publication. In this context, we know the extent of the problem, we know less but still a large amount about the causes of the problem, but we seem incapable of working out how to address it.

Even those ethnic minority employees who do enter the workforce are far too likely to be congregated at the lower levels of any organisations, or enter into careers or jobs with little job security and little chance of progression. They are also likely to be the first to be affected by any restructuring or business closures as a result of an economic downturn.

Our workplaces must reflect British society in the twenty first century. That means that in terms of the total workforce, across professions and through the ranks in individual organisations and industries, there should be fair and

equal distribution of people. We must eliminate the 'snowy peaks' at the top of our major industries.

The private sector should follow the example of the public sector and monitor their staff recruitment, selection, promotion, disciplinary processes and training across the equality strands. This is not simply so that organisations can be named and shamed but it must be a key tool to highlight where progress is being made and judge the success of measures to bring about the profound change that is necessary.

As the Equalities Review made clear, where good intentions and targeted efforts do not bring about the necessary changes, some form of special measures and positive action must be considered. This does not have to extend as far as positive discrimination but it can require greater training and support for marginalised employees, perhaps compensating for the lack of education and skills opportunities available to them earlier in their life. This is crucial if we are to reinvigorate social mobility. Without some kind of compensating system, the disadvantages some people inherit will hold them back throughout their careers and then be passed on to their children. We must be bold in breaking the cycle.

Ensuring decent wages is essential in reducing inequality in the workplace. We should commit to moving towards greater income equality. The minimum wage has been beneficial but is only a floor – the living wage should be promoted across the public sector. We should also explore the idea of differential levels depending upon regions of the country. The existing minimum wage is also not sufficiently enforced – more needs to be done to crack down on employers circumventing the law.

Measures can also be taken with regard to supplier diversity and procurement to ensure a greater distribution of contracts and access to work. There has been innovative

work done across the pubic and private sectors to broaden and promote inclusion in the supply chain. This should be developed further and encouraged by government.

Workplace culture needs to change – to be more sensitive to differing needs and expectations. This applies to issues of gender, age and disability just as much as race. We need to remove traditional roles in the workplace and at home and allow greater flexibility in how people enter the labour market so that we are not trying to force diverse communities into monolithic working practices. This requires greater extension of the flexible working practices encouraged since 1997 – allowing for more flexibility over hours and location of work. It also means the Government needs to reverse its retreat from new parental leave provision and adopt a more Scandinavian approach whereby up to 12 months leave can be shared between parents.

The minimum wage has been beneficial but is only a floor – the living wage should be promoted across the public sector.

We should not ignore the fact that unequal distribution across economic sectors can be the result of choice, possibly inspired by religious principles or practices. American research has indicated that certain niches in the labour market function as a safety net by providing continuous employment (Waters, 2008). However it is more likely to come about as a result of inequalities in education, a poverty of aspiration and indirect discrimination in careers advice. We need to have a more open discussion about the ramifications and potential detrimental impact of occupational segregation, particularly in terms of interaction, networking and power-sharing.

There is also a clear task in producing more data upon the role of workplace in fostering interaction. Human

capital research has indicated that a third of respondents liked meeting people from different walks of life through work and a quarter broadened their understanding of different cultural backgrounds through the workplace. We need to know more. Composition of industries and workplaces should be made central to traditional measures of success and we must work to eliminate occupation segregation.

Changing our workplaces and the employment opportunities available to people is the fast-track to creating a more integrated society. If we can ensure that entering a particular profession, securing a job, progressing to senior ranks and earning a decent wage is not predictable at birth, we will ensure social mobility. Not only will this generate more equal opportunities for people, but it will also lead to diverse workplaces where people are exposed to different cultures. We can then hope that this understanding and these friendships are taken into the home and other lifestyle choices.

Health and Social Care

Why it matters

Health is currently an under-developed factor in promoting integration. Tackling still persistent health inequalities and combating bad health are fundamental to integration, but health services can go further.

The more integrated an area, the higher its social capital is likely to be. Research has demonstrated clear links between higher levels of social capital and better health outcomes – both in terms of individual health and also with reduced inequalities (Wilkinson, 2005). Health is poorer in communities where levels of interaction are low and where people feel insecure (iCoCo, 2009).

However, it is not a one way street. A healthier community is more likely to be integrated, with people having fuller access to services, employment opportunities and playing a more active role in civic life.

We should also be looking at how and when people access care services and not simply the end outcomes. As early intervention and prevention is accepted to be the best way of guaranteeing good health, so too should equality of access to those services be seen as a marker of an integrated society. For a start, the NHS is the biggest employer in the country and is vital to creating some of the work-related outcomes outlined earlier. But also, almost every person has some regular encounter with a health service, be it a visit to their GP or long-term care arrangements. This places it as a strong potential agent of change for community dynamics.

We cannot overlook the contribution health and social care services make to the development of friendships and acquaintances between people. Just as it is important that

our education system ensures that people from all backgrounds meet one another and interact, so too is it with health and social care. In no way should any key services be encouraging people to segregate and creating additional barriers to integrate.

What does success look like?

In judging the contribution of health and social care to fostering integration, we need to bring in all these factors – the overall health outcomes together with the way in which services are accessed. Our objective must be to eliminate the health gaps between disadvantaged groups and communities.

- There are no intrinsic differences between the health of all groups in society;
- Everybody benefits equally from a diverse range of health services;
- Health providers actively contribute to enhanced interaction between all groups in society.

How do we measure success?

Indicators for each of these outcomes vary. We can be clearer on overall health outcomes than we can on levels of access and involvement in service delivery. Our judgement of success should focus upon:

- Health outcomes across the main health indicators looked at by social group;
- Equality of access to and use of health services;
- Diversity of those accessing particular services, thus facilitating interaction.

How are we doing?

As a nation we have become far healthier over recent decades but progress has been slower for lower socio-economic groups than for the well off. In many cases, that has led to a widening of the gap. The Department of Health itself has admitted the "double disadvantage" of those being most in need of services having the least access to them. A baby born to a poor family today has a 17 per cent higher than average chance of dying, up from 13 per cent in 1997. That baby is also far more likely to have a low birth weight, a key determinant of future life chances and personal development. Adults in the poorest fifth of the income distribution are twice as likely to be at risk of developing a mental illness as those on average incomes (NPI, 2009).

Greater devolution must not lead to greater disparities in levels of services.

On average, ethnic minority communities are also more likely to suffer from poor health outcomes than the rest of the population. The picture is not uniform, and different communities suffer in different ways. However, the overall picture is highly troubling.

Infant mortality for babies of both Pakistani and Caribbean-born mothers is almost double the national average; south Asian men are twice as likely to suffer from some form of heart disease while Caribbean men are twice as likely to suffer a stroke. In London, three of the five key factors associated with infant death were mothers who live in the most deprived parts of the city, families in the manual working cohort and mothers born in East or West Africa and the Caribbean. These disparities are stark.

The wider health surveys also show that ethnic minority communities are more likely to report ill health to their GP, especially chronic conditions, and that this ill health starts at a younger age then the rest of the population. To a large extent, these acute disparities are linked to the relative poverty of most ethnic minority communities.

The gaps in mental health services are even more acute. Black and mixed race admission rates are over three times the national average, constituting 21 per cent of all inpatients (CRE, 2007). Black Caribbean men have the highest median duration of stay while the highest number of admissions was amongst men from the 'other black' group, at 18 times higher than the national average. All these groups were also significantly more likely to enter through the criminal justice system when the condition will be more acute (Ibid).

There is still a lack of data that details how effectively the health service is delivering. We know about outcomes but not how to change them. The Department of Health's NHS 'Vital Signs' are due to be developed so that they can be analysed by socioeconomic group, ethnicity and other dimensions of inequality. This is vital if we are to really close the inequality gaps. The performance of the department itself has also been a cause for concern, particularly with regard to developing recent changes to the mental health system and introducing more choice-based mechanisms. Indeed, the CRE was forced to undertake a formal investigation of the department in 2007 which concluded that it was guilty of "systemic and ongoing noncompliance" with regard to its race equality responsibilities (Ibid).

As the data on access and interaction is so limited, it is hard to assess what the current situation is. We know that ethnic minority children are more likely to stay in care for longer and have more disrupted placements. This may be

partly as a result of the chronic lack of ethnic minority foster carers and adopters. Perceptions of discrimination in the health and social care systems are falling, although patient services show lower levels of satisfaction amongst many ethnic minority communities.

Policy implications

Undoubtedly, health outcomes will improve and inequalities narrow if wider social inequalities are addressed. However, that does not mean that health services should simply sit back and wait. The commitment in the new NHS Constitution to "promote equality … and to pay particular attention to groups or sections of society where improvements in health and life expectancy are not keeping pace with the rest of the population" is hugely welcome.

The postcode lottery must end. Decent and accessible health services should be available in all parts of the country to all communities. We need to make sure there are sufficient opportunities for early intervention and where inequalities are clearly identified, priority should be given to tackling them. Greater devolution must not lead to greater disparities in levels of services.

The annual 'Count Me In' Census shows that despite the recommendations from the Rocky Bennett Inquiry, inequality in mental health is still acute. This Inquiry, from 2005, looked at the death of a Jamaican patient after excessive restraining in a psychiatric ward. Though an assertion rejected by the Department of Health, the Inquiry ruled that the health service suffered from institutional racism and labelled the poor treatment of ethnic minority patients as a "festering abscess". The Department of Health needs to urgently revisit its strategy for promoting racial equality in mental health, working closely with local NHS Trusts and the criminal justice system.

Ensuring good quantitative and qualitative data is vital. Both the Department of Health and the NHS have been slow in seeing the need to remedy this. While they have provided incentives to GPs to collect ethnicity data, this should be made compulsory. The systematic collection and analysis of data must be central to developing inclusive and equitable services. If health services do not do better of their own accord, the Equality and Human Rights Commission should step in.

Just as with other service areas, the need to have responsive data in a fast-moving climate is important. For instance, 'Count Me In' has shown recent jumps of those in the 'white other' category without English as a first language entering the system. This is likely to be as a result of recent immigration from central and eastern Europe but there is insufficient data to know this. Ethnic monitoring should be tailored to the needs of the service provider. Health services should learn from their education counterparts and define data collection that enables timely and important changes in service delivery.

The potential of health services to create positive public spaces that facilitate interaction has been significantly underestimated. For example, waiting rooms are a space where people could come together and have positive contact. The 'Our health, our care, our say' initiative demands that health services should "belong to the community"; this needs to be all communities and ensure that health provision is offered a way in which people can come together. Partly, this means that community engagement needs to be better but also ensuring that opportunities to co-locate heath services alongside other facilities such as schools, libraries or places of worship etc are taken.

The introduction of choice-based mechanisms must not be allowed to create segregated services. Just as with edu-

cation, it is vital that service provision facilitates contact between people from different backgrounds. If choice is to be extended, it must not be solely about provider or location as this is likely to exacerbate segregation that already exists in either residential or social settings. There should be detailed monitoring of any new system to ensure they are attracting a cross-section of the population and not leading to a concentration of any one group, be it socioeconomic or ethnic. Extension of GP autonomy could lead to an exacerbated post-code lottery where people become ever more trapped in the cycles of ill-health and poverty. Rather than decisions being taken based upon medical need, they will be made according to the GP's balance sheet. This will make access to services even tougher in areas with more acute needs

The role of the health sector as an employer is crucial. A representative workforce and decision-making structures in all our public services are important. While the medical profession has higher than average entry rates for ethnic minority students, career progression is still slow for many and complaints of discrimination or disproportionate use of disciplinary still unacceptably high. The BMA should work with service managers to address this. NHS Trust management boards and other local decision-making institutions should also be far more representative than is currently the case.

Housing

Why it matters

Poor housing traps people in a vicious circle: those who suffer it are more likely to be socially excluded and yet their living conditions become one of the greatest barriers to moving out of that state. The design, condition and composition of housing affects people's health and educational outcomes, as well as their opportunities to participate in the local community. In addition, the location of housing can often restrict people's access to transport, education and employment opportunities. Housing that is in poor condition and poorly accessible is a major determining factor in the persistent inequalities in our society.

The nature of our neighbourhoods is changing, often as a result of several inter-connected trends. Population mobility, or churn, seems to have accelerated in many areas – both urban and rural – and the demand for housing can quickly change, as can the character of the area. This has considerable implications across public policy, in respect of social capital and citizenship, community tensions and cohesion, and school, health and other service provision.

There has also been a significant issue in recent years around the availability of social housing, the lack of which has been a major cause of community tensions and exploited by political extremists to ferment tensions.

Housing is a major causal factor in ensuring segregation – socio-economic as well as racial – between communities. If developed well, mixed communities can contribute to interaction between people from different backgrounds. Many of the racially-based civil disturbances in recent years have arisen in parts of the country where separation between ethnic groups has been most acute, allowing myths and fears to spread and tensions to grow.

What does success look like?

In terms of what integration in housing may look like, it is quite straightforward, focussing upon equality and interaction. We need to ensure that housing is no longer a clear dividing line in our society – both in terms of who has access to decent housing but also in where that housing is. Housing cannot be allowed to continue to separate people in the way it frequently does now. We also know well what failure in this respect looks like – the victims of New Orleans in 2005 were marked strongly by their location and quality of housing as well as their race and socio-economic position. The challenge comes in how you can bring integrated housing about.

- Everybody lives in decent social and private housing;
- Every group in society has equal access and use of private housing; and equally benefit from social housing facilities;
- Housing planning and provisions enable and stimulate interaction between people from different backgrounds.

How do we measure success?

In order to judge where we are, we need to identify suitable indicators for these objectives. As with education, there is data in this field that requires analysis in a different way and with a different focus. To judge how integrated a society we are, we might perhaps look at:

- Numbers and proportions of those who live in decent quality housing;
- Proportionate access to renting and ownership in the private housing market and proportional use

of social housing amongst social and ethnic groups;
- Inter-ethnic and socio-economic contact and settlement patterns.

How are we doing?

Just as it is a barometer of the unequal life chances faced in Britain overall, so too is our housing sector where socio-economic and ethnic disparities are particularly acute. Too often social housing is positioned as a safety net and the need for it to enable opportunities to climb out of poverty are ignored. Affordable housing must be a means, not an end in itself.

Longitudinal research for the Smith Institute shows a direct correlation between living in social housing today and poorer outcomes across a wide range of measures of deprivation and social exclusion (Feinstein, 2008). Through looking at various cohorts' experiences of housing since 1946, the research concludes that "social housing has almost exclusively become the preserve of the poor." Significantly, this was not always the case. For those born into social housing in 1946 there was no apparent penalty in terms of life-chances, and it would be wrong to conclude that there was something intrinsically wrong with the tenure, over and above the woeful management of social housing in the post-war era (Gregory, 2009). Nevertheless, the fact remains that social housing is now intimately associated with both individual disadvantage and neighbourhood deprivation. Thus we have a triple whammy – the poorest people living in the poorest housing in the poorest areas.

There is also a very worrying racial dimension to this situation. Ethnic minority households are nearly twice as likely as white households to live in non-decent housing, live in areas with a poor built environment and to feel less safe in public spaces. More than half of working age indi-

viduals in social housing do not work, more than double the national average (CRE, 2006).

Overcrowding rates are generally highest for ethnic minority households – compared to a rate for white families of 2 per cent, Bangladeshi households have a 29 per cent rate. Ethnic minority households are over twice a likely to be dissatisfied with their housing and have the lowest levels of owner-occupation. 21 per cent of all households accepted as homeless and in priority need were from an ethnic minority background despite only comprising 7 per cent of all households, three times the national average (Ibid).

The data over residential patterns and segregation is particularly controversial and prone to different interpretations. However, there is certainly a clustering of ethnic minority populations in deprived areas. 67 per cent of all England's ethnic minority population live in the 88 most deprived wards. Furthermore, this clustering of communities appears to be increasing. Between 1991-2001, Census data shows that the White population reduced by 43,000 in Manchester, 90,000 in Birmingham and 340,000 in London. At the same time, the ethnic minority population grew by 15,000 in Manchester, 58,000 in Birmingham and 600,000 in London.

An increasing concentration of ethnic minority communities in our urban spaces poses its own public policy challenges. Mike Poulsen's analysis of London is telling (Poulsen, 2006). Essentially there had been a sizeable increase in the ethnic minority population between the 1991 and 2001 Census. This meant that areas that were almost wholly white in 1991 had become more mixed by 2001. However, areas that were majority ethnic minority have become far more concentrated. Thus we see mixing on the one hand but increased segregation on the other. In London in 2001, the non-white population is about 25 per cent of the total population and yet we see an increase in

the number of wards where ethnic minorities constitute over 70 per cent of the population. This is not a phenomenon confined to London – similar patterns can be seen in other cities across the UK. In particular, the study of Bradford by Alan Carling shows not only trends towards greater polarisation but also the inability of the Index of Dissimilarity to track segregation (Carling, 2008). It is that segregation that we should be concerned about.

Policy implications

It must be hoped that great advances in integration can be achieved simply by putting into practice the previous Government's many commitments to improve and expand the quality of housing stock available. However, many of these plans were considered to be unrealistic even in times of economic prosperity. In today's climate, the chances must be even more remote. And yet tackling the inequalities and segregation of our housing market is crucial towards creating a more integrated society. Quite simply, we need more social housing. Local authorities should be allowed to build more houses - and to borrow to do so.

We must ensure that social housing is not simply the preserve of the poor. Until the 1960s, social housing was often the tenure of choice for people. Whilst we cannot expect to change the desire for home ownership, we can ensure that social housing is not given a social stigma and is presented as an attractive and practical choice for people for whom home ownership may not be the right lifestyle choice. It should be seen as a matter of choice and not last resort.

Similarly, any growth in social housing must not repeat the mistakes of the past. It should not be concentrated in any area, deprived or not, but be mixed with other types of tenure. This will ensure that social housing does not have a direct connection to a poor local environment, poor schools,

lack of employment opportunities and poor transport and thus poor life chances.

Integration in housing demands an end to residential location being largely determined by ethnic or socio-economic group, as it in some inner city areas. As outlined earlier, too often this kind of physical separation is also symptomatic of highly disparate levels in the quality of housing stock. Issues of good relations must be monitored and evaluated and built into housing measurement. This applies to issues of access, satisfaction and outcomes and should be applied not simply to the main ethnic categories in the 2001 Census but also to take into account significant local populations not covered in this, such as gypsy and traveller communities or new migrants.

We must get better and more frequent data on population dynamics and change, why people move and exercise particular choices, or fail to take advantage of them. Using other pieces of information, often at the local level, we need to be able to track rapid population movement and ensure that housing can meet local demands. Census data must be more frequent and responsive to change and local authorities need to become better at looking at other data sets such as the Labour Force Survey, school Census data or even GP registrations to track population movement in their area.

Planning and regeneration schemes need to take far more account of the diversity of the local population and ensure that this is considered at all stages of project development, including design, consultation and evaluation. In particular, there is currently a large gap in skills and knowledge around equality and integration in the design and evaluation of success in planning and implementation of physical buildings and public spaces. Such spaces can provide a focus for bringing people together to interact with one another and increase notions of society and mutuality. Design and planning

should seek wherever possible to bring people from diverse backgrounds together and not create further barriers. New building projects, be they residential or commercial such as supermarkets, and new civic spaces such as libraries or one-stop shops can be places where integration is promoted. Planning needs to take account of geographical patterns of segregation and where possible seek to work against this. Rather than putting specialist services in already segregated areas, they should be used to break down those barriers. This is what Malmo in Sweden did with its language centres, moving them out of their segregated suburbs and into the town centre.

Communities and Local Government indicators of 'sustainable communities' need to be augmented by broader measures of success in terms of physical interaction in geographic areas. We should work towards a common typology for the spatial distribution of communities that can tell us how segregated or integrated our neighbourhoods are becoming. In doing that, the clear objective should be for neighbourhoods not to be able to be easily identified or simply defined by one very strong characteristic, be that race, faith or social class. Our communities must be mixed in every sense or many of the other life chances indicators discussed will become almost impossible to achieve. Furthermore, physical separation is all too frequently an insurmountable barrier in developing trust and reciprocity across communities.

The Homes and Communities Agency is a major step forward in this respect. Having the mandate to promote "thriving communities" at its heart, it will need to ensure that its regeneration and planning functions work to this end. Its role and its work so far augurs well and is evidence of a growing consensus about the need to create more physically integrated communities. However, its task is huge and realistically will take generations to put into practice.

Criminal Justice and Safety

Why it matters

The perception of personal safety is crucial to community development. It is a key component of the human security framework developed by the United Nations, where protection from physical violence and the removal of the fear of crime, particularly violent crime, is seen as crucial to personal wellbeing (UNDP, 1994). That feeling of security is the foundation for engagement and trust in the neighbourhood.

A high fear of crime is also likely to provide a flashpoint in exacerbating any tensions that already exist in a community. Criminal activity will be an enormous barrier to good community relations and is likely to encourage individuals and small communities to retreat into ever more narrow groupings. It will also generate fear of the 'other' and, as we saw in Oldham in 2001 and Birmingham in 2005, such criminal activity can become the subject for rumour and myths that set one community against another.

For too long, the police and prison services have been seen as the most discriminatory institutions in

Furthermore, the chances of being a victim of crime are a typical indicator of life chances for people living in a particular area. Crime and fear of crime is also a strong negative predictor of poor perceptions of cohesion in an area (Laurence and Heath, 2008).

Personal safety is linked to trust in institutions to act fairly. The criminal justice sector has been on the frontline of race relations in Britain and, for too long, the police and prison services have been seen as the most discriminatory institutions in Britain. The years since the Stephen

Lawrence and Zahid Mubarek Inquiries have seen significant progress made but there is still much to be done to alter common perceptions of the fairness of the system. This is not just about perceptions – they stem from the actual numbers of people within the system and their experiences. Even today, they have remained historically and significantly different for different groups within society. The criminal justice system not only is responsible for ensuring equal treatment but it is a key indicator of how well the state in its many guises is behaving towards different groups within society.

What does success look like?

The differing experience of people in the criminal justice system is well-trodden ground but it is important that this is augmented by measures of perceptions of personal safety and victim of crime statistics.

Our outcomes therefore focus on issues around safety. They also need to take into account equality of treatment as measured through proportionate outcomes and trust and confidence in the systems and institutions.

- Every group in society is equally protected and feels safe;
- Criminal justice agencies treat every individual and group fairly and not disproportionately;
- All groups in society trust/have confidence in criminal justice agencies;
- Individuals from all groups in society participate at all levels of criminal justice agencies and in independent boards.

How do we measure success?

In order to judge where we are, we need to identify suitable indicators for these objectives – crucially combining objective indicators with subjective ones. It is important to be able to gauge how people feel, as this impacts directly upon their willingness to integrate, even if perceptions are not always supported by actual experiences. Those experiences must also be included, not just to complement perception data but also because the criminal justice system has traditionally been a source of great disproportionality between groups in society. At its worst, it has been proven guilty of profound and sustained discrimination. The key things to measure would be:

- Exposure to crime and antisocial behaviour, including fear of crime;
- Disproportionality by group on stop and search, caution, arrest, sentencing and ASBOs;
- Relative confidence levels in the criminal justice system;
- Composition of middle and senior management in the key criminal justice agencies and independent boards.

How are we doing?

The link between crime and social exclusion is well documented. Many offenders have experienced poverty and the resulting poor education, housing problems and lack of constant employment. Government figures show that the 5 per cent most disadvantaged are 100 times more likely to have multiple problems related to criminal justice than the most advantaged 50 per cent. Those living in the most deprived areas are also far more likely to be the victims of crime. Unemployed people are twice as likely to be the

victims of robbery as the average person, as are those in the ACORN category 'Hard Pressed' compared to those in the 'Wealthy Achievers' category (NPI, 2009) . Households in the least deprived areas were significantly less likely to be the victims of crime than those in the most deprived areas. Those in social housing also are more likely to cite fear of crime as a key factor affecting their quality of life.

While progress has been significant in recent years, that was from a very low starting point. Progress has been greatest in the recruitment and promotion of ethnic minorities with overall numbers rising rapidly and those in the higher echelons, while still being lower in proportion to numbers overall, also rising. Just 3.5 per cent of police officers and 4 per cent of prison staff are from an ethnic minority background. Just 3 per cent of the judiciary are from an ethnic minority and the vast majority of these are concentrated at the lower end.

However, ethnic minority communities are still grossly over-represented at all stages of the criminal justice system. In particular, black people are over seven times as likely to be stopped and searched, a figure that is rising again in the wake of counter-terrorism strategies. Ethnic minority groups are arrested over three times as much as white communities and account for around 25 per cent of the prison population (Race for Justice, 2008). The disproportionality is glaring and shows a continued problem in achieving integration. It is no wonder that almost a third of ethnic minority people feel they would be treated unfairly by the criminal justice system; indeed, the surprise may be that it is that low.

This pattern is mirrored when looking at the socio-economic status of those in the criminal justice system with the unemployed being 13 times as likely to be in prison and 72

per cent of prisoners being in receipt of benefits immediately before entering prison.

Furthermore, there is a double whammy for both the poor and ethnic minority groups as they are also far more likely to be the victims of crime and to feel unsafe. Incidents of racially motivated crime have risen in the past decade and all groups consistently express higher fear of all types of crime from car crime through to violent crime.

Policy implications

Quite simply, the disproportionality needs to end. The criminal justice system must treat all parts of society fairly. The inquiries into the deaths of Stephen Lawrence and Zahid Mubarek together with the two formal investigations of the police and prison services undertaken by the CRE made a series of concrete recommendations as to how this can be done. More work is required to monitor and chase progress on these. Whatever the arguments over the term 'institutional racism', it did provide a massive impetus for action.

We must not allow disagreement over the use of the term to create confusion. By Trevor Phillips declaring that 'institutional racism' should no longer be applied, the danger is that both the police and the regulatory body will take their eye off the ball. It also misses the point - 'institutional racism' is about collective failure not individual malfeasance. Given the reality of the experiences of ethnic minority communities as detailed above, to think that there is still not an enormous challenge is nothing short of institutional complacency.

The Crown Prosecution Service has been a beacon of progress in recent years, greatly increasing the diversity of its workforce and reducing many disparities in its outcomes. This has been done through careful monitoring of

data and then targeted strategies where disparities have been discovered. Not only does this show that change can be brought about but it also give other parts of the system indicators of the way to bring this change about.

Until we get a truly representative workforce in the criminal justice system, it is unlikely that ethnic minorities will ever have true confidence in it. It is in this field that the case for some form of positive action to speed up recruitment is most pressing. The police had a target of achieving 7 per cent ethnic minority officers by 2009 but dropped it because it was "unrealistic". It would take 17 years at present recruitment rates to get a representative workforce in the police.

Ensuring a representative workforce, at all ranks and levels, is crucial to both confidence in the system and actual fair treatment. This needs to change and, as with wider issues of employment, where change is not coming at a quick enough rate, some form of time – limited positive action must be considered. This could be specifically targeted recruitment, training and mentoring to fast-track new recruits or in some cases, the preference for a candidate from an under-represented group where two candidates were level on other assessments. This is the approach suggested in the Equality Act 2010. It is vital that these organisations are representative of the communities they seek to serve.

Furthermore, other aspects of the criminal justice system can have an important effect upon outcomes. Currently no data is available on the make-up of police authorities, independent monitoring boards and independent custody visitors. It should be.

Data on stop and search and other aspects must continue to be collected and published, as making the level of disproportionality visible then demands action. Too often the response

seems to be a desire to relax the collection of data in the hope of burying the problem. Indeed, many of the precautions and requirements to record and monitor brought in by Labour in the face of persistent disparity threaten to be taken away by the new government under the guide of reducing bureaucracy. This cannot be allowed to happen. Where published data shows a gap still existing, specific targets for reducing it and strategies to achieve this should be required of all aspects of the criminal justice system.

In this climate of massively unequal treatment, forthcoming developments are likely to exacerbate the situation. The danger in a wholesale move towards civil liberties is that different measures will be applied differentially rather than across the board. We must be careful to monitor whether some schemes are applied to some communities.

Political Participation and Empowerment

Why it matters

As our population becomes ever more diverse, the need for our institutions and instruments of power to reflect this grows more urgent. Participation in political processes and decision making is crucial to ensuring that individuals are able to exercise their democratic rights and to influence the governance of a country. Furthermore, the recent row over MPs' expenses and the crisis in the legitimacy of our political institutions has made the case for democratic reform more urgent. It is important that issues of integration are put at the heart of any reform.

All of the social outcomes that have been discussed earlier are unlikely to become more equal without fuller engagement and involvement in Britain's power structures. A real commitment to equality is unlikely to happen until all communities have a voice; unless all Britons are able to participate in decision making, services and businesses will never provide for us all equally as citizens. And with rights come responsibilities that in themselves strengthen society: all groups in society should expect to share in how we make decisions, but also expect to carry the responsibilities of making society work.

Inclusive participation matters in both the formal decision-making processes and also the more informal social networks that in reality can govern much of any individual or community's daily experiences.

So the 'shared future' set out by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion can only be achieved if all communities within an area are able to take part in the process by which that future is discussed and agreed. Integration can only succeed where all communities feel valued, and this demands full participation.

A real notion of empowering citizens produces a range of benefits to both individuals and communities. Both civil and civic participation provide valuable opportunities for meeting and engaging with people from different backgrounds, reducing tensions in communities by enabling individuals, regardless of their background, to have a voice. This sense of empowerment and engagement can help create a greater sense of belonging within a community.

What does success look like?

Our criteria for success in terms of empowerment must be about increasing participation in the democratic process and involvement in civic life overall, as well as ensuring there are no groups being particularly marginalised.

- Every group in society has representatives in central and local government decision making bodies
- Every group in society participates proportionally in the political process
- Every group in society participates in all and in particular at the most senior levels of all institutions that provide public services
- Every group in society trusts and believes in central and local government.

How do we measure success?

Participation can initially be quite easily measured using quantitative data such as voter turnout and membership of institutions. However, that will need to be augmented by more subjective indicators that attempt to identify levels of trust and engagement in public life.

- Percentage of seats held by different groups in national parliaments and local government;
- Voter turn-out at general and local elections;
- Composition of management boards of public service providers (central and local government institutions, police, courts, academia, schools, etc.);
- Trust in government and institutions.

How are we doing?

Just four members of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and London Assembly come from an ethnic minority background – out of 214 places. At local authority level, just over 4 per cent of councillors were from an ethnic minority background. Just under a third are women. Westminster fares slightly better and made substantial progress in the recent election. We now have 27 MPs from ethnic minority communities, a rise of 12 since 2005. However, that is still less than half the number it should be if the Commons was to be representative of the country as a whole. It is worse on gender - only just over a fifth of MPs are women.

The picture for social class is even worse. Rather remarkably 34% of MPs in 2010 went to fee paying private schools while a quarter are Oxbridge graduates. A Smith Institute study of new MPs also shows that their occupational background continues to be ever more biased toward business and the 'metropolitan professions', particularly finance, law, public affairs, and politics.

Voter turnout reflects the same worrying picture. At the 2005 General Election, ethnic minority turnout was just 47 per cent as opposed to the national rate of 61 per cent. In part, this is reflective of the fact outlined earlier about the predominance of Britain's ethnic minority population in our

most deprived areas. There is a clear link that shows that those who are most social excluded are also most likely to be politically excluded. According to the Citizenship Survey, the top 10 per cent most deprived areas in the country show the lowest participation rates. Furthermore, participation in all forms of voluntary activities is a third lower amongst people with no formal educational qualifications.

Policy implications

Unequal levels of participation, both formal and informal, are a vicious cycle that leads to increased disempowerment and inequality. Correcting this situation requires huge political will and effort. Our political parties must be more open and inclusive and seek to ensure that they are truly representative of the wider population. This is not to argue for all-black shortlists, as they would lead to an assumption that ethnic minority MPs could only come from areas of high ethnic minority populations and would forever mire the case for a more representative parliament in that of identity politics. A representative parliament must be a desirable indicator of an integrated society but that is not to demand quotas to get there.

Term-limits have been discussed as a way of increasing opportunities but at Westminster this seems too crude an approach – it certainly has not been a feasible option without fixed-term parliaments. Even then, it would seem to work against experience. However, term-limits at local level might be a way of broadening the base of representatives and bringing more people into the political process. Parties could also introduce more targeted training and support for under-represented groups to put them in a stronger position when it comes to candidate selections.

A more diverse cadre of candidates and office-holders is also likely to increase turnout amongst currently marginalised

groups. However, if we accept that voting and participating in the democratic process is a crucial expression of citizenship, we should consider the issue of compulsory voting. Perhaps, just as with obeying the rule of law, voting should be an obligation of citizenship. To aid this, elections should either be moved to weekends or even Election Day could be made a public holiday which could double as a celebration of common citizenship. This might also open up party activism beyond the dedicated few.

It is estimated that it is poor and minority communities that are most likely to be not on the electoral register. If the new Government's proposals for redrawing the parliamentary boundaries go ahead without addressing this and looking at numbers alongside the population figures from the forthcoming 2011 Census, then these communities will be further disenfranchised.

We need to rebalance the 'choice and voice' debates. The aim should be to improve participation in decision-making and to set the direction of public services by encouraging greater public involvement rather than resorting to a consumerist model of choosing services. Indeed, by focusing on choice at an individual level, we risk lessening participation in the political process and creating a democratic deficit. Choice and voice must apply to everyone and not just to those who can manipulate the system to their advantage. This means that if decisions and management of services are indeed to be devolved to the local level, they must be overseen by democratic arrangements – either the local authority or newly created elected bodies. Just as with parliament, that voice needs to be inclusive and representative of the country as a whole.

Devolution also presents opportunities and risks, and must be done right if it is not to exacerbate existing inequalities. The right form of localism could be a huge

asset in developing integration – the sites, spheres and agents of interaction all need a local concentration. This is about empowering local communities to have control of their own areas and encourage them to work together for the benefit of all. However, in a segregated world, localism could entrench the divisions between communities – allowing capture of services by a vocal minority and thus greater exclusion. If communities are fractured, lack access to power and services and are in competition with one another for resources then localism will mean those with greater power can over rule the needs of minorities. Policies should be local in focus and delivery but must be centrally monitored and managed. There must be a level of equality guaranteed by Whitehall. The United States is a warning of what happens without this. Local control of the bulk of taxation is something many local authorities in the UK dream of but when you look at the hollowed-out city centres and the vicious cycle of crime, deprivation, poor housing and flight of business from areas you see many authorities without the resources to reverse that decline.

The way in which the new administration talks of devolution must be a source of concern. We may well be moving into an era where where you live will have an even greater impact upon the quality of service you receive. Empowerment must not only be about empowering the rich and those with the human and social capital to push their way to front. Government has a responsibility to protect the most vulnerable and ensure they receive fair services.

CONCLUSION

Integration is more than the sum of its parts; it is crucial in the end that all policy areas pull in the same direction and work together to create solidarity and inclusion across society as a whole.

Along with political involvement and engagement, measures of social inclusion, mutuality and solidarity are the most significant additions to the more traditional life chances indicators outlined in the previous section and throughout this report. For the reasons set out earlier, this area is vital if we are to realise the progressive vision of an integrated society. It stems from an explicitly political starting point – as outlined in Labour's own statement of aims and values – that "by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone".

Integration offers a progressive approach to the social challenges of the twenty first century. It offers us a way to reject a narrow conservatism that tries to erode diversity into a monolithic whole. However, it also is how we can move beyond the identity politics that has been sustained by many on the left. These two schools of thought are set up in opposition to one another and thus a prisoner of each. Identity politics was a legitimate challenge to a conservatism that did not want society or institutions to change and demanded conformity from new immigrants or other groups in society. At its extreme, this conservatism turns into xenophobia, racism and overt prejudice. The left's response was and is correct - rightly asserting that different views, lifestyles and cultures are equally legitimate.

However, in rejecting an assimilationist approach that privileged the status quo and was resistant to change, too great an adherence to identity politics also implicitly rejected notions of a shared identity and experience. What made us different became more important than what we had in common. As the human genome project asserted, we are all 99.9 per cent the same. It is time that we focussed on that common humanity.

We need to move beyond these two debates. Just as we should oppose a socially constructed and anachronistic view of a status quo that rejects diversity, we must also reject the idea that it is our individual identity that is all that matters. The choice must not be between a forced assimilation and a laissez-faire multiculturalism. Integration is about a different approach. It says we can both celebrate our differences but that we must also celebrate what we have in common. An integrated society is diverse but still unified and recognises both the individual and the collective.

Integration is not about retreating to what society may have looked like a century or even a decade ago but is about building a new vision founded on common values. It is about developing a shared sense of identity that encourages solidarity and helps to develop a renewed sense of belonging. That is what I believe political leaders on left and right have been looking for when debating a 'new Britishness'. It is a civic identity, which exists alongside other identities. We are not looking to replace difference with uniformity but arguing that we need some mutual identity alongside our own individual identities. That mutual identity is also constantly evolving, shaped by our diversity and by social change. Indeed, it is the process of change and the negotiation, tolerance and understanding involved that may well be the most important aspects. As Robert Putnam argues,

"the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of 'we'."

But integration as a policy framework goes beyond ideas of identity; it also drives forward the cause of a more equal society. In recent years, debates over equality have become too focussed upon individual life chances and paid too little attention to the state of the society we share. That also means we have tended to ignore how the one reinforces the other. Creating a shared sense of belonging and solidarity is impossible in a society that is as unequal as the one in which we live. To achieve this idea of a new encompassing notion of society, every individual must be of equal value, command equal respect and have equality of opportunity. But we will never achieve that if we do not have that collective vision.

Integration offers Labour a clear distinction between its own values, rooted in community and solidarity and the liberal individualism of the Coalition. It means the Party needs to abandon some of the obsession with consumerism and individual choice and return to its collective roots. By adopting a communitarian outlook, focussed upon equality for all and interaction between all, we can move towards a society that achieves those goals. Our relationships with each other are as important as our individual opportunities. Furthermore, our neighbour's opportunities should be as important as our own.

Much of this pamphlet has talked about measuring integration and this is important. However, it is not just about how we measure, it is about what we do. The various policy initiatives here are suggestions and designed to indicate what might need to change. They are by no means comprehensive. Some might not even work. Indeed, integration is not a time-limited objective that we can develop a few policies for and then say that it has been achieved. Is some

respects, it is a moving target and its manifestations will change over time. But it should be a guide for other policies – when an idea is proposed we should ask whether it works towards these goals of equality and solidarity.

It is the vision behind integration that matters most. It is about ensuring that every individual has equal life chances that they have a stake in society and they are not limited by a narrow facet of their identity. Solidarity and strong community ties are essential to breaking down inequality but they are impossible to achieve while inequality persists. An individual's wellbeing is directly related to the society around them and their actions, behaviour and attitudes should be seen in relation to the communities they live in.

In the earlier section, I accused the UK of being "data rich but analysis poor" and the available sources to measure social outcomes and assess progress in these policy areas supports that assertion. Many of these areas of public policy have a wealth of data already collected, although it does not necessarily tell us the things that matter.

In the paragraphs below, I detail some of the currently available source material that could enable us to make our judgments. However, this material is certainly not comprehensive – for instance, it tells us far more about equality than the bigger picture of integration. It is also very much service specific. That means that appropriate links are hard to draw and the data is often not directly comparable. For instance, we have data sets that measure different geographic areas (indeed, some only look at institutions and not location), select a different set of ethnic groups and are conducted in contrasting time periods. Thus, it is almost impossible to draw a comprehensive picture. This will get worse with the decision of the new Government to scrap many of the existing indicators used to measure these issues, in particular the Place Survey. Imperfect they may have been, but the inability to track progress will hamper those interested in taking a

longitudinal view. It will also be politically convenient as deteriorating statistics as the impact of public service cuts take hold will not be collected, let along published

When I began this project, I had hoped that as well as setting out a policy framework for integration, I might be able to draw some conclusions about how the UK was doing overall. It soon became apparent that this was going to be impossible. In the various sections, I have tried to draw what conclusions might be currently available but a national assessment can only be guessed at. In this section, I detail what where we might glean some of the information required. In most cases it is numerous but not overly revealing. One of the challenges of integration is changing how we should be assessing social progress.

A relatively thorough picture of economic equality was provided by John Hills and his independent panel in January 2010. This was a fairly damning picture. The EHRC is due to publish its first triennial report on the state on equality in the UK is autumn 2010. Alongside the Hills report, this will be a valuable benchmark. However, the EHRC has struggled thus far in how to assess the 'good relations' part of its mandate and we are unlikely to have a picture of the true strength of our communities in the near future.

Education

The primary source material for education would be the Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC) that feeds into reports regularly produced by the Department for Education and National Statistics Bulletins and LEAs. PLASC data and its associated reports include a description of school populations across England and the local level, attainment at foundation stage and key stage 1-4 attainment and A-level, attendance, exclusions, language spoken, free school meals, spe-

cial education needs, parental involvement in education, ethnic background of teachers and those who teach ethnic minority pupils. Importantly, this data goes below the Census-level categories and addresses often ignored groups such as children of gypsy and traveller heritage.

This level of detail and regularity allows for a wide range of measurement and comparison across groups, normally done thus far for socio-economic status and ethnic minority communities. Both of these are essential in assessing how integrated we might be.

This, though, is not comprehensive for all our needs. Interaction measures are harder to identify. PLASC data can indicate the extent to which schools are mixed, which could be used as a proxy for potential for interaction and friendship formation. Simon Burgess' work on ethnic segregation of England's secondary-school-age children uses school-level data from the Annual Census of Schools (2001) with ward-level data from 2001 census. This is a developing area of research with recent ESRC (Breugel and Weller), JRF (Smith and Khanom) and Glasgow Centre for the Child and Society (Ross and Hill) reports on interaction in schools which have looked at friendships as pupils moved from primary to secondary schools. There has also been some work done which looks at school make-up by socio-economic groups. In the US, this is used as a direct proxy for ethnic composition but the picture is not so straightforward in the UK.

Work

The main source of data for employment is the quarterly Labour Force Survey and most analyses of equality in the labour market, such as the Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce, use this as their base. This raw data and the collection of key elements contained in the various update

summaries produced by ONS would provide enough information on issues such as employment and participation rates, wage disparities, and the numbers and backgrounds of employees in senior positions. Importantly, the Labour Force Survey also allows assessment down to local authority level and is longitudinal thus allowing measurement of progress over time.

There are also regular surveys of the backgrounds of directors of FTSE 100 companies, senior civil servant and other industries. However, these are frequently produced 'in-house' and would benefit from some external analysis, building upon the annual 'Sex and Power' report started by the Equal Opportunities Commission and continued by the EHRC. Data availability on specific professions is also harder to identify as collection and publication of data is only compulsory in the public sector. Given that around 80 per cent of people are employed in the private sector, the absence of this kind of reporting makes is difficult to form a comprehensive picture.

Data on interethnic professional and personal networks is much harder to come by. There have been some recent attempts to estimate this, notably by the CRE, but it has not been progressed. There is limited data upon occupational segregation and yet this is something that helps drive differential pay rates. Some existing measures of social capital can be applied to this but there is no national picture currently available.

Health and Social Care

Overall health outcomes are generally well-documented and can be tracked longitudinally. Our key indicators would be a combination of the standardised mortality and illness ratios with comparative rates of mental illness and birth weights.

The Government has clear targets to reduce inequalities by 2010 and is regularly monitoring progress against those targets. This provides us with the primary data to assess success on this measure. Part of this is the annual 'Count Me In' Census for those accessing mental health services which provides some of the richest and most comprehensive data on disparities in health services. The health survey for England, supported by similar exercises in Scotland and Wales, measures health inequalities by ethnicity every five years. It is important that this collection and collation of data is maintained beyond the current programme. This can be augmented by the decennial ONS Longitudinal Study which contains detailed ethnicity data on births, cancers and deaths.

Data on access to services is harder to find. There is an absence of good qualitative data across the health and social care sectors. The situation is particularly acute in primary care where we simply cannot tell enough about who is accessing services – and perhaps more importantly who is not. This lack of information is an enormous barrier in challenging some of the health inequalities we see.

While there has been some progress in recent years, primary data is still too patchy to allow for proper consideration of health needs and for policy to be developed accordingly. Some aspects of the data collection for health outcomes can be used a proxies for access to services but we are currently far better at measuring the symptom rather than the cause of the problem. We can also draw some ideas from outside the health and social care sectors – the annual British Household Panel Survey does at least give us some indication about the use of health services.

This lack of data carries into any attempt to measure the overall diversity of service use. Just as we cannot currently ensure that there is equality of access to services, we do not know how integrated those services are. There has recently

been an academic focus on the links between health and social capital, stressing the inter-relationship of the two. In particular, mental health has been studied internationally. However, the authors themselves bemoan the fact that the data is piecemeal and this has yet to be carried forward into studying how health providers can be crucial creators of interethnic contact and care.

Housing

There is detailed data on much of this although it may be of limited long-term value. A significant amount of housing information relies upon the Census which becomes out of date very quickly and whose ethnic categorisations are increasingly being challenged. Furthermore, these problems are typically most acute in areas with high levels of mobility and transient populations and those experiencing rapid changes due to migration. Clearly, these are the areas where the challenge of integration is also likely to be greater and so too the need for more accurate and timely data.

Decent housing measures are best identified through local authorities' Housing Needs surveys which can assess both issues of structure and physical standards and cultural sensitivities. The integration challenge is to look at issues of overcrowding, social housing tenant satisfaction and indicators of safe and desirable neighbourhoods and ensure there is no disproportionality between groups. This situation is likely to be exacerbated in an economic downturn when home ownership may come under threat. In theory, this can be done through DCLG's Survey of English Housing, Audit Commission Inspection reports of Local Authority Housing and Housing Associations and police records of criminal activity, though what will remain after the abolition of the Audit Commission is as yet unclear

House ownership or participation in different parts of the housing market can also best be measured by looking for disproportionality between various groups amongst already standard indicators. For instance, key data here would be that of new buyers and those successfully accessing mortgages, those who are registered as homeless and those who have security of tenure in social housing (i.e. are home owners or hold secure/assured tenure).

Census data which captures residential patterns and ethnicity is central to any assessment of physical interaction. This includes the ethnic composition of wards and analysis measured through the Index of Isolation which provides a more substantive analysis than the Index of Dissimilarity. The latter measures segregation as the difference between the distribution of populations across a city, offsetting the areas of segregation against the areas of mix. It is also far more relevant in areas of few but substantial ethnic populations, such as in the old south of the United States. The Index of Isolation measures segregation through the ethnic profile of each census area within a city, thus separating the areas of segregation from the areas of mix.

Criminal Justice

The primary source material for the first of these would be the annual British Crime Survey which breaks down its data by ethnicity. This survey provides us with sufficient information to identify such issues as rates of crime and victimisation, personal experiences and perceptions of crime. For direct victims of crime it also covers reporting to the police, police response and victim support. This can be augmented with some aspects of the Citizenship Survey where we can identify potential proxy indicators such as levels of trust in a neighbourhood and feeling safe walking alone after dark.

The advantage of these sources is that they provide crucial longitudinal data so we are able to track progress over time.

There is also readily available data for issues of disproportionality on stop and search, caution, arrest and sentencing. This is collected and published by the Home Office, set in stone by the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.

Again, the Citizenship Survey augments this quantitative data with more qualitative aspects with its measurement of perceptions, asking people whether they believe that the Criminal Justice System would treat them worse than people of other races. This kind of perceptions data has been driving the Government's PSA targets in recent years and thus been subject to monitoring.

Just as with employment data, information on numbers and levels of seniority across the criminal justice system is readily available as it falls within public sector monitoring requirements. Data is easily available on the numbers of ethnic minorities working in the police service, prison service, probation service, Crown Prosecution Service and other criminal justice agencies such as the Home Office and Department for Constitutional Affairs themselves.

Political Participation and Empowerment

The first indicator here is readily available – the ethnic make-up of parliament can be easily seen and monitored. This might be augmented with the numbers of ethnic minority candidates standing at general elections. This is often contained within Electoral Commission reports. Local authority representation is harder o be definitive about because of the sheer number of by-elections over a year and the fact that most local authorities have some kind of election annually. However, there are frequent Censuses of local authority

councillors and it is important these are undertaken and published regularly.

Voter turnout is less easy to be definitive about as its will almost certainly rely upon poling data. MORI undertook such work for the Electoral Commission in the 2005 general election and most national polling organisations add ethnic minority boosters to their work. However, much of this work is about voting intentions rather than actual participation in an election. Little similar work is undertaken for local government elections. There has been some data collected on voter registration by Operation Black Vote and this could be used as a baseline indicator for this objective.

As outlined in the various public policy sections, there is some limited data on representation on respective institutions. However, it is piecemeal and would need consolidating. Some, such as that for public appointments, is collected and published but his only addresses the senior echelons of this type of power.

The data on trust on government and institutions is currently even more limited and relates to the absence of any meaningful social capital indicators, as set out in more detail in the previous chapter.

Overall Social Solidarity

Our main source of data has been the Citizenship Survey (now incorporated into the Place Survey) but I believe that this is fundamentally flawed. It tells us how people feel not necessarily what the outcomes are. How are we to judge which is more important – the data from the Citizenship Survey which says that 54 per cent of people mixed socially in school or the research that shows us that schools are becoming more segregated? Furthermore, while we have seen a steady figure above 80 per cent say their community

is cohesive, the same period has seen a rise in political and religious extremism. This data is also at variance with public polling: Ipsos-Mori tells us that a majority of people believe that Britain is losing its culture, race relations have risen to be one of the highest issues of concern and there are increasing calls for a cap on the number of immigrants coming into the country.

When compared to the social outcomes we have already discussed in education, health or housing, there is also a huge gap between a very small number of people feeling they are being discriminated against as measured in the Citizenship Survey and the outcomes we can measure in those sectors. What this tells us firstly is that discrimination is not the same thing as inequality and perhaps explains why, despite one of the most robust anti- discrimination frameworks in the world, Britain is still unequal. It also tells us that perceptions on their own are not reliable indicators. National surveys can also mask massive local discrepancies. We are interested in measuring specific neighbourhoods and communities not simply a national overview.

So, the first thing we need to get right is how we measure. If we are to rely upon the Citizenship Survey, then all is largely right with society. However, other facts tell us that this just is not the case. We know it intuitively as well as factually. Therefore, we must consider it unreliable and not a sufficient indicator of solidarity. Britain must look to adopt more traditional measures of social capital such as the proportion of people who believe that others can be trusted, the numbers and rates of involvement in civic, religious and political organisations and the frequency and diversity of informal socialising. All these are important because they tell us something about the levels of collective action in an area which will be connected to a broader, shared identity and sense of solidarity.

This is the ultimate example of where deciding what we want to measure can lead us to the policy implications. Broadening out current data sources beyond perceptions, we might want to include such things as membership of trade unions, inter-ethnic sports or cultural activities and neighbourhood involvement. We then need the policy options to promote these. We also, as set out in the earlier sections, need to ensure that measures that encourage interaction and solidarity are built into wider policy delivery. Firstly, we need to remove barriers such as segregated service delivery or deprivation and then we also need to invest in activities such as culture, sport or attractive public spaces that facilitate interaction.

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

Discussion Guide: Separate and Unequal

How to use this Discussion Guide

The guide can be used in various ways by Fabian Local Societies, local political party meetings and trade union branches, student societies, NGOs and other groups.

- You might hold a discussion among local members or invite a guest speaker – for example, an MP, academic or local practitioner to lead a group discussion.

- Some different key themes are suggested. You might choose to spend 15 – 20 minutes on each area, or decide to focus the whole discussion on one of the issues for a more detailed discussion.

A discussion could address some or all of the following questions:

1. Towards a new politics of progressive integration

• The campaigns for a politics of equality and a politics of integration have often been pushing against each other rather than working with one another. Why has this been the case and how can we bring them together?

• Multiculturalism has been the central plank of the left's platform on race and faith since the first wave of mass migration in the 1950s. Is this still the right approach in the 21st century?

2. Progressive integration in practice

• Choosing the policy area of either education, health or employment, consider the following questions:

- How successful was the Labour Government in improving integration in this area?

- What is the most important policy measure that could be taken now to improve matters going forward?

• Political participation is central to integration, and the current levels of both minority ethnic representation and voter turnout paint a worrying picture. Which of these policy recommendations do you agree with and why?

- All minority shortlists for prospective parliamentary candidates

- Term limits for sitting MPs

- Compulsory voting as an obligation of citizenship

- Make 'Election Day' a public holiday to encourage turnout

- Go further with devolution to empower local communities

Please let us know what you think

Whatever view you take of the issues, we would very much like to hear about your discussion. Please send us a summary of your debate (perhaps 300 words) to debate@fabians.org.uk.



Is Equality Fair?

What the public really think about equality – and what we should do about it.

Edited by Tom Hampson and Jemima Olchawski

In this Fabian Special, John Denham, Kate Green, Stewart Lansley, Jemima Olchawski, Ben Page and Zoe Williams respond to new Fabian work on public attitudes to fairness.

The work, commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, found that most people think that 'deserved' inequalities are fair, and attitudes towards those on low incomes were often more negative than attitudes towards the rich. However, we also found that people strongly support progressive tax and benefits.

"If we ever give up on fairness and equality the centre left will have lost all meaning. The Fabian research on voter attitudes doesn't tell us to give up; it just asks us to think about how we move forward." – John Denham MP



The Solidarity Society

Why we can afford to end poverty, and how to do it with public support.

Tim Horton and James Gregory

This report sets out a strategy for how to reduce, eliminate and prevent poverty in Britain.

'The Solidarity Society' is the final report of a project to commemorate the centenary of Beatrice Webb's 1909 Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law. It addresses how the values and insights of the Minority Report can animate and inspire a radical contemporary vision to fight and prevent poverty in modern Britain.

The report makes immediate proposals to help build momentum for deeper change. It also seeks to learn lessons from the successes and failures of post-war welfare history, as well as from international evidence on poverty prevention.



The Change We Need

What Britain can learn from Obama's victory

Edited by Nick Anstead and Will Straw, with a foreword by Gordon Brown

How can a party in office for more than a decade recapture its idealism? Can Labour hope to draw on the same popular enthusiasm that swept Barack Obama to victory?

In 'The Change We Need', staffers from the Obama campaign come together with senior British and American politicians, academics, thinkers and campaigners to draw forwardlooking and optimistic lessons for the British progressive left.

Together they show that the opportunity can only be seized if we fundamentally rethink the ways we do politics in Britain, by rejecting the command-and-control model of the New Labour era and energising grassroots supporters.

"Contained within these pages are the ideas of tomorrow – the new ways of working that will help Labour members do even more to change our world." – Gordon Brown

FABIAN

LIFE CHANCES AND EQUALITY

Separate and Unequal

How integration can deliver the good society

Britain is separate because it is unequal, and it is unequal because it is separate. The gap between rich and poor, having exploded during the 1980s, is still growing, despite measures to address poverty in the 13 years of Labour Government. At the same time, we face growing fragmentation in our communities.

In this new Fabian Ideas pamphlet, Nick Johnson argues that the politics of integration and equality have become fractured and that we can make the clearest case for both by showing what integration really means. The effect that a more integrated society would have on all our lives will be a powerful message for progressive politicians: equality and integration must live together or fall apart.

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